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Abstract 
The global energy demand is increasing. The oil companies are going into harsher climates and 
deeper waters to replace their reserves. Much of the undiscovered hydrocarbon reservoirs are 
believed to be located in the Arctic region. The seasonable ice free waters surrounding the Arctic can 
be drilled utilizing conventional drilling vessels designed for open water conditions. The region 
introduces several new operational challenges leading to an increased possibility of the drilling vessel 
moving off location.  
This Master Thesis looks at the challenges related to operating a conventional drilling vessel in the 
seasonable open waters in the Arctic, using today’s methods for disconnecting and reconnecting the 
marine drilling riser from the BOP.   
The need for a reduction in the operational downtime related to planned and unplanned 
disconnections is identified and several alternative methods for reducing the dis-/reconnect time are 
presented and rated. 
A concept is chosen based on a wide range of design requirements thus leading to an 89-97 % 
reduction in costs related to planned and unplanned disconnections, depending on water depth and 
well type.  
The operational subsea control system needs are mapped and several possible control options are 
presented and evaluated. Based on a Preliminary Hazard Analysis, cost and system complexity, a 
control system is chosen. 
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1 Introduction 
The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2008 projects a scenario of 45 % increase in 
global energy demand by 2030, and hydrocarbons to account for 80 % of the supply. The strategy 
they propose to meet these demands, is to recover hydrocarbons in three different ways (IEA, 2008):  
 
 Improved recovery from currently producing reservoirs 
 Development of low quality reservoirs (shale gas, oil sands, etc.)  
 Map and exploit remote regions, i.e. deep and ultra-deep waters and harsh environments 
like the Arctic. 
 
The Arctic region has an abundance of natural recourses in many forms. The US Geological Survey 
assessment of the region, states that hydrocarbons amount to 1669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 
90 billion barrels of oil and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. 84 % of these volumes are in deep 
water basins in the Arctic region (D. Gautier, 2008) 
 
To reach these resources, we need to drill exploration wells. Drilling in this environment has been 
done previously, however this has up to now been in shallow waters and on a smaller scale.  
 
The interest for the Arctic region in Norway, has recently increased after Statoil announced a major 
field discovery in well 7220/8-1 at the beginning of April 2011. This is a field called Skrugard and have 
had major press coverage in the spring of 2011. This well is located 110 km south of Bjørnøya, half 
way between the most northern part of mainland Norway and Spitzbergen. 
 
The Arctic environments impose new operational as well as engineering challenges. One of the 
challenges is the increased probability of having too move of location with the drilling unit due to ice 
features drifting near the drill location. This in turn creates none productive time with a considerable 
increase in drilling cost as a consequence.  
 
This thesis aims at mapping the challenge related to staying on location with a conventional drilling 
unit operating in the seasonable open waters in the Arctic. It will go through the current methods 
and practice for disconnecting and reconnecting the marine riser system to the blow out preventer 
located on the sea floor. The future need for a reduction in disconnection and reconnection time 
when moving on and off location with a drilling vessel will be addressed by presenting and rating 
several alternative concepts.  The subsequent control system needs will be addressed and an analysis 
is undertaken to choose the favourable control system. 
 
Previous work on this matter is limited to a project thesis written in 2007 by Therese Sønstabø as a 
student in the Department of Petroleum Engineering and Applied Geophysics at NTNU. This work 
does highlight some of the challenges related to arctic offshore operations. Her work does not 
conclude as to any preferred methods or in detailed solutions. The report also consists of the work 
undertaken by the author in his project thesis delivered in December 2010.  
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2 Operating mobile offshore units in the Arctic 
To get hydrocarbons from the reservoir to the marked , a complete set of complex processes is 
needed. One of them involves the creation of the well by drilling. The water depth on well location 
will to a large extent govern the type of drilling unit used. Today the most common is to use a mobile 
offshore drilling unit (MODU). They are used in exploration, appraisal, intervention and production 
drilling. MODU’s include semi submersibles, drilling barges, jack ups and drill ships. As the name 
implies, these units are capable of moving off location when the well is completed or the risk related 
to staying on location is too high.   
 
In recent years the focus has shifted to meet the ever increasing energy demand. The oil companies 
are on the search to maintain their reserves. Some of these reserves are assumed to be located in 
the Arctic. 
 
Drilling in the Arctic with MODU’s is not a new venture 
and started in the mid 1970’s north of Alaska. The 
Kulluk is a MODU and is shown in Figure 1. It was 
launched in 1983 (Rirzone, 2010) and operated in the 
waters north of Alaska to early 1990’s in water depths 
from 20 to 60 meters. The vessel is designed to 
withstand ice loads from 1.2 meter of unbroken level 
ice in survival mode. Survival mode indicated that 
normal operation is halted and that the vessel can stay 
at location. The Kulluk is a drilling barge i.e. it has no 
propulsion and is dependent on towing vessels to 
change the drilling location. The hull is inverted conical 
with the main deck measuring approximately 100 
meters in diameter and the waterline about 70 meter. 
The hull is omnidirectional i.e. it is independent of the ice angle of attack (Løset and Gudmestad, 
2006). The inverted conical design is chosen to change the ice failure mode so that the ice is broken 
in bending instead of crushing.  
 
The Kulluk is designed to perform in ice conditions, however with its large waterplane area it 
becomes sensitive to heave and rolling motions when operating in open water. Conventional drilling 
unit designs are optimized to operate in ice free open water conditions with very good vessel 
motions allowing drilling operations to continue in rough weather conditions. These units are 
numerous and the day rates are lower compared to specialized vessels designed particularly for 
arctic operations.  
 
The US Geological Survey has in a report published in 2008, given an assessment of undiscovered oil 
and gas in the Arctic. The probability of finding an oil or gas field with recoverable resources greater 
than 50 million barrels of oil equivalent is shown on a map given in Appendix 1.  Combining this info 
with the Arctic marine topographic map given in Appendix 2, we see that some areas are located 
north of Russia in shallow waters and others are located in several waters on depths between 100-
Figure 1: The  Kulluk (Hewitt, 2007) 
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2000 meters. 84 % of estimated hydrocarbon volumes are thought to be in deep water basins in the 
Arctic region.  Wells drilled on locations deeper than 100 meters will be favourable to drill with the 
use of a semisubmersible or a drillship.  
 
Based on the above the conclusion is that the marked for conventional semisubmersibles and drill 
ships is present, however the operating climate is different to what they are used to today.  
2.1 The Arctic climate 
The Arctic is a widely used term, defined in several ways. The most common is perhaps the Arctic 
Circle (66° 33′ 44″ north), which is the approximate limit of the midnight sun. This definition might not 
be adequate to describe some of the areas where we would find it beneficial. The Arctic is therefore 
often defined by the 10° Celsius isotherm in July, which also corresponds quite well to the northern 
three line shown in Appendix 3 
 
Operating in the marine environment in the Arctic introduces several challenges due to the climate, 
such as: 
 
 Sea ice 
 Icebergs 
 Logistics 
 Safety issues such as relief well drilling capabilities 
 Working condition such as long periods without daylight 
 Low temperatures 
 Permafrost 
 Icing on vessel and on/in equipment 
 Weather forecasting  
 
In the following segments the main challenges related to the drilling vessel staying on location in the 
Arctic will be addressed.   
2.1.1 Forecasting weather in the Arctic  
Running large scale operations involving the interface between ocean, air and humans will always be 
weather dependent. At lower latitudes we have gained experience over several centuries with 
marine activities. Therefore statistical data is present and gives the opportunity to build numerical 
models used in the forecasting of weather. When planning offshore operations the result of these 
models is used to estimate weather conditions and to ensure that required safety margins are 
present.  
 
The numerical models used for simulations today are optimized and fine-tuned to give a satisfactory 
prediction further south where the marked and the number of users is greater than in the  north. 
 
Observations are also used in forecasting of the weather, such as satellite observations, buoys, 
planes, radio probes, offshore structures, vessels observations and observations made on 
meteorological posts. The areas between these observations are blind spots where nothing is 
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measured. In the Arctic, there is satellite coverage for observations; however the number of 
verifications by vertical observations like planes or balloon radio probes is not available to a 
satisfactory degree. The number of ground observations by ships etc., is also quite low. Feedback on 
received weather forecasts used to improve the models and future forecasts, is therefore not 
present to a satisfactory degree.   
 
The sum of uncertainty and the physical environment means that smaller weather phenomena’s, 
such as troughs can play a significant role on the ground, without being picked up and taken into 
account in forecasts. Troughs arise when cold air flows from the north, above the ice and meet the 
relative warm water masses along the ice edge. This introduces instability in the atmospheric 
conditions, which might build up wind, thunder and precipitation. Troughs have an average life span 
of 18 hours and can reach wind speeds of 20,8 to 32,5 m/s. Troughs can also play an important role 
in the initiation of larger weather system like polar lows (Samuelsen, 2010). Polar lows, are small 
scale and short lived atmospheric low pressure systems that occurs in the Arctic region. It can have a 
horizontal extent from 100 to 1000 km and have a life span from 6 hours to a couple of days. Polar 
lows are also called Arctic hurricane and have near-surface winds of at least 17 m/s (Rasmussen and 
Turner, 2003). However, troughs are 7 to 10 times more common than the more known polar low.  In 
genera troughs can be seen as a smaller version of the polar lows. Both the troughs and polar lows 
can involve rapid change in wind direction and force.   
As a rule of thumb, the Norwegian meteorological institute claim they can forecast polar lows and 
troughs quite accurate 0 to 12 hours ahead.  Further 12 to 24 hours a decline in accuracy is observed.  
Beyond 24 hours they find it hard to forecast these phenomena’s (Samuelsen, 2010).Therefore, in an 
offshore context we should not expect the same confidence interval in the Arctic as we do for 
example on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS). MODU operations into the Arctic region should 
therefore expect weather forecasts with shorter time intervals and with a wider estimation 
uncertainty as compared to the standard obtained in areas where similar operations are being 
carried out today. The occurrence of rapidly changing wind conditions should be expected when 
operating in regions affected by troughs and polar lows. 
2.1.2 Operating in ice  
Challenges concerning floating ice features will arise when operating MODU’s further north. 
The focus in this work is to study challenges related to the use of conventional drilling vessels in the 
seasonal open water areas where hydrocarbons are present. Based on this, it is assumed that the 
vessel will not be constructed such that it can sustain ice actions as a result of ice features. This 
involves that the vessel will have to move off location if ice moves into its proximity. 
Sea ice and icebergs are the main contributors to a possible disconnection and will therefore be 
described in the following sections.  
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2.1.2.1 Sea Ice 
Sea ice forms from salt water. The freezing temperature is approximately -1, 8° Celsius for sea water 
with 3, 4 % salt. At this temperature we might observe growth of frazil particles. The sea ice continue 
to grow as long as there is a large enough temperature difference to transport the heat from the 
underside of the ice into the cold air circulating above the initial ice level, thereby continuing the 
icing process beneath the existing ice.  
 
The salt that is present in the seawater will to a large degree be separated away from the ice crystals 
when the ice is formed. However, some salt is isolated in the ice structure and remains locked in the 
ice.  When such ice is exposed to a long period of freezing temperature, the ice will accumulate the 
salt into liquid salter water with lower freezing temperature. This liquid is called brine and can, given 
enough time, leak vertically downwards to form brine channels into the underlying seawater. 
Because of this, older ice can be measured with lower salinity level.  Older ice normally means 
multiyear ice, i.e. ice that has survived the summer melting period and is exposed to multiple 
winters.   
 
Due to the decreasing salinity of the sea ice with time, first-and multiyear ice can be distinguished 
with the use of satellite sensors. The satellites plots the difference in electromagnetic properties and 
a salinity based ice map can be turned into a first/multiyear ice map. In Figure 2  the end of February 
sea ice age map is shown.  
 
Figure 2: Map indicating the end of February ice extent (NSIDC, 2009)  
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Most areas containing only first year ice can be reached on a seasonable basis. This involves that 
hydrocarbons can be drilled for with conventional MODU’s, however only in a limited time interval. 
These waters are called open operating environments. Typical locations referred to as open 
operating environments are:  
 
 North, North- east Barents Sea  
 Pechora Sea  
 Sakhalin 
 Chukchi Sea  
 Baffin Bay  
 
In these waters it will be possible to utilize conventional drilling vessels for operations depending on 
well completion time and operating conditions. The open operating environment does not mean that 
the waters will be completely ice free.  On the contrary it indicates that ice will be present to some 
extent and must be taken into account when the operation is planned, I.e. the drilling vessel can 
withstand the ice actions, the ice  is managed by standby support vessels dedicated for ice 
management or the drilling vessel has to be moved off location. 
 
The opposite of open operating environment is a closed operating environment, reflecting the 
conditions where multiyear ice is present or there is a large flux of multiyear ice. The limits between 
the two ice regimes are not easy to determinate. They vary from year to year and on geographical 
location. Typical closed operating environment are: 
 
 US Beaufort sea 
 Canadian Beaufort sea 
 Laptev Sea  
 
Operating in these conditions requires ice strengthened designs in both drilling and support vessels. 
At present time, such vessels are not widely accessible in the price range that makes drilling 
economically favourable in large scale.   
 
The differences between the two operating environments can have significant impact on the drilling, 
marine requirements, schedule and costs for operations (Hewitt, 2007). 
2.1.2.2 Drifting sea ice 
Wen operating in the open water area mentioned above, there is a possibility of encountering 
drifting ice features. Such features might originate from broken sea ice or fresh water glacier ice in 
the form of icebergs. Drifting ice might become a problem depending on its amount, size, speed, 
directions and drilling vessel design.  
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Figure 3: Arctic Ocean circulations (NSIDC, 2010) 
The driving forces behind ice drift are (NSIDC, 2010)  
 
 Wind 
 Ocean currents  
 Coriolis force  
 Internal ice stress  
 Sea surface tilt 
 
The wind is a significant 
contributor to the forces 
influencing ice drift. The wind 
driven ocean circulations in the 
Arctic are shown in Figure 3 
(NSIDC, 2010). The two largest 
systems are the Beaufort Gyre 
rotating clockwise and the 
Transpolar drift flowing from 
the Russian Siberian cost 
towards North Greenland and 
the North Atlantic Ocean.  
 
The two systems are large contributors to the long term ice drift patterns shown in Figure 4. In this 
figure the drift is rendered as vectors, so that the speed and drift direction can be represented. It is 
important to bear in mind that these long term patterns can have large short term variations as a 
result of a storm or other metrological phenomena’s as discussed in section 2.1.1 (NSIDC, 2010). 
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Figure 5: Glacier and iceberg formation (UNIS, 2010) 
 
Figure 4: Mean Arctic ice motion from 1978 to 2003 (NSIDC, 2010) 
2.1.2.3 Drifting Icebergs 
Icebergs originate from glacier ice. 
Glaciers are created when snow 
compounds on land and is 
compressed under its own weight. 
Given enough time and pressure, the 
snow is gradually converted into 
glacier ice. After enough ice buildup, 
the glacier will flow outwards to 
distribute its increased mass.  
 
This flow is characterized by creep deformations, involving a low internal rate of change in the ice 
structure such that the ice appears plastic in its deformation.  
 
Icebergs in the Barents sea are mostly formed on the shores of Franz Josef Land, however, icebergs 
are also created around  Novaya Zemlya, the East side of Svalbard and Severnaya Zemlya (EB, 2010). 
The biggest contributor to icebergs in the Arctic is the Greenland icecap. The areas that are affected 
by iceberg drift from the Greenland icecap is shown in Appendix 4 .  
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Iceberg drift trajectories are affected by the same factors as drifting sea ice listed in 2.1.2.2. 
Additionally, grounding must be taken into account. Because of the relative large mass compared to 
other drifting ice features, the icebergs have a deeper draught. This leads to the grounding of bigger 
icebergs when they encounter shallower waters. Normally, large icebergs are not considered a  
problem in waters shallower then 50 meters (UNIS, 2010) 
2.2 Operational consequence of operating a MODU in the Arctic  
As presented in this chapter, the challenges linked to arctic offshore operations are diverse and 
multi-disciplinary. In this rapport the challenges are narrowed down to the vessels ability to stay on 
location connected to the subsea equipment using a conventional semisubmersible or drillship. 
 
Looking at only this challenge and based upon: 
 
 The areas where floating ice features are relevant versus the locations of the potential 
hydrocarbons 
 The water depths making drifting icebergs possible  
 The sum of uncertainties in weather forecasting  
 Wind as a driving force in floating ice features drift 
 
A conclusion is reached.  An increased rate of disconnections must be expected if not the effort put 
into ice management is substantial. Ice management is performed by standby boats and includes 
towing, melting and vessel propeller thrust etc. in order to lower the probability of drifting ice 
features becoming a hazard to the operation. Ice management can only be done on features that are: 
 
 Few enough 
 Small enough 
 Detected visually or by radar 
 
Ice management is also an extra expense added to the well construction cost.   
 
Based on this, the goal should be to minimize the need for ice management by being capable moving 
of location and on again without a considerable operational downtime.  
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Figure 6: The marine riser 
system(API16Q, 2001) 
3 The Marine riser system 
Before establishing the disconnection procedure a basic understanding of the systems involved is 
needed. This chapter gives an introduction to the marine drilling riser system and some of its support 
systems. 
The riser system forms an extension of the wellbore from the Blowout 
Preventer (BOP) stack to the drilling vessel, see Figure 6.The primary 
functions of the marine riser system are to (API16Q, 2001): 
 Provide fluid communication between the well and the drilling 
vessel 
o In the riser annulus under normal drilling conditions 
o Through the choke and kill lines when the BOP stack is being 
used to control the well 
 Support the choke, kill, and auxiliary lines 
 Guide tools into the well 
 Act as the load carrier when  running and retrieving the BOP  
 
The fluid that the riser transports can be sea water or in most cases 
oil or water based drilling mud. This is used to transport drill cutting, 
lubricate and cool down the drill bit. It also makes it possible to build 
the hydrostatical column which, together with mud specific gravity, 
produces the needed pressure to enclose the downhole 
pore/reservoir pressure.   
 
A typical marine riser system consists of (McCrane, 2001): 
 Riser joints 
 Slip joint  
 Upper and lower flex joints /ball joints 
 Riser tension system  
 Diverter system 
 Lower marine riser package (LMRP)   
The complexity and important role of the riser system in well control means that the system is under 
several API, NORSOK and classification society requirements. The riser system requirements are 
listed but not limited to:  
API API spec 16R, API 16F, API RP 16Q, API BULL 16J, API  SPEC 
16F 
NORSOK NORSOK D-010 
DNV DNV-OS-E101, DNV-OSS-302 
 
Table 1: Riser rules and regulations 
In the following sections an introduction to the different parts included in a marine riser system. A 
figure giving an overview over the components is enclosed in Appendix 5, this should be used as a 
reference to achieve overall system understanding. 
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Figure 7:Cameron RF riser joint (Cameron, 
2010) 
3.1 Riser Joints 
 
The riser consists of segments of steel pipe varying from 50 to 90 
feet (15, 2 to 27, 4 meters) from flange to flange. A pipe segment 
is called a riser joint. The riser joint is made up by: 
 Riser main tube 
 Auxiliary lines 
 Flanges 
The riser can also be delivered in smaller lengths for adaptation to 
water depths etc. A smaller intermediate riser joint is called a 
riser pup joint and is delivered in customized lengths, depending 
on the customer’s needs.  
The riser joints are ended in matching flanges and can be made 
up/installed with bolts above the rotary table before they are 
lowered down and the next joint is inserted in the riser stack. The 
riser components are described in detail in the following sections. 
 
 
 
    
3.1.1 Riser main tube 
Riser main tube and associated couplings are generally sized to be compatible with a specific BOP 
stack size. Compatible BOP bore i.e., the BOP internal hole diameter, and riser outer diameter 
combinations are (McCrane, 2001): 
 
 
 
 
 
The main tube is specified by its outside diameter, wall thickness, and material properties. Steel 
grades most commonly used in risers are x-52, x-65 and x-80 where the number refers to the 
material yield strength in 103 pound per square inch (psi). The most common material is the x-80 
with a yield strength of 80000 psi equivalent to 552 MPa.   
BOP [inch] BOP[mm] Riser OD[inch] Riser OD[mm] 
13 5/8" 346.1 16 406.4 
16 3/4" 425.5 18 5/8 473.1 
18 3/4" 476.3 20 or 21 508  or 533.4 
20 3/4" 527.1 22 or 24 558.8 or 609.6 
21 l/4" 539.8  24 609.6 
Table 2: Compatible BOP bore and riser outer diameter combinations 
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The riser tube pressure rating should sustain the load corresponding to the difference in hydrostatic 
pressure between the drilling fluid inside the riser and seawater outside in all operational conditions. 
In addition to this the riser main tube must sustain the loads from: 
 Waves 
 Current 
 Applied dynamic tension while in operation and while running the BOP stack.  
 Rig Motions 
All these loads are dynamic, thus making fatigue toughness an important material and design quality 
that the riser must incorporate. 
3.1.2 Auxiliary lines  
These lines carry fluids along the length of the riser. Normally, they are an integral part of each riser 
joint and are attached on the outside of the riser main tube by support brackets. This is shown in 
Figure 7. These lines are used for the following (API16Q, 2001): 
 
Kill & choke 
The kill and choke are used to provide a controlled flow of oil, gas or drilling fluid from the 
wellbore to the surface when the BOP is closed.   
The pressure rating should correspond to that of the BOP stack, normally 15000 psi 
Mud boost line 
When drilling in small diameter holes, the mud flow 
rate is reduced such that it is optimized for 
downhole performance. When the mud return 
flows into increased diameter channels like the 
riser, the mud flow velocity goes down. This might 
cause poor drill cuttings transportation and lead to 
build-up of cuttings downhole. In order to increase 
riser annular circulating velocities, we might use a 
mud booster line. The booster line guides drilling 
mud into the riser just above the blowout 
preventer stack in a riser pup joint fitted with a 
gate valve as shown on Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Mud booster pup joint (Cameron, 2010) 
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Hydraulic Supply lines 
There is a possibility for the riser to be fitted with hydraulic supply lines that can carry 
hydraulic operating fluid to the BOP subsea control system. This is often the case when using 
a multiplex BOP control system, described in chapter 9.2.3 
The pressure rating on the hydraulic supply lines should match the BOP control system 
pressure rating.  
Air lines 
If the riser is fitted with air cans to provide buoyancy, air will have to be supplied through air 
lines on the riser to adjust the applied buoyancy.    
3.2  Drilling vessel motions 
The drilling vessel is not a fixed structure and is 
therefore reacting to environmental loads by moving 
in a six degrees of freedom system shown in Figure 
9. 
A movement along one of the axes will lead to the 
vessel moving off location and thereby change the 
riser length and angle.   
In addition, pitch and roll movements will create 
angular differences between the drill floor and BOP 
stack.  
 
In the following the parts that allow the riser system movements as described above, while still being 
able to fulfill the primary functions already stated in section 3, is presented.  
Figure 9: Vessel DOF (wikipedia) 
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Figure 11: Flex joint (Transocean, 
2010) 
3.2.1 Slip joint 
Heave is the most common vessel motion in any sea 
state and a motion difficult to change once the 
hydrodynamic properties of a vessel is given .   
In order to allow vertical movement, the riser system is 
equipped with a telescopic joint/slip joint. It has an inner 
and an outer barrel and is sealed with a packer assembly 
such that drilling fluid can flow back to the drilling 
vessels fluid handling system. On the slip joint shown in 
Figure 10, there is placed a tensioner ring where the 
riser tensioner wire ropes are connected. The packer 
assembly is located above the tension ring. This 
represents the top of the BOP mounted riser stack and 
indicates the fixed sea bottom level.  
Figure 10 also shows the goose necks terminating the 
auxiliary lines from the riser over in flexible hoses. This 
provides a flexible transition of the auxiliary lines from 
the rig to the riser  
3.2.2 Upper and lower flex joint 
A floating drilling vessel might be moored or dynamically 
positioned. However, it does not stay centered perfectly over the 
wellbore. Current, wind, tides and waves act to push the rig off the 
ideal position. In order to prevent excessive bending loads in the riser, 
flex joints are used at the bottom and top of the riser assembly. The 
flex joint provides for typically 10: of deflection of the riser as the rig 
moves horizontally, rolls or pitches above the well. 
The rotational movement is achieved using flexiblel elements made up 
of in a sandwich of spherical steel rings and synthetic rubber. 
(McCrane, 2001). The design can also be of a ball-joint type. The ball 
joint will be hydraulically balance-pressurized to avoid excessive 
friction between the ball and the housing, thus reducing the friction. A 
ball joint is shown in Figure 12. 
3.3 Riser tension system 
The riser tension system is used to apply tension at the top of the riser. This is done in order to 
prevent the riser from buckling and to keep it in a close to vertical orientation. The tension is applied 
on the tensioner ring, which is located on the outer barrel of the slip joint, shown in Figure 10. The 
forces are transferred either by the use of hydraulic cylinders or wire ropes mounted on the 
tensioner ring. The wire rope system is the conventional solution and uses hydraulic cylinders fixed 
on the vessel to keep the desired tension in the ropes. Both systems are energized by a bank of high 
pressure air/gas accumulators and a gas/hydraulic interface. The riser tension system is an important 
Figure 10: Slip joint (Djupesland, 2009) 
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parts of the riser disconnect sequence, as it picks up and lifts the entire riser system from the BOP 
when unlaced.    
3.4  Diverter System 
The diverter is located on top of the upper flex joint, directly below the rotary table at drill floor level. 
The system diverts the drilling fluid that returns with the riser to the flow line that goes to the mud 
treatment system onboard. It also has the capability to close an elastic packing around the drill pipe 
(DP) to divert a possible gas influx from entering the drill floor by routing it overboard for venting. A 
typical diverter is shown in red in Figure 12, where the elastic element is shown in red.  
 
Figure 12: Diverter & ball joint assembly (McCrane, 2001) 
3.5 Lower marine riser package  
The lower marine riser package (LMRP) is the lower end of the marine riser system. It marks the 
transition from the riser system to the lower BOP stack. The LMRP consists of : 
 Riser adapter 
 Flex joint 
 One or more annular preventer 
 Hydraulic connector 
 Control pods 
This is shown in Figure 13.  
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Figure 13: LMRP shown in red on BOP(left) and detailed view(right) (Vetco) 
3.5.1 Riser adapter/Flex joint 
The first part of the LMRP is the riser adapter which has a standard riser coupling flange. The adapter 
is fitted with auxiliary line kick outs to facilitate flexibility for the auxiliary lines over the flex joint. 
After the kick outs, the lines cross over into pressure hoses or steel pipe before they are continued to 
the lower BOP stack. 
The next element is the previously mentioned lower flex joint/ball joint. In Figure 14 we can see an 
oil state/Cameron version where the riser adapter and the flex joint is one part.  
 
Figure 14: Riser adapter and flex joint (Transocean, 2010) 
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3.5.2 Annular preventers 
The riser annulus can hold large quantities of drilling fluid with high specific gravity. The annular 
preventer must be able to close and retain these drilling fluids. They can close on drillpipe (DP), 
casing or upon itself. This is done by applying hydraulic pressure and pushing the rubber/steel insert 
out in the annulus. When the hydraulic pressure is vented, the steel inserts in the rubber help return 
the annular preventer to its initial position.  
 
Figure 15: Vetco annular preventer (Vetco) 
 
3.5.3 Hydraulic connector 
The LMRP ends with a hydraulic connector 
securing the LMRP to the lower BOP stack. It is 
this connector that is opened under a controlled 
riser disconnect. Manufacturers include ABB 
Vetco Gray, Cameron DrillQuip etc. The 
connector is hydraulic driven and when pressure 
is applied on the correct ports the actuator ring 
is pressed downwards. The actuator ring in turn, 
pushes the collet fingers into the matching 
profile on the male connector profile on the 
lower BOP stack. The release force is larger than 
the locking force to incorporate a safety factor 
that increases the chance of disconnection. 
 
If the drilling vessel has drifted far from well center, angular differences between the male and 
female parts and the connector is present. This in turn creates a possibility for a mechanical bind 
between the connector and the BOP male adapter. This can be a challenge and must be taken into 
account when designing the disconnect sequence.  
The connector shown on Figure 16 is a Cameron mod 70 collet connector. The mechanical function is 
similar to other models/manufacturers.   
Figure 16: Cameron Mod 70 Collet Connector (Transocean, 2010) 
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When installing a hydraulic connector, a seal ring is installed between the female and male profiles. 
The seal rings come in different designs; however they are all based on the principle of delivering a 
metal to metal seal surface. Due to this, the ring must be exchanged every time the gasket is 
“disturbed”, such as under a LMRP disconnection.  This must be done with the use of a work ROV 
equipped with several special tools and a pressure test must be performed over the seal, to verify 
that no leaks are present. This is done by sealing the lower BOP with the use of a BOP test tool  or by 
preinstalled test rams in the BOP. 
3.5.4 Control pods  
The LMRP is fitted with two male control pods that 
stab into female receptacles on the lower BOP 
stack. These control pods terminates the pod 
umbilicals supplying the BOP with control signals 
and hydraulic pressure. The dual setup is chosen to 
achieve redundancy so that if one pod/umbilical is 
rendered useless, the other is capable of 
controlling the entire BOP and LMRP. The 
umbilicals are clamped and fixated and are located 
180: apart of each other.  The control pods on the 
LMRP are also located 180: apart. The BOP control 
system is presented in more detail in Chapter 9.2. 
 
 
 
The hydraulic pressure and control signals are transferred to the lower BOP stacks female receptacle 
and to their final users via a hose bundle connected to the lower receptacle.  
There are, as mentioned earlier, several hydraulic users on the LMRP. In the case of a disconnection 
we need hydraulic supply even after the lower BOP stack is de energized. This is done by use of an 
intermediate female receptacle fixed to the LMRP guide frame. This provides capability to use the 
annular preventer and the connector after disconnect and before reconnect (Vetco).  
  
Figure 17: Control pod change transition(Vetco) 
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Master Thesis 
 
 
20 
 
 
  
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Andreas Djupesland 
 
 
21 
 
 
4 The Blow out preventer stack 
The main function of the subsea blow out preventer is to maintain well control if the drilling 
operation encounter flux of reservoir fluids when penetrating layers of varying pressures.  A sudden 
pressure peak and subsequent influx of reservoir fluid is also known as a kick. If this is  experienced 
while drilling, the annular and/or ram preventers can be closed and drilling fluid with required 
qualities  can be circulated in a controlled manner through the kill and choke line returning the well 
to normal operational condition. In a situation where the operation losses well control, the BOP is 
capable to shear certain tubulars and enclose the well pressure.  
The BOP stack can be divided in two main parts. The upper part is the LMRP as previously described 
in section 3.5 and is actually a part of the riser system. The lower part is the BOP itself. It is the lower 
part that is left on the seafloor in case of a marine riser disconnect. It is also this part of the BOP that 
encloses the well pressure. This is often referred to as the lower BOP stack. The LMRP and lower BOP 
stack is shown in Figure 18: BOP stack (Vetco)Figure 18.   
 
Figure 18: BOP stack (Vetco) 
The lower BOP stack has the following main components:  
 Welled connector 
 A series of rams 
 At least one annular preventer 
 Male profile for the hydraulic connector on the LMRP to connect to 
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Figure 20: Cameron VBR (Transocean, 2010) 
The annular preventer is similar in design and function as the earlier described annular preventer 
located in the LMRP and described in Section 3.5.2. The wellhead connector is also quite similar to 
the LMRP hydraulic connector in Section 3.5.3, the locking profile however, might have a different 
design and be able to transferee other loads.  
 
The rams are hydraulic cylinders with the possibility of having different inserts fulfilling different 
needs. The main difference being pipe and shear ram. Common ram types will be described in the 
following section.  
 
The pipe ram can have a fixed or variable pipe size 
design. The main function is to seal the annulus by 
closing on the DP, creating a pressure tight seal 
between the wellbore underneath and above the 
pipe ram. This is done to maintain control over the 
well while still using the DP to circulate drilling 
fluids. These rams can also be used for hanging off 
DP if required. The hang off capacity on the rams 
are different from the various manufacturers. The DP size being hanged off is also very important in 
relations to the hang off capacity. Shaffer (Nilsen, 2010), a producer of BOP systems, reports that for 
their multi ram models have hang off weight capacities according to Table 3. 
Bore Size (inches) 
Working Press. (psi) 
Model 
Pipe 
Size Range 
(inches) 
 
Pipe Suspension (in 1000 lbs.) 
2 
3
/8 2 
7
/8 3 
1
/2 4 4 
1
/2 5 5 
1
/2 6 
5
/8 7 
18 
3
/4, 15,000 SL  3 
1
/2–5 — — 200 200 400 600 — — — 
18 
3
/4, 15,000 SL/SLX  3 
1
/2–5 
1
/2 — — 200 200 400 600 600 — — 
18 
3
/4, 15,000 SL  5–7 — — — — — 300 300 600 — 
Table 3: Pipe ram hang off capacity 
Based on this, an estimate of the minimal DP length capacity in the pipe ram can be calculated. If 
hanging off 6 5/8 , the capacity is 600 000 lbs on a 18 ¾” 15,000 SL model. This corresponds to a 
length of 6, 6 km of hung off pipe. This does not include the weight of drill collar, the bottom hole 
assembly or a safety factor and is based on a weight of 27,7 lbs./ft. (Gabolde and Nguyen, 2006)      
 
 
Contrary to the fixed pipe ram, the variable pipe ram 
can adapt to several diameter drill pipes. The flexible 
elastomer sealing adapts with its steel elements to 
the particular DP in the hole at the time of 
activation.   A variable pipe ram is shown in Figure 20 
Figure 19: Fixed pipe ram (Transocean, 2010) 
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The bidirectional ram is a ram developed 
by Cameron and is designed to fulfill the 
demand for the required pressure testing 
of the hydraulic connector. As mentioned 
in chapter 3.5.3, the seal ring on in the 
connector must be changed after LMRP 
lift off. This is done prior to landing the 
LMRP. To verify that the correct sealing 
properties are obtained on the newly 
installed seal ring, a pressure test/ 
Leak off test is performed.  
 
The upper annular and the test ram are then closed, creating a confined cavity containing the 
connector and its seal elements. Not all BOP’s are equipped with a test ram. If no test ram is 
installed, a BOP test tool must be lowered down inside the BOP i.e. run In hole (RIH) and landed in 
the BOP or wellhead to seal off the lower part of the bore.  
 
The last type of ram is the blind shear ram. This 
ram cuts through DP and seals the wellbore. The 
blind shear ram is only used in emergencies. If 
sufficient time is present, the DP is hung off at a 
lower ram before the blind shear ram is used. 
Otherwise, the DP is lost down the wellbore and 
the potential well damages can be large. The 
shear ram cannot cut through DP tool joints. 
Consideration most therefore been given to 
insure that no tool joints are present in shear 
path of the shear ram when operated.   
There are typically four rams in a normal BOP setup. 
The upper one will be a blind shear ram and the 
lower three usually pipe rams. The normal operating 
pressure is 1 500 /3000 psi, the shear ram however, 
usually has higher pressure sources to cut through 
the pipe. In Figure 23 we can see the upper ram 
shearing DP while the lower ram is used to hang off 
and seal around the pipe. A simplified functional 
BOP setup is also given in Appendix 6. The appendix 
also contains vertical heights of some components in 
relations to the wellhead. This height is of 
importance when considering forces transmitted 
from the riser system, through the BOP, to the 
wellhead.  
Figure 22: DVS shear ram (Transocean, 2010) 
Figure 21: Bi directional test 
ram(Vidal, 2011) 
Figure 23: Ram's in function (Vetco) 
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5 Drill pipe  
The disconnection operation includes the interface between rig equipment and drill pipe. This 
chapter therefore gives a short introduction to DP and different aspects related to drill pipe handling 
in the process of dis- and reconnection of the LMRP. 
 
Drill pipe is a normally delivered in 31 foot length and is used in the drilling proses on and offshore. 
Drill pipe manufacturing is governed by the ANSI/API specification 5DP and is standardized 
concerning material properties and dimensions. It is important to bear in mind that the standard only 
covers API DP, there are also other designs available on the marked, with variations in treads, sealing 
and therefore also make up torques. 
Drill pipe is the tool used to: 
 Transfer the rotational torque to make hole, from the topside mounted top drive to the 
drillbitt on the other end of the drill string.   
 Transfer the total weight of the drill string (which is made up of a number of single drill 
pipes, bottom hole assembly, drill 
collar etc.) 
 Transport the well control fluid, 
chemicals and cement down to the 
allocated downhole position.   
Normally DP is delivered in sizes from 2 3/8” 
to 6 5/8” for use in offshore drilling 
processes. The size difference is large both in 
dimensions and forces required to hold and 
make up the needed connection torque.  
The DP consists of the DP body which in turn 
defines the DP dimension. In addition to this, 
there is a box and a pin end tool joint welded 
on to the pipe endings. See Figure 24 for 
details.  
The threaded connection that connects two 
different DP’s  is located on the tool joint (TJ). 
The threads are API tapered threads 
providing a fast engagement in order to save 
operational time when making/braking up 
connections. The sealing effect is obtained by 
the shoulder-to-shoulder sealing surfaces, 
sealing the inner DP cavity from the exterior 
and gives a safe way of handling the other 
loads carried through the pipe body. 
  Figure 24: Drillpipe(API, 2010) 
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The elevator shoulder, hardfacing, sealing shoulder and tong space is also located on the TJ 
The elevator shoulder is shown in Figure 25 and is a diameter transition with a standardized angel of 
18° (box) and 35° (pin) (API, 2010).  This shoulder is used when handling pipe with elevators by the 
drilling crew. It is used to fixate and to some degree carry the vertical loads when lifting drill pipe 
assemblies.  
The hardfacing is also known as hard banding and is a hardened 
material belt laid down/welded on the box end of the DP. The 
hardened material belt is 3” wide and is raised up from the rest of the 
tong space by 1/16”. This makes the tool joint more capable of 
withstanding operational wear and tear. The hardfacing is highlighted 
in red on Figure 25. 
The tong space is the vertical section of the box and pin end of the TJ 
allocated to have rig tongs/iron roughnecks connecting to them and 
transferring the recommended make up/brake out torques. This area 
cannot be as hard as the hard facing area, as the gripping mechanisms 
would start to slide when applying high torques, destroying both the TJ 
and the rig tools.  
Drill pipe length is measured from shoulder to shoulder and might vary 
within limitations stated in the buyer contract. Each drill pipe shall be 
measured, and the findings must be documented.  API specifies that 
the accuracy of measurement technique used when recording DP 
length shall be within 0, 03 meter(API, 2010). This requirement 
introduces varying DP length. If a drillstring consist of several hundred 
single DP’s, the length offset might be in the range of meters. It is 
therefore difficult to predict accurately where downhole TJ is located in 
a hang off/shear situation. Caution should therefore be taken with 
regards to lowering speed when landing TJ’s on a pipe ram or similar 
mechanism. 
The drill pipe often becomes worn out in the threads due to numerous make up and break out 
operations. The DP owners can refurbish the treads by machining new ones. As a result of this the TJ 
becomes shorter. This introduces the possibility of varying TJ length. The available reduction is 
controlled by API and NS-2 which is a drillstring inspection standard. Reference is made to Moum 
thesis where the extent and effects of the variation in TJ length is explained.  
Drill pipe is mad by several manufactures including Grand Prideco and Vallourec Mannesmann to 
name a few.  
 
 
Figure 25: Box end Elevator 
shoulder, hardfacing in red (API, 
2010) 
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6 The disconnection 
The decision to disconnect the marine riser system from the BOP is mainly based upon operating 
criterias stated in the rig specific procedures. These procedures have to be in compliance with the 
governing national requirements on the location the drilling vessel is operating. Typical things 
affecting riser disconnection, might be: 
 Vessel motions 
 Vessel offset  
 Tension in the riser system 
 Angle of the lower flex joint 
 Tension in the highest loaded mooring line 
On the NCS the Norwegian maritime directorate has set regulations that all floating drilling and 
production vessels have to be in compliance with. This is known as “The regulations for mobile 
offshore units”. Paragraph 16 under the production plant regulation it is stated:  
“The maximum excursion of the facility in the intact condition and after any single failure or double 
fault shall not exceed the maximum excursion that risers are designed to withstand. A  safety margin 
of 2.5% of water depth shall be used  for rigid risers, whilst a safety margin of 5% of the water depth 
shall be used for flexible risers” (Sjøfartsdirektoratet, 2003) 
The lower ball joint described in Section 3.2.2 is often mechanically limited to 10°. Based on this and 
including the 2,5% safety factor, the maximum vessel offset with regards to the riser system, is listed 
in Table 4:   
Water 
Depth 
(m) 
Maximum 
offset (m) 
100 15,1 
200 30,3 
300 45,4 
400 60,5 
500 75,7 
1000 151,3 
1500 227,0 
2000 302,7 
Table 4: Maximum offset 
If a drift off happens during normal drilling operations it is necessary to be able to:  
 Hang off drill pipe on the pipe rams 
 Shear the DP 
 Seal the wellbore 
 Disconnect the LMRP 
 Clear the BOP with the LMRP 
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Master Thesis 
 
 
28 
 
 
Figure 26: Watch circles 
Figure 27: The disconnection seen from a subsea 
perspective, LMRP lift-off to the right(Cameron) 
This needs to be completed before the limitations stated by the Norwegian maritime directorate are 
reached. Otherwise, damage to the wellhead, the BOP or losing the riser are possible outcomes. All 
are critical components in controlling the well. Effort is therefore put into modelling the actions 
needed to complete the disconnection in order to estimate the time used on a vessel specific level.  
Traditionally the offset distance as a function of water depth (WD) has been used to establish watch 
circles to indicate the drift off situation, as shown on Figure 26. A yellow alarm is typically given at a 
drift off of 2,5 % of WD followed by a red alarm at 5,5 %(Robinson, 1997).  
These limitations are in most cases correct. However, drilling in deep water and with heavy mud can 
result in a different riser performance and therefore change the riser system limitations.  
 
Based on this some rigs use lower flex joint angle as a improved indicator of whether to disconnect 
or not. An angle of 3° on the lower flex joint would typically indicate a yellow alarm and 5 ° a red 
alarm (Robinson, 1997). However, lower flex joint angle is not a standalone indicator. As seen from 
Table 4, large drift of values are encountered while operating on deep water wells. The elongation of 
the riser system must be compensated by the slip joint, thus making slip joint stroke a limiting factor 
on deeper waters.  
A combination of the two measures in real time should give an improved indication on the riser 
trends and therefore the criticality with regards to an imminent disconnect.   
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If the vessel is approaching the offset limitations, the crew onboard will: 
 Reduce chain tension on leeward side 
 Adjust tension on wind side to equal levels 
 Use the azimuth thrusters, which either might be operated manually from the bridge/control 
room or automatically by the mooring system if equipped as such.  
If the situation continues to worsen after above measures are  implemented, a disconnection is 
executed. A disconnection is shown in Figure 27, where we can see the LMRP clear the BOP and hang 
from the riser after the disconnection.  
The reason for vessel drift off is in most cases weather induced forces but is not limited to this. Other 
factors might be: 
 Dynamic poisoning system failure  
 Mooring system failure 
 Level or broken ice forces  
 Collision with object 
 Dynamic positioning operator fault 
6.1 Current procedures for disconnecting marine drilling riser 
If the disconnection take place while drill pipe is downhole, the operation has three choices. They can 
be simplified to: 
1. Running emergency hang off tool and hanging off the DP on a pipe ram below the shear ram 
or in the wellhead 
2. Hanging off the DP on a pipe ram and shearing the DP  
3. Shearing the DP, dropping it into the well  
All of the above methods seals off the wellbore and maintains the existing barrier philosophies. The 
difference is the time it takes to execute the complete set of preparations, operative tasks, the 
consequences for the well and the time it takes to become operative once the riser is connected to 
the BOP stack again Table 5 give a time estimate based on a well located on 300 meter WD. The 
disconnect time includes all tasks from normal drilling to liftoff of the LMRP from the BOP. The 
reconnect time includes the tasks undertaken from the LMRP is connected to the BOP and pressure 
is equal in riser and wellbore, until normal drilling operations is started up again.  
Disconnection method Disconnect time Reconnect time 
Emergency hang off tool 3 hrs. 8 hrs. 
Hanging off the DP 90 sec. 24-48 hrs. 
Shearing the DP 60 sec. 48 hrs. at best  
Table 5: Disconnect/reconnect time (Lund, 2010) 
The methods are described in detail in the following sections. 
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6.1.1 Use of drill pipe hang off tool 
Most regions of the world have reliable weather forecasts and preparations can be made to 
upcoming situations that might include a disconnection. If severe weather is expected or other 
factors lead to the vessel operator expecting the operational limitations to be exceeded, 
Preparations to use the emergency drill pipe hang off tool can be started.  
The emergency drill pipe hang off tool (EDPHOT) is a drill string that is 
designed to be hanged off in pipe rams or in the wellhead, its protectors or in 
the casing hanger.  
The tool consists of a drill string and a tool joint box, this TJ box is equipped 
with two sets of internal threads on two separate faces. One of the treads is 
right hand threads like the rest of the DP threaded connections, and the other 
one is lefthander threads.  
In Figure 28 we can see the: 
1. Running tool  
2. Hang off tool 
3. Retrieving tool 
Both the running and retrieving is done with the use of standard DP above the 
EDPHT. The tool is therefore made up as a part of the drill string and run in 
hole. When placed at hang off location the top drive applies a clockwise (CW) 
torque, releasing the running tool from the hang off tool. The drill string is 
then retracted into the riser and the riser can be sealed off. Beyond this point 
it is normal to wait in order to see if the situation continues to develop in the 
direction of a disconnection. In Appendix 7 a detailed operating procedure is 
given (Lund, 2010). In short, the following actions will have to take place: 
1. Pull bit inside last casing 
2. Pull out of hole (POOH) a distance equal to the WD plus two stands 
3. Install Kelly cock (valve that is made up in the DP string, in open position) with back pressure 
valve on top in one stand. Run in hole. 
4. Install EDPHOT with one stand (three drill pipes, already made up in to one length)  DP  
5. Run hang off stand into one stand above BOP 
6. Activate active heave compensator (AHC). Run in and land EDPHT in wear bushing/bore 
protector, set down weight underneath land of point.  
7. Unscrew landing string 
8. Pull out of BOP with landing string and close middle pipe-ram and blind shear ram. 
9. Displace riser to sea water with the use of kill, choke and booster lines  
10. Wait on weather to initiate disconnection of LMRP if necessary   
The complete procedure must be completed before facing the operating limits. If the approach to 
these operating limits is slow, the time lost on waiting on whether (WOW) might be substantial. 
Figure 28: Emergency 
Hang off Tool(Cameron) 
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There is also a chance for the disconnection not being initiated, In this case significant time that 
could otherwise be used for well productive tasks, is lost.  
The time used to install an EDPHOT is depending on the distance from where the drillbitt is drilling to 
the last casing and the WD. If we look at deepwater drilling, time used on tripping out and into the 
hole cannot be neglected. A tripping speed of 500 meters per hour can be used Based on this 
assumption, the time used to run and operate the EDPHOT on a well at 300 meters WD is 
approximately 2 hours. Including one hour in handling of the tool, the total time is 3 hours. Time 
used on reconnection is due to extensive tripping, estimated to 8 hours before normal drilling can 
resume.  
6.1.1.1 Deeper waters 
If we consider a well located on substantial deeper waters, say 3000 meters, the costs will increase. 
On such wells the drilling window might be narrow. This means that the difference between the 
inherent formation pore pressure and the pressure the formation can withstand without taking 
structural damage is small. This may lead to more challenging well control situations due to the 
formations pressure sensitivity.  
Based on this assumption and due to the large wellhead /ram hang off profile as shown in Figure 28, 
the speed while Running in Hole (RIH) with the tool might be restricted by the operator. This will 
render our assumption of 500 meters per hour, as to high, and adds time to the  preparations 
towards a planned disconnect. This added time might be substantial on deep and ultra-deepwater 
wells.  
When running in hole with a the large diameter wellhead profile shown in Figure 28 the bottom hole 
pressure may vary. This is the result of the wellhead profile having a velocity in the relatively high 
viscous drilling mud.  The pressure build up on the leading edge may account for too large variations 
in the bottomhole pressure if the tripping speed is too high and might therefore be restricted by the 
well operator.  
If we estimate the restriction to a mean tripping speed of 200 m/hour and look at the well located at 
3000 waterdepth, the time used will be: 
1. Pull bit inside last casing 
2. Pull out of hole (POOH) a distance equal to the WD plus two stands at 500m/h 
          
              
            
3. Install Kelly cock (valve that is made up in the DP string, in open position) with back pressure 
valve on top in one stand. Run in hole. 
          
4. Install EDPHOT with one stand  DP  
          
5. Run hang off stand into one stand above BOP following operators restrictions of 200m/h 
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6. Activate active heave compensator (AHC). Run in and land EDPHOT in wear bushing/bore 
protector, set down weight underneath land of point.  
          
7. Unscrew landing string 
8. Pull out of BOP with landing string and close middle pipe-ram and blind shear ram. 
9. Displace riser to sea water with the use of kill, choke and booster lines  
10. Wait on weather to initiate disconnection of LMRP if necessary   
We are then able operational ready to disconnect the LMRP, if the situation requires this. We 
have then used a total of 22, 77 hours to reach the point where we are able to disconnect the 
LMRP.  
The reconnection is somewhat wider in the time estimate due to larger uncertainties but due to the 
long restricted tripping distance and possible challenges, it is assumed to take 26 hours.  
It should be noted that the estimates based on this specific ultra-deepwater well, is an extreme case. 
However, in general, both the disconnection and reconnection time will increase with wells that are 
located in deeper waters. 
6.1.1.2 Operational log review  
In February 2011, Transocean Winner performed a DP hang off procedure with a subsequent LMRP 
disconnection.  This was while drilling a well for Marathon oil in the southern part of the North Sea, 
well 24/9-10 A on the NCS. The operational log is enclosed in Appendix 10 to Appendix 12. As seen, 
the background for the disconnection was the anchor tension exceeding the operational limit stated 
for the rig as a result of wind and current forces. Going through the details in the log uncovers that 
significant time is on WOW, as a result of running the EDPHOT. After the deciding to RIH with the 
EDPHOT at 10:00 Friday 4/2-11 , we wait until to Saturday  5/2-11 at 05:45 before initiating the LMRP 
disconnection. A total of 19 hours and 45 minutes used on WOW.  
 
6.1.2 Hanging off the drill pipe on a pipe ram and shearing the drill pipe  
If there is a need to disconnect, but not sufficient time to run the EDPHOT, the DP is hung of in the 
pipe ram in the BOP stack. The pipe above the hang off point is sheared using the blind shear ram. 
Typically the vessel is in yellow zone when this procedure is relevant. The following tasks must be 
undertaken to be able to disconnect the LMRP: 
 
1. If time displace riser to sea water 
2. Activate AHC 
3. Space out tool joint to be approximately 2 m above middle pipe ram 
4. Close middle pipe ram with reduced pressure. 500 psi 
5. Set down 5 tons on ram, increase pressure to 3000 psi 
6. Set down string weight minus the weight above the BOP. Use some over pull when cutting 
the string 
7. Cut the string using the shear ram 
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8. Pull out of BOP with the string. Close blind shear ram while pulling out of riser with DP and 
prepare to disconnect the LMRP 
 
This process in much quicker in the EDPHOT disconnection sequence, however, it is challenging 
during the reconnect phase. This is due to the challenges associated with picking up the sheared DP. 
It might need extensive milling and fishing before pickup can be initiated. The milling and fishing 
operations exposes the subsea equipment for additional hazards, thus increasing the allover 
operational risk.   
A disconnection time of 90 seconds and a very variable reconnection time of 24 hours might be 
expected.    
6.1.3 Shearing the drill pipe dropping it into the well, emergency disconnection 
Shearing and dropping the drill string, is performed in extreme emergencies when facing a high risk 
scenario. In this process, there is not sufficient time to land the TJ in the pipe ram and the DP is 
dropped into the wellbore after shearing. This will typically be when the vessel has entered the 
previously mentioned “red zone”. It is normal practice to organize this procedure of emergency 
disconnection in what is called an emergency disconnection sequence (EDS)  
 
The EDS shall be designed such that the well is safely shut in as a part of a functional sequence. The 
time the sequence takes is measured from the operator pushes a dedicated button and initiates it 
onboard the vessel, to the LMRP is lifted clear of the BOP stack. This time should be as short as 
possible. (API16D, JANUARY 2005)  The EDS increases the process efficiency and minimizes human 
error in disconnections. The sequence can be reprogrammed between wells. There can also be 
several sequences available for the operator, thus making it more adapted to the ongoing well 
operation (Cameron).  
 
The complete disconnection process takes normally somewhere between 30 and 90 seconds. If we 
look at the time spent before disconnection of the LMRP, this is the fastest method.  Shearing and 
dropping the drillstring is a last resort decision and the consequence of this method will be prolonged 
reconnection due to DP fishing and milling, at best. However, the well can be severely damaged or 
lost completely in a worst case scenario due to the consequences of the dropped DP. The estimated 
reconnection time is 48 hours. This estimate is highly uncertain, as the damages due to the dropped 
drill string might be severe.  
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6.2 Cost of operational downtime 
It is concluded in section 2.2 that we can expect an increase in  disconnection frequency when 
constructing wells in arctic waters using conventional MODU’s. In Chapter 6.1, the operational 
downtime time experienced, using disconnecting methods available today is estimated. Based on 
this, the costs related to disconnections can be estimated. It should be noted that the possibility of a 
disconnection is now based on a conventional MODU operating in Arctic waters where floating ice 
features are expected; with minimal ice management. The assumed possibility of the different types 
of disconnections is presented in Table 6:  
 
Method  Possibility/well 
Use of drill pipe hang off tool: 0,5 
Hanging off the drill pipe and shearing  0,1 
emergency disconnection 0,01 
Table 6: Possibility disconnection/well 
A well construction completion time of 55 days is assumed. This gives a yearly production of 6.6 
wells. Based on this, the yearly amount of disconnections is estimated and presented in Table 7: 
 
Method Possibility*well/year Number of yearly 
disconnections 
Use of drill pipe hang off tool: 0,5*6,6 3,3 
Hanging off the drill pipe and 
shearing 
0,1*6,6 0,66 
emergency disconnection 0,01*6,6 0,066 
Table 7: Yearly amount of disconnections 
The times used on the different methods are previously stated. Assuming a drilling vessel day rate of 
500 000 $/day (20833 $/hour) we then can calculate the estimated cost of operational downtime 
due to disconnections using the time estimates stated in chapter 6.1. This is presented in Table 8 and 
Table 9: 
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Well at 300 meters water depth: 
 
Method Number of yearly 
disconnections 
Yearly 
disconnections*The 
sum of disconnect and 
reconnect time *day 
rate 
Yearly cost related to 
disconnections in 
dollars 
 
Use of drill pipe hang 
off tool: 
3,3 3,3*(2+8)*20833 687 489 
Hanging off the drill 
pipe and shearing 
0,66 0,66*24*20833 329 995 
emergency 
disconnection 
0,066 0,066*48*20833 65 999 
Yearly total  4,026  1 083 483 
Table 8: Cost of operational downtime due to disconnections; 300 m WD 
Well at 3000 meters water depth: 
Method Number of yearly 
disconnections 
Yearly 
disconnections*The 
sum of disconnect and 
reconnect time *day 
rate 
Yearly cost related to 
disconnections in 
dollars 
 
Use of drill pipe hang 
off tool: 
3,3 3,3*(22,77+26)*20833 3 352 883 
Hanging off the drill 
pipe and shearing 
0,66 0,66*24*20833 329 995 
emergency 
disconnection 
0,066 0,066*48*20833 65 999 
Yearly total 4,026  3 748 878 
Table 9: Cost of operational downtime due to disconnections; 3000 m WD 
In this comparison the relatively quick disconnection time of the hang off and shear and EDS 
methods, are baked into the uncertainty of the reconnect time. The time used waiting in weather can 
amount to a considerable number of hours; this is however neglected in this calculation, in order to 
get a conservative estimate.  It should also be noted that the estimate done on the deepwater well is 
an extreme high cost case and will not be representative on the NCS. With this in mind it is concluded 
that the cost associated with disconnections due to arctic operations amounts to 1.083.483 $/year 
for one rig operating on midwater wells and 3.748.878 $/year on ultradeepwater wells.  
 
As for the operational log we can estimate that if we use a conservative standby day rate of 350.000 
$, a 19 hours and 45 time slot amounts to a 288.000 $ loss for the operator. This is time that could 
have been used for well productive tasks as the weather limitations at the time, was not in existence 
of the operational limits before early on the morning of Saturday the 5/2-11. Reference is given to 
chapter 6.1.1.2 for the background info and Appendix 10 to Appendix 12 for operational details.  
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7 Alternative methods for quick disconnection of marine drilling 
riser 
The oil and gas industry has in the last couple of years started to move into both more hostile 
environments and undertaking ultra-deepwater drilling. Looking at both planned and unplanned 
disconnections, there are improvement possibilities. Valuable time is used both related to the 
disconnection and reconnection phase. 
Previous work within the topic (Sønstabø, 2007) mentions the possibility of placing components 
dedicated for making and braking tool joint connections, in the lower BOP stack or in the riser 
system.  In order to introduce components reducing the time consumed, several design 
requirements must be fulfilled. In this chapter the design criteria’s will be stated and new concepts 
for drilling riser disconnection will be presented. The emphasis will be on operations where DP is 
present trough the BOP stack.    
 
7.1 System requirements 
When designing a new concept as an integrated part of a complicated system, care must be taken 
with regards to the design requirements. In addition to the high system complexity, the system in 
question is placed subsea, out of reach and out of sight for the operating crew and maintenance 
staff. 
The main design intent that the equipment must fulfill, can be summarized as: 
o Locate and fixate the specific tool joint in question  
o Remove TJ connection torque to a desired value with required accuracy  
o B of minimal disturbance to the ongoing operation when not in use 
All of the above must be performed: 
o Safely, as an integrated part of the subsea equipment 
o Within a desired time window 
o With high operational reliability 
o At a low cost 
o With the ability to communicate with and monitor the subsea sequence  
A more detailed study of the design requirements will be given in the following sections 
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7.1.1 Locating drill pipe 
The tool joint can be located subsea using various methods.  
Acoustic, magnetic and mechanic localization have been 
addressed in this research to this thesis. The method chosen in 
the end was mechanical localization in the form of landing the 
18° elevator shoulder on the box end of the tool joint, on a 
tool joint locator. This is shown in Appendix 18. This method is 
chosen due to low system complexity and it’s similarity to 
methods used in the industry today.  
In the process of de-torqueing a TJ, the weight of the 
drillstring and all downhole equipment is at all times held by 
the lifting equipment onboard the vessel i.e. the drawwork. 
Due to heave motions, the AHC system is activated under the 
entire process. The AHC system is designed to compensate for 
load variations, however, due to hydraulic losses, mechanical 
wear etc., vertical force variation in the range of 1-2%  might 
be expected. This variation in vertical load must be taken up 
by the mechanism that grips the specific tool joint in question. 
Maximal vertical load is therefore assumed to be 30 tons and 
must be handled both in the positive and negative vertical 
direction to cope with load variations while the cylinders are 
clamped on the TJ. 
 
7.1.2 Make up & break out torque  
The torque needed to make or break TJ connections, vary with DP size and design. Technips Drilling 
Data Handbook is assessed as the best way to ensure sufficiently accurate make-up and break-out 
values. The recommended make-up torque varies between 45 270 - 70 870 Nm for 5 1/2" drill pipes 
and 59 530 - 88 090 Nm for 6 5/8" DP. It should be noted that these numbers apply to new TJ’s, 
lower make-up torques are recommended for Premium class and Class 2 TJ’s. 
According to Aker Solutions, (Rudshaug, 2011) an addition of  5-10 % to the tabulated make-up 
torque has to be expected when breaking out the TJ connection. This is due to stick friction in the TJ 
threads and seal shoulder. The amount of stick friction is highly dependent on the condition of the 
threads, the cleanliness of the threaded area and the amount of thread-dope applied. Aker also 
estimates that all torque is applied over the first 15-30: of rotation from when the shoulders on the 
box- and pin end touch. After the shoulders touch, Hooke's law becomes applicable. This assumption 
is illustrated as a torque turn graph in Figure 30. All of the data from Aker Solutions is based on 
empirical experience gained through extensive testing in the process of building topside iron 
roughnecks. Using their experience is more realistic than assuming and calculating values from 
scratch. Adding a safety margin of 10% to the tabulated torque means the maximum torque needed 
is 15-20% above the tabulated torque from the Drilling Data Handbook ,when including the addition 
due to stick friction. This gives a maximum break out torque of 105 708 Nm. This is backed up by 
Figure 29: Magnetic and mechanic 
localization of TJ 
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NORSOK D-001’s nominative data sheet (NORSOK, 1998). This document recommends to install an 
iron roughneck with a minimum break out torque of 100 000 Nm and a make-up torque of 80 000 
Nm. 
Splitting the wanted 30: rotation into two 15: iterations simplifies the design of our product and 
minimizes the physical size of the torque mechanism. The assumed torque turn graph when 
performing two 15 : operational cycles is shown in Figure 30. 
It should be noted that the torque case shown here is a worst case scenario considering a new 6-5/8” 
TJ. The makeup torque will decrease with degrading TJ condition and with smaller DP sizes.   
  
Figure 30: Assumed torque turn graph showing our two de-torque 
sequences 
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7.1.3 Clamping force 
A dice is an interchangeable hardened machined component that is 
pressed into the softer TJ tong space material. A generic dice setup 
can be seen in Figure 31. These dices transfers the torque from a 
torque mechanism to the TJ connection. This is the same principle 
used by several topside roughneck vendors. The dices ability to 
transfer a torque is dependent on the force that the dice is pushed 
radial towards the tong space on the TJ. This force is called clamp 
force and ensures that the dices penetrate the tong space of the 
tool joint and therefore generating a friction factor of   =1. The 
clamp force needed to sufficiently penetrate the tong space of the 
TJ with the dice is applied by using clamp cylinders. When choosing 
this clamp force it is s also essential to avoid using excessive force. 
This may lead to excessive pressure on the threaded area and thus 
increasing the stick friction and cause unnecessary penetration of 
the tool joint damaging the tong space.  
 
 
 
Figure 32: Aker Solutions clamp torque graph for 6 5/8" DP 
The clamping force is highly dependent on what kind of torque that needs to be achieved. Aker 
Solutions has supplied empirical test curves for 5 ½” and 6 5/8" drill pipe, showing the relationship 
between needed clamping force and the torque this clamping force can provide without slipping i.e. 
relative rotational movement between the dice and the TJ. The "two dices" curve is the one valid for 
our design. This curve is extrapolated to find the approximate amount of clamping force needed in 
our design. The extrapolation is by no means exact, however, it is  considered to be more exact than 
any calculation based on theoretical assumptions. The values from the Aker Solutions graph is the 
result  from real tests done on real tool joint, and the clear tendency of the graph justifies the linear 
extrapolation as long as sufficient margin of safety is added. Using the same 105 708 Nm break out 
torque found in section 7.1.2, a clamping force of 593,6 kN is needed. As advised by Aker Solutions, 
Figure 31: Dice setup example seen 
from the front and from above 
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15 % safety margin is added to the read value to ensure the connection does not slip and deprave the 
tong space. This resulting in a clamping force of 682,7 kN 
7.1.4 Riser forces 
When considering a new component to be inserted as a load bearing element in the BOP or riser 
stack, the load across the component is of high importance. A conservative estimate of the expected 
loads in such an element is needed to look at the resulting stresses in its load bearing parts. This is 
executed to identify bad conceptual design at an early stage. Basing the design on a worst case 
scenario for a riser joint is therefore the design assumption. This is not the forces experienced while 
in operation, nevertheless, this conservative approach is capable of amplifying bad design qualities.  
Ambrose compares traditional hang-off of risers in reference to a "soft" method (Ambrose, 2001). 
Traditional “hard hagoff” is performed when disconnecting the LMRP from the BOP. The diverter 
assembly is then removed and the slip joint is collapsed. The upmost part of the riser system is then 
retracted on board the drilling vessel and landed in a riser spider. This riser spider locks the rigid riser 
to the vessels, forcing the subsea system to obtain more or less the same vertical movements as the 
vessel. The resulting riser forces as a result of the two distinct methods are shown in Figure 33. This 
situation imposes large vertical forces and might lead to bending of the riser. This is important to 
take into consideration due to the fact that the machine might be integrated into the riser string and 
must survive all operational situations. Ambrose considers a hard hang off performed on an ultra 
deepwater level of 10 000 feet with rough weather.  
 
Figure 33:  Effective Tension Variation at Tension Ring, Hard vs. Soft Hangoff Small Drillship in 22-ft Hs Seas, 60 deg 
heading to the waves, 9600-ft Water Depth(Ambrose, 2001) 
 
The work undertaken in the article "Mooring and Riser Management In Ultra-Deep Water and 
Beyond" considers the forces involved when landing the BOP on the well-head for the first time 
(Pelley, 2005). This is the maximum static load the riser string is exposed to, as the BOP can weigh up 
to 500 tons. The study compares the use of conventional steel marine drilling risers with new 
composite marine drilling risers in ultra-deep waters, where the weight of the riser string can be a 
problem.    
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The study takes into consideration 
o Weight of the BOP 
o Weight of the LMRP 
o Weight of the flex joint 
o Dynamic heave amplitude  
o Acceleration of the total weight (start and stop of lowering procedure) 
This results in the following weights: 
o 687 tons Static hanging wet weight 
o 175 tons Hook load dynamic amplitude 
o 98 tons  Acceleration load 
o 960 tons Total landing load 
Conclusively, the work carried out by Ambrose combined with the results obtained by Pelley, gives us 
an estimate of handling 1000 tons. This is used as a requirement for the loads the product needs to 
handle vertically between two riser flanges.  This load is calculated for the worst case scenario i.e. 
the riser that will have to carry all of the loads associated with the complete subsea system. This will, 
in a hang off situation, be the top part of the riser with the forces being reduced when going further 
down in the riser stack. This gives a conservative estimate of the forces applied on the product. It is 
also important to clarify that the forces mapped here are not detailed enough to perform an in depth 
design of the components. It is more a way of ranking how the different designs deals with the stress 
and strain as a result of the forces and to give an indication as to what range the forces will be in.  
A more detailed force analysis, including fatigue study of the design must be undertaken on a later 
stage, in order to improve load bearing characteristics and give a favourable end design.   
 
7.1.5 Dimensional requirements  
Introducing new components in a subsea system will require careful planning. This includes building 
the design into the already installed equipment assemblies with minimal negative implications to 
existing operational and handling procedures and equipment performance. This is not an easy task, 
as the requirements are many and diverse. In this section the physical handling and installation 
restrictions that exist on relevant rigs for operation in and close to ice infested waters will be 
mapped.   
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7.1.5.1 Background 
The world’s fleet of MODU’s consists of a number of different designs. Deciding the physical layout of 
the rig is done in the early phase of construction and under later modifications and upgrades. These 
decisions are based on the operational requirements that are given by the operator. Such 
requirements may be: 
 Type of operations  
 Cost 
 Design water depths 
 Conceptual design 
 Design generation 
 Climate and other environmental conditions  
The diversity in these aspects, give large variations in the physical buildup of the units. This should be 
taken into consideration in the conceptual design loops, too insure physical handling capabilities and 
to guarantee a large market basis for the design.  The physical restrictions will be apparent in the 
following operations: 
  
 Running an retrieval of equipment 
 Installation in riser/BOP stack 
 Shipping to and from vessel  
 Carry out required planned and corrective maintenance 
 Modifications to existing equipment 
  
All the above mentioned operations will require physical handling of the equipment and the interface 
between the vessel physical limitations, crew banksmen and onboard lifting equipment. The first 
requirement is enough space on the MODU, both in height and width, to perform the mentioned 
operations.   
A normal layout of a drilling unit will easily facilitate cargo handling to and from shore with a supply 
ship. From the supply ship there will be manual crane handling with cranes situated onboard the 
drilling vessel.  Normally there will be space to lay out the equipment on deck for temporary storage 
and inspection.  
The most challenging part of the physical handling will be the installation and running/retrieval 
process. This will have to take place in one of the most cramped and restricted parts of the rig 
namely the cellar deck area and the drill floor. The two areas have different limitations and will 
create two different running procedures. 
 If we choose to design the component to be installed on cellar deck, a draft of a running procedure 
will be: 
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1. Install components in cradle on top of lower flex joint on the BOP while in storage location 
on cellar deck.  
2. Skid BOP with components out under the center of the drill floor. 
3. Connect first riser flange to the components and run the entire length of the stack as before. 
 
If we choose to design the component to be installed on the drill floor, a draft of a running procedure 
will be: 
1. Skid BOP without components out under the center of the drill floor 
2. Run components through the rotary on drill floor and connect to riser flange on lower flex 
joint 
3. Connect standard riser to upper riser flange on components and run the entire length of the 
riser as before  
 
The differences in design limitations between the two running procedures are large and a more 
detailed description of these areas is therefore given before selecting one installation and running 
philosophy.  
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7.1.5.2 Cellar deck  
The Cellar Deck refers to the lower deck of a floater and will normally be the deck where crew and 
subsea engineers work when inspecting and maintaining the BOP stack.  This area will be situated 
around the opening in the lower deck of the structure known as the moonpool. In Figure 34, the 
cellar deck can be seen within the blue box with the moonpool in the center of the figure. In this 
figure, the upper decks, drill floor and the derrick has been removed.   
 
Figure 34: The "Polar Pioneer" seen from STBD. FWD. Main deck in white, machinery deck in pink.(Transocean, 2011) 
 This area will be the hub for a number of different systems closely supporting the drilling, subsea 
and/or production part of the overall operation. The area is therefore often highly customized on 
each rig to fully accommodate the rigs owner/operator specific needs. The biggest movable 
component in this area is the complete BOP stack being skidded to and from its storage position 
where maintenance is carried out between wells. The stack can vary in height depending on supplier 
and setup which often will be well specific.  An example of vertical buildup of the BOP is enclosed in 
Appendix 6.  
When approaching drilling contractors (Transocean, 2011) and looking at the vertical BOP skid 
limitations, the available vertical “play” is in the range between 2-3,5 meter, depending on the 
amount of equipment that had to be changed. These findings are made by examination of the 
existing Transocean fleet in Norway, a total of 5 rigs designed in the beginning and mid 80’s. Two of 
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the rigs; Transocean Arctic and Polar Pioneer, have been designed for arctic environment and have 
performed drilling in parts of the Norwegian Barents Sea. These rigs can therefore, despite their age, 
be representative for a lower limit with regards to design generation and the particular restrictions 
that generation impose.  
 
Based on these findings and talks with other drilling contractors, the conclusion can be made that the 
cellar deck is a highly rig specific area. This is the result of numerous modifications done throughout 
the rigs life, resulting in highly deviating layouts despite rigs leaving the shipyard as identical basic 
designs. This introduces a high degree of uncertainty into building our design with the basic 
assumption of mounting the new components on top of the BOP stack and skid out beneath drill 
floor.  
 
Conclusively, every increase in height from existing dimensions, would introduce uncertainty 
regarding if the rig can use our concept without going through possible large refits of piping, cranes, 
sheaves etc.   
 
Dimensional limitations using cellar deck: 
 
 Width:  
o No practical limitation as long as it is possible to go through the moonpool with the 
design.  
 Height: 
o 2 meters, flange to flange, will be associated with  uncertainty 
 
Pros using the cellar deck: 
 Will not lead to longer running and retrieval times of the BOP and riser on single activity 
vessels 
 Larger time window can be used on installation, testing etc. 
Cons using the cellar deck: 
 Large uncertainties with the available vertical height on cellar deck 
 Can be a costly implementation round and therefore make the concept ” hard to sell “ 
 The lower flex joint on top of the BOP is not designed to support large structures in 
compressive stress and will buckle if not fitted with a support cradle for the SIR.   
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7.1.5.3 Drill floor 
The drill floor is normally where the operational focus is placed. This is the area where most of the 
hands-on work related to operations is executed, such as: 
 
 Setting up/creating the drilling tools e.g. the bottom hole assembly etc. 
 Adding and removing drillstring under normal drilling 
 Running and retrieval of  
o Riser and BOP 
o Wire line tools 
 Adding the rotational torque needed to make hole 
 
The drill floor is built up around the rotary table which is the start of the “drilling hole” seen from a 
topside view. The rotary table is a machine capable of rotating it’s center part and can use electric or 
hydraulic power to accomplish this.  The geometry of the rotating part of the rotary table can be of 
different designs, bushings however will in all cases be used to build the desired hole dimensions for 
the ongoing operation.   
 
Figure 35: Aker wirth  60 ½"  hydraulic driven rotary table shown without bushings 
In Figure 35 a rotary table is shown without bushings 
installed. The bushings are hinged on one side to be able to 
be installed and removed while a object is present in the 
hole. In Figure 36 one can see the drilling crew onboard the 
drilling vessel “CHIKYU” running in hole with the drilling bit. 
The drilling bit is bigger than the rest of the drill string and 
the outer bushing and inner bushing is therefore removed. 
The bushings can be seen in the back/foreground of Figure 
36. The inner bushing has a tapered surface. This surface is 
the female part of the slips, which hold the vertical load of 
the drill pipe while drill pipe is being added or removed.   
 
  
Figure 36: Drilling crew onboard the drilling vessel 
“CHIKYU” 
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To Install/remove the bushings, lifting yokes combined with chain and 
hooks are used in premade lifting slots embedded on the bushings. 
This is shown in Figure 37.  
With the rotary table being the foundation for a large part of the 
operations conducted on the drill floor, standardization soon come 
into the picture, thus giving the different equipment suppliers a 
standardized set of limitations on diameters of tools/equipment that 
can go through the rotary table.   
 
Rotary tables are delivered in several standardized versions ranging from a open hole diameter from 
27½” to 75½” with the industry “standard” on the oldest relevant rigs being 49½”. On newer vessels, 
equipped for deeper waters, larger rotary tables like 60 ½” and 75½” are standard. Choosing to use 
the 49½” as design criteria might become a engineering challenge, but will guarantee a large user 
market.   If more detailed engineering proves this diameter to be too small, it might be increased to 
60 ½” or 75½” on a later stage, depending on the conclusion of a subsequent analysis.  
Looking at vertical limitations, the drill floor vertical capacity is high, as the drilling rig normally uses 
lengths up to 30 meters long drill pipe. Normal riser running deals with the previously mentioned 50 
feet and up (15,24 meters) riser length. Using this as a design limitation will guarantee handling 
capabilities onboard the vessels. 
To get an overview, using the rotary table with all its split bushings removed, will give us a 
standardized foundation to build our design on thus establishing our diameter design criteria to 
maximum 49½”. 
Conclusively, less uncertainty is associated using the drill floor to sculpt our design limitations. 
Dimensional limitations using Drill floor: 
 
 Width:  
o 49 ½” diameter 
 Height: 
o Limited due to “guaranteed” handling to 50 feet.  
 
Pros using Drill floor: 
 Good handling capabilities  
 Standard dimensional limitations with low uncertainty connected 
Cons using Drill floor: 
 49½” width limitations.  
 Will lead to a longer time associated with running and retrieval of BOP/riser  on single 
activity drilling vessels 
Figure 37: Manual handling of rotary bushings 
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7.1.6 Concluding 
The previous sections have looked into the limitations as a 
result of installing and running our concept using the cellar 
deck and the drill floor. Figure 38 shows how the two 
approaches give room for different limitations. 
Looking at the amount of uncertainty associated with 
introducing an increased BOP stack height on cellar deck, we 
soon favor the more standardized limitation we will have to 
incorporate by going through the rotary table.  
 
 
7.1.7 Operational time 
Today’s procedure related to preparing for a possible disconnect might take up large portions of time 
that could have been spent in a more productive way. First, the drilling bit must be retracted from 
the open hole section, to a casing protected section of the well. Not taking the time associated with 
tripping out of an open hole section into consideration, this thesis goal is to facilitate a mechanical 
operational time of 5 minutes. This is the time it will take to locate, fixate, de-torque, free and land 
the tool joint in question. Additional time must be granted to displace riser and prepare for LMRP 
disconnect.  
Concerning the reconnection time of a hung-off drill pipe, a larger time window must be expected.  
This is due to uncertainties concerning centering, using annular preventer, thread engagement etc. It 
is believed that this can be achieved well within one hour of LMRP reconnection and this is therefore 
stated as the design criteria. 
7.1.8 Operational compatibility 
A feasible design will have to be compatible with a certain range of drill pipe sizes. When discussing 
which drill pipe size to adapt our design to with Professor Sangesland, information was received that 
the drill pipe sizes most common to use in most drilling operations is 5 ½” and 6 5/8”. This is also the 
sizes that require the larges operational forces. Therefore, adapting our design to these drill pipe 
dimensions gives a favorable approach to tool joint dimensions. If required, it would be possible to 
widen the operational limit to include smaller drill pipe sizes on a later stage. 
 Odfjell well service rents out drill pipe to drilling contractors in Norway. They provided us with some 
discarded tool joints to study to help us be creative when in the idea phase of making the concept. 
The 6 5/8” pipe dimensions are attached in Appendix 9 .Please note that these TJ’s are made 2” 
longer than the standard. 
  
Figure 38: The limitations that the design must 
incorporate using the cellar deck or drill floor 
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7.1.9 Concept requirements conclusion  
The requirements can be divided into the following segments:  
 Safety  
 Handling  
 Technical  
 Operational  
 
Safety: 
 Internal pressure capacity  
The component will have to be designed with a pressure rating equal or higher than 
the components in the system it is a part of.  
 Consequence to existing safety systems  
A solution that will reduce the existing safety systems reliability cannot be 
introduced. Therefore the component must be able to withstand equal or greater 
global loads then the system otherwise would experience. Effects of the changes 
made must also not introduce an unfavorable gain in forces acting for example the 
wellhead. Power and control system requirements needed to drive the additional 
equipment cannot degrade existing safety systems power and control reliability.  
 
 Rules and regulations/Standards   
All applicable regulations will have to be fulfilled. 
Handling: 
The crew onboard must handle the component when stacking it into the subsea system. Physical size 
and weight is therefore important to ease operations.  
 Height 
Height is restricted to 50 feet. 
 Width 
49 ½” diameters at max 
 Estimated weight (in air)  
General handling capabilities must be as good as possible. The added weight will 
increase loads on the BOP stack and must therefore be kept as low as reasonable 
possible.  
 Impact due to sea current  
The current forces imposed on the subsea components can be of a significant 
magnitude. The components should be designed to minimize the current drag forces.  
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Technical: 
 Maintainability 
Component reliability will be linked to its design and maintenance. Easy access for rig 
personnel to carry out inspections and maintenance must be incorporated. 
 Wear on components due to drillstring movements   
When drilling the well, there will be times when the rotating drillstring might create 
wear surfaces in the component. This must be imbedded in the design and not 
compromise the operability of the component.  
 Hydrates build up/how to avoid/consequences 
In normal operations there is a chance for hydrocarbons in the form of hydrates 
building up in places where this is possible. This might prevent us from operating the 
components as wished. The design should therefore take this into account and try to 
prevent such buildup. It should also have the possibility to flush possible volumes 
where hydrates are present with chemicals in flush ports.  
 Buildup of drill cuttings or other mud related components 
Normal drilling cuttings and mud additives might build up in cavities and decrease 
equipment reliability if not taken into account  
 Pressure drop across the subsea pipe breaker 
It is of high importance that the pressure drop across the component is as low as 
possible to minimize static and dynamic mud pressure differences at drill bit.  
 Be able to firmly latch on the tool joint and deliver accurate torque on 5 ½” and 6 5/8” drill 
pipe (Gabolde and Nguyen, 2006), se Table 10. 
Drill pipe slice [inches]  Max Tool joint outer 
diameter[mm] 
Make up torque[Nm] 
5 ½ 177,8 45270 
6 5/8 215,9 88090 
Table 10: Requirements related to tool joint size and make up torque 
 Locating and latching on to a TJ 
Must be able to land/locate and latch on to opposite sides of a TJ. As a result 30 tons 
in vertical force must be taken up by the engaging cylinders 
 Torque 
Be able to break out 6 5/8” DP resulting in a dimensional torque capacity of               
105 708 Nm 
 Clamping force 
To transfer the torque, a clamp force of 682,7 kN is required 
 Vertical load from riser 
A vertical load of 1000 tons should be handled by the conceptual design 
 External pressure 
The concept should sustain a max operational water depth of 4000 meters 
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Operational: 
 Ability to maintain full riser bore if single or multiple failure is present 
A component that will be narrower than the existing riser/BOP bore cannot be 
introduced as this will create operational limitations.  
 Use of standard components  
The design should try to use existing components to ease production and increase 
reliability.  
 Operating reliability 
Should be as high as reasonable possible and should have a maintenance interval 
that is at a minimum equal to the BOP maintenance schedule.  
 Operational time 
5 minutes operational time in the disconnection phase 
1 hour in the reconnection phase 
 Operational complexity  
Operational complexity should be kept as low as possible. One person should be able 
to run the process. Automatization with manual intervention should be studied to 
increase reliability and reduce time.  
 Stuck tools 
The design must minimize the possibility for bottom hole assembly/DP/wire line tool 
etc. getting stuck while running in and out of the hole.    
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7.2 The different methods 
In the process of designing tools managing the challenges described so far in the document, an open 
ended approach was used. This means that no idea was considered impossible and no costs or 
practical limitations were considered. This is done to enhance the creative process and aim at 
discovering spin-off ideas that emerge from the sum of proposals laid out on the designers work 
bench. The following ideas where considered as alternatives to today’s procedures.  
7.2.1 Pyrotechnics 
The use of explosives in the drilling industry to shoot of drill pipe is widely known. This is done when 
drill pipe has been jammed or is stuck in a section of the well. An explosive charge is then lowered 
down to the allocated depth and detonated, freeing large parts of the drill pipe. The affected well 
section is then cemented and can be re-drilled with a new trajectory. Running the explosive charge is 
mostly done with the use of wire line.  A modified version of this method was used by Statoil on one 
of their fixed platforms (Eck-Olsen, 2007). The procedure is based on pre-torqueing the drill string 
with a pre calculated CCW torque. Then the charge is lowered down and detonated at a location near 
a suited TJ, see figure Figure 39. The shock created by the detonation will lower the needed torque 
and open up the TJ connection.   The idea is to use the same setup and performed the following 
procedure.  
 
1. POOH untill drillbitt is inside last casing  
2. Run in wire line tool with explosives through the top drive 
(DDM) inside DP  
3. Activate AHC  
4. Land tool joint in pipe ram, maintaining some tension in 
the DP  
5. Apply CCW torque with DDM  
6. Detonating the charge alongside desired tool joint  
7. Spin out DP and pull inside riser  
8. Close LMRP annular preventer and prepare to disconnect 
the LMRP from BOP  
 
The method is generically visualized in Figure 40.  
 
The method is simple but as explained by Eck-Olsen, there are large 
uncertainties when it comes to the amount of explosives. 
Detonating a large amount of explosives within the BOP would also 
introduce some risk. The main focus would be the sealing capabilities 
of the pipe ram in use and the seals in the wellhead and LMRP connector, after detonation of the 
explosive charge.  In addition to this the torsional energy built up in the CCW pre-torqued drillstring, 
will upon release, create the possibility for another TJ connection to spin out due to inertia. This was 
experienced by Statoil on their field test. This would mean that we might lose the drillstring down on 
the exposed pipe ram and its seals. The entire BOP would then have to be pulled out for inspection 
and repair.  
Figure 39: Drillpipe shown with explosive 
charge (VAM) 
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If the drill pipe is not landed in the slips in the rotary table as described in 7.1.5.3, the torque shock 
would travel all the way up in the DDM, exposing the delicate components for peak loads and 
probably increasing maintenance cost. 
All of the above gives reason to believe that this method would be time consuming, not reliable and 
therefore not be feasible to replace today’s methods.   
 
Figure 40: Idea behind using an explosive charge while disconnecting 
7.2.2 Vibration 
The open ended approach included examining the possibility of introducing a mechanism that 
created vibrations over a tool joint. The idea being that a vibrating tool joint in its resonance zone, 
with a low CCW torque going across it, will unscrew and lower the inherent connection torque. This 
was assessed as a possible way of avoiding the large forces as a result of the full break out torques 
required to carry out a controlled opening of a tool joint connection. The method is generically 
visualized in Figure 41. After discussing the approach for some time, the conclution that  vibrations 
would have possible unforeseen consequences for bolted connections, seal surfaces and various 
advanced assemblies already in place subsea, was taken. This method was therefore also abandoned 
after some initial rounds of developing.  
 
Figure 41: Idea behind using vibration to lower TJ break out torque while disconnecting 
7.2.3 Modified BOP 
In order to keep the system complexity on a minimum and also to minimize costs related to 
necessary modifications, we started to examine the possibility of using existing BOP equipment to 
facilitate de-torque of the TJ connection.  
The idea is to locate and land DP as done today, mechanically in the BOP pipe ram.  Then we 
introduce a set of wide pipe rams spaced vertically one drill pipe length above the landed TJ. This set 
of pipe rams is designed to latch on to the TJ tong space both on the pin and the box end, thereby 
compensating for the variation in TJ lengths. A CCW torque is then applied by the upper pistons, de-
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torqueing the TJ held in place by the engaged BOP pipe ram to a pre-set value. The upper wide pipe 
rams are then retracted, and the TJ in the BOP pipe ram can be spinned out using the DDM. The drill 
pipe is then two separate parts and the upper one can be retracted into the riser. The series of 
actions is shown in Figure 42 
One of the challenges with this method is the use of the BOP as a functional mechanism outside its 
main work area, namely as a barrier. In addition, the pipe ram must handle large torques and must 
be re-designed with regards to its gripping surfaces. The proposal will also include that large torques 
will travel across the BOP stack and the DP body. Large torques over these elements is not the most 
favorable approach. 
This method has been looked at before (Sønstabø, 2007) and in the authors project thesis autumn 
2010. Although the ideas vary in details, the use of the BOP and the introduction of new components 
in the BOP create some initial doubt both by authorities in the form of NPD and by the industry.   
  
 
Figure 42: Modified BOP generic sequence. The TJ in the BOP pipe ram is the one that is de-torqued 
7.2.4 Iron roughneck design 
The topside use of iron roughnecks have been an industry standard for many years. The idea in the 
following sections is to use some of the design features found on topside roughnecks and adapt them 
for the operational requirements stated.   
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Figure 43: Cut away view of concept utilizing circular 
torque tool driven by hydraulic motors shown in red. 
Torque tool shown in right figure 
7.2.4.1 Circular torque Wrench    
One concept in particular was developed in the author’s project thesis was using the 18 ¾” BOP bore 
as a design basis and trying to use a circular design, the use of a circular torque tool became a 
possibility. This concept is called the Circular Torque Wrench (CTW) The idea is to have two sets of 
dice jaws placed with a suitable vertical space out.  Each of the jaw sets consists of 4 pistons. The 
lower pistons are fixed and latch on to the box end of the tool joint and hold it in place. The upper 
set of pistons is located in the torque tool. These pistons are rotated with the torque tool after 
latching on to the pin end of the DP.  This gives the possibility of applying continuous high torque in 
both CW and CCW direction, without having to reorient the grip. This leads to the ability of final 
make up of DP subsea thus minimizing tripping. When the torque wrench is not in use, the pistons 
are retracted and full riser bore is achieved. A fail safe design with regards to full riser bore in all 
eventualities can be built-in by using springs and a failsafe directional control valve. The design is 
clean and slick seen from the riser bore and there is a minimal posibility of stuck DP or tools due to 
the machine. The pressure drop due to drill fluids flowing over the CTW is also greatly reduced 
compared to other concepts studied in the same project. Build-up of  mud additives or hydrate is  
kept to a minum by sealing the riser from the internal CTW components. The complete CTW 
assembly is represented in a cross section view in Figure 43.  
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The torque wrench will be placed above the lower flex joint prior to skidding the BOP out in the 
moonpool area, due to difficulties to obtain a design under the 49 ½” diameter limitations stated in 
the design requirements. This leads to a dependency on available vertical free-play, adding a 
negative characteristic to the design.  The CTW is shown installed on the BOP stack on Figure 44. 
The CTW has a standard riser flange which is connected to a riser when the BOP with CTW is placed 
below rotary. Tension is then applied and the complete subsea stack is run according to today’s 
procedures.. The conceptual dimensions are summarized by: 
CTW Dimensions  
Height between flanges  1195 [mm] 
Width 2114 [mm] 
Depth  1510 [mm] 
Table 11: Conceptual dimensions 
This concept has some drawbacks. The torque tool has a 360° rotation. After additional work was 
performed in the understanding of the de-torque sequence, the assumption that most of the torque 
is removed within the first 30° of rotation, was a feasible design requirement. The full rotation 
therefore complicates the design without adding any large operational advantages. The riser forces 
must be carried over the bolted connection on the outer part of the upper cover. The forces in the 
bolted connection would be large. Applying the dimensioning riser loads mentioned in the design 
requirements, some deflection of the seal surface of the cover be could expect. The design approach 
using the wide cover is not the ideal way of transferring the loads. Work was therefore continued on 
developing a more suited design 
 
Figure 44: BOP stack with CTW installed 
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7.2.4.2 Subsea Iron Roughneck, sector based 
The work on the concepts gave important knowledge into what qualities we wanted from the end 
design. Several good ideas had created the understanding that the components needed to transfer 
the loads in a manner as close to the original marine drilling riser as possible. In addition, we wanted 
to restrict our operational angle of torque, to allow for better load handling and to simplify the 
design. The basic idea of the circular design from the previous concept was a good attack angle and it 
was decided to continue along this path. Out of these conceptual limitations, the idea of using a 
modified riser pup joint was developed.  The basic idea of using a normal riser pup joint modified 
with two vertical flanges for mounting of machinery modules is shown in Figure 45. 
  
Figure 45: Riser pup joint with vertical flanges 
This design gave the following advantages: 
 We could rely on the load bearing parts of the design to be narrower that the 49 ½ “stated in 
the requirements, making it possible to run the concept trough rotary. 
 We could simplify the load bearing part of our design to a level similar as a normal riser pup 
joint. Optimization on the dimensions of the riser pup joint can be done to give it the 
required bending stiffness and length and at the same time use the same modules to house 
the torque machinery.  
 We could modularize our design into machinery modules. This will simplify maintenance on- 
and offshore and create easy handling. It also created the opportunity to utilize several 
locations on the rig for maintenance work etc.    
The end result of the pup joint design is shown in Figure 46. This riser pup join has been tested with 
regards to load cases and has been proven conceptually able to transfer the loads stipulated in the 
design requirements.  For details on load bearing capacities, reference is made to Trond Schou 
Moum’s master thesis (Moum, 2011).   
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With the riser pup joint design established, the focus can be directed towards developing functional 
mechanical modules capable of locating the TJ, delivering the required clamp force and torque. 
Several module designs were looked upon as capable of fulfilling our needs. Reference to Trond 
Schou Moum’s master thesis is given for details on the different layouts and mechanical solutions 
(Moum, 2011). The basis for all the internal designs was the concept of using only two upper 
cylinders and 2 lower cylinders. The internal design chosen will be described in detail.  
The two lower cylinders consist of a tool joint locator and a set of dices designed to be compatible 
with 5 ½” and 6 5/8” DP. The upper cylinder is also fitted with a similar set of dices. One of the lower 
cylinders is shown in Figure 47. The tool joint locator shown in the lower part of the cylinder can be 
moved independently from the rest of the cylinder. 
 
Figure 47:  Lower clamp cylinder with tool joint locator 
 
Figure 46: SIR riser 
pup joint 
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This cylinder set is designed to have the ability to deliver the required makeup and break out torque. 
This is done with the use of a rotating jaw in combination with a slide and a dedicated torque 
cylinder shown in Figure 48. The rotating jaw is driven by a shaft installed vertically in the jaw slide, 
connected to the torque cylinder. The vertical shaft is supported by support slides in the bottom of 
the housing and in the belonging upper cover. This support of the shaft takes the side acting forces as 
a result of the jaw slide path and torque in the TJ. This removes  side forces from the hydraulic 
torque cylinder and protects the cylinders front bushing and seals from accelerated wear. The 
bottom of the housing with the support slide, torque cylinder and vertical shaft is shown in Figure 49. 
In this figure the clamp cylinder is retracted, in figure Figure 50, this cylinder is shown in its expanded 
position.  
 
Figure 48 Rotating jaw with upper and lower jaw slide 
 
Figure 49 : Upper clamp cylinder shown without its cover installed and with/without rotating jaw  
This rotating jaw design has high torque capacities in both CW and CCW direction. The design allows 
for optimization of the slide path when practical tests show the needed torque-turn graphs.  The 
rotation of the dice jaw is shown in Figure 50.  The design chosen fulfills the 15° requirement stated 
in the design requirements.   
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The upper and lower clamp cylinder is installed in the machinery module housing vertically above 
one another with a spacing designed to comply with the available tong spaces. This is shown in 
Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51: Machinery module with transparent cover on upper clamp cylinder 
The complete machinery modules with  its internal components are bolted on to the vertical flanges 
on the SIR riser pup joint. This is shown in figure Figure 52. This unit is placed above the BOP as 
illustrated in Figure 53. 
 
Figure 52: The SIR with all components installed 
Figure 50: Upper clamp cylinder shown without cover installed. Torque mechanism in retracted and expanded 
position giving a 15 ° operational rotation 
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The operational sequence of the SIR is thoroughly presented in chapter 8 and the SIR de-torque 
sequence is visualized in Appendix 18. The SIR concept has the physical conceptual dimensions 
illustrated in Table 12. For more details on dimensions, reference is made to Appendix 15 to 
Appendix 17.  
SIR Dimensions  
Height between flanges  2500 [mm] 
Width including modules 3875 [mm] 
Width excluding modules 990 [mm] 
Depth  990 [mm] 
Max weight in air 16  [tons] 
Table 12: SIR conceptual dimensions and weight 
The riser pup joint is transported to and from vessel location with protector plates installed on the 
machine module flanges. The plates should be designed such that all sealing surfaces are protected 
and the fasteners used are protected from damages occurring while handling the equipment.  
 
 
Figure 53: The SIR installed on the BOP 
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7.3 Rating concepts 
Before detailed engineering is started, the best concept will have to be chosen. There are several 
methods used today to rate conceptual designs. This particular step of a design process is often 
associated with loose assumptions and “gut feeling” as the most common rating method performed 
is a quantitative system rating. 
The system is evaluated by a set of criteria’s and given a value based on its assumed or historical 
performance on a scale from for example 1-10 where 10 is the best performance. The criteria’s are 
given a relative importance, often called weighting factor. The overall summation of the performance 
value multiplied with the criteria weighting factor, will give the system/concept overall performance 
(Thompson, 1999): 
                           
 
(1)   
 
 
Where : P   = Overall performance  
     = Criteria performance value 
     = Criteria relative importance 
 
The design proposal with the highest number value of P will be the preferred conceptual design 
based on the weighting and the performance values given by the designers.  
 
One problem by using the above described method is that numerous criteria’s are used. This migh 
create a tendency to produce an overall performance value of similar level for all of the designs 
because the good and bad aspects of each design tend to average out to a common level.  
As mentioned above, this method is often given a gut feeling approach as many of the performance 
values must be estimated using engineering reasoning. This method is therefore also prone to some 
subjective bias(Thompson, 1999). 
 
It is therefore important to give reasonable arguments when assessing the performance values. The 
numbers must under no circumstances be “plucked from the air”. 
 
One method mentioned in the relevant literature (Thompson, 1999) is to choose a “neutral” design 
and design criteria’s, then rating the other conceptual designs with this datum concept as a base line. 
The subsequent rating is performed only with the use of summation and subtraction signs, the 
method is shown in Figure 54. This gives a more qualitative approach with fewer pitfalls in a 
conceptual phase where few or none details are accessible to the designer. 
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Figure 54: Quantitative concept evaluations method example(Thompson, 1999) 
 
There is also a method for evaluating if too many criteria’s have been used and that the good sides 
wheigh up for the bad sides of the specific design. This method is called Device performance index 
(DPI) and is a quantitative method. It is more or less built up in the same manner as the quantitative 
addition method, but aims at reducing the shadow effects and is thus an improved method. The 
same rules apply to this method when assessing performance values, the number of criteria’s and 
the criteria relative importance. The formula of weighted DPI can be expressed as (Thompson, 1999): 
 
      
   
 
  
  
 
 
(2)   
Where:      = Overall concept performance using Device performance index  
         = Criteria performance value 
         = Criteria relative importance 
 
Our approach to this challenge is to use a scale from 1-5 where 3 is a neutral attribute and 5 is the 
best score. We will try to minimize the number of criteria’s taken into the account and to use 
weighting factors only when strictly necessary. We will base our rating on the basic addition method 
but will perform a sensitivity analysis with a weighted DPI method to see if the outcome of our 
analysis will be different. This will combine what we find attractive with the qualitative “plus-minus 
“method with the more agile quantitative addition method. At the same time this will give a insight 
into the strength of our results when performing a DPI rating.  
The concepts chosen to be rated is the modified BOP covered in Section 7.2.3, the CTW covered in 
7.2.4.1, and the SIR covered in Section 7.2.4.2 
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7.3.1 Rating results 
The rating results using the summation method is shown in Table 13.  
 
Concept 
weight factor 
 
CTW BOP SIR 
Safety: 
    5 interference on existing safety 
systems 5 1 5 
4 operational reliability 3 3 4 
 Safety sum 37 17 41 
Handling: 
    
3 
additional rigging needed in running 
and retrieval  
1 3 2 
4 height 1 4 3 
2 width 2 3 5 
2 weight (est. in air) 2 4 3 
1 hydrodynamical impact 3 4 2 
 Handling sum 18 43 36 
Technical: 
    2 manufacturing complexity 2 3 5 
3 load handling 2 4 4 
1 drill cuttings build-up 4 4 4 
1 pressure drop over the components 3 4 4 
3 maintainability 3 2 5 
1 required redesign of existing 
systems 5 1 5 
 Technical sum 31 33 50 
Operational: 
    3 localizing tool joint 3 5 3 
1 centering 3 5 3 
2 grip on lower part of tool joint (box) 5 2 5 
2 grip on upper part of tool joint (pin) 5 5 5 
2 torque 5 3 5 
1 speed 5 2 5 
3 operational repetability 5 2 5 
2 monitoring accuracy 4 1 4 
3 operational complexity 4 1 5 
 Operational sum 82 53 85 
 
TOTAL WEIGHTED SCORE 168 146 212 
Table 13: Rating of the concepts using the summation method 
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Using the DPI method we get the result shown in Table 14 
 
Concept 
Weight factor 
 
CWT BOP SIR 
Safety: 
    5 interference on existing safety systems 5 1 5 
4 operational reliability 3 3 4 
 Safety sum 3,9 1,4 4,5 
Handling: 
    
3 additional rigging needed in running and retrieval 
1 3 2 
4 height 1 4 3 
2 width 2 3 5 
2 weight (est. in air) 2 4 3 
1 hydrodynamical impact 3 4 2 
 Handling sum 1,3 3,5 2,7 
Technical: 
    2 manufacturing complexity 2 3 5 
3 load handling 2 4 4 
1 drill cuttings build-up 4 4 4 
1 pressure drop over the components 3 4 4 
3 maintainability 3 2 5 
1 required redesign of existing systems 5 1 5 
 Technical sum 2,6 2,5 4,5 
Operational: 
    3 localizing tool joint 3 5 3 
1 centering 3 5 3 
2 grip on lower part of tool joint (box) 5 2 5 
2 grip on upper part of tool joint (pin) 5 5 5 
2 torque 5 3 5 
1 speed 5 2 5 
3 operational repetability 5 2 5 
2 monitoring accuracy 4 1 4 
3 operational complexity 4 1 5 
 Operational sum 2,7 1,6 2,3 
TOTAL WEIGHTED SCORE 2,5 2,1 3,8 
Table 14: Rating of the concepts using the DPI method 
Applying the results of both rating methods , reveals  that the SIR design is the concept that receives 
consistent better rating. Based on this and a dialogue between the designers and their advisors, the 
SIR concept is chosen as a basis for all further design work.  
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7.4 Cost reduction with improved disconnection method 
Earlier in this thesis an operational log was presented, showing in detail the time spent on while 
preparing and waiting on weather on a midwater well. 19 hours and 45 minutes was used from the 
decision was made to RIH with the EDPHOT, to the actual disconnection.  
There are two points that are important to emphasize in this context: 
 The weather did not show trends of exceeding the operational limits before approximately 
45 minutes before disconnection of the LMRP.  
 The weather could easily have calmed down at that time, making the use of the EDPHOT and 
the subsequent WOW, unnecessary.  
In both cases, a more efficient way of disconnecting would be preferred.  
We assume that the displacing of the marine drilling riser will take 1,3 hours including all activities 
(lining up, pumping etc.) and that the DP de-torque and hang off sequence is completed within 5 
minutes.  
Based on the reduction in time used by the elimination of the EDPHOT, the decision to displace and 
prepare for hang off would be done on the basis of new criteria’s with regards to environmental 
conditions. We can therefore say that the rig would be operative and constructing well until Saturday 
morning at 0330, 17 hours and 30 minutes later than with the use of the EDPHOT.  
This gives a reduction from 19 hours and 45 minutes to 2 hours and 15 minutes. Assuming the same 
standby rate of 350 000 $/day, this would give the operator a 255210 $ cost saving due to reduced 
WOW. We are now only conceding one well and one possible disconnection. If the new and wider 
operational limitations had not been exceeded, the cost saving would be higher as it would not be 
necessary to interfere with planed well construction tasks at all.  
The reconnection savings are not large on the water depths in this operational example, as it only 
involve less than 300 meters of tripping each direction, but the time used on tripping is, as stated 
before, is proportional with water depth.  
The fact that the new and wider operational limits will be in place due to shorter operational times, 
will affect the operations in arctic areas in a positive way. In Section 6.2 a two cases where assumed 
disconnection probabilities and the subsequent operational cost while operating in arctic 
environments was presented.  . It is now possible to re-assess the assumptions in light of the new 
info on time needed to disconnect and give new estimates of costs related to disconnections using 
the SIR concept.   
The yearly cost for each rig amounted to 1 083 483$. If we choose to implement the SIR method, 
planned and unplanned disconnections can be treated in the same manner. The operational 
limitations will be wider and the number of hazardous situations resulting in an actual disconnection 
preparation will be lower. The probability of planned disconnections will therefore be reduced. On 
the other hand, the emergency disconnections will have to be treated in the same way as today for 
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safety reasons. Based on this and assuming yearly rate of disconnection for the different methods, 
we can calculate the new costs related to planned and unplanned disconnections: 
 
Method  Possibility/well 
Use of drill pipe hang off tool: 0,25 
Hanging off the drill pipe and shearing  0,1 
emergency disconnection 0,01 
Table 15:  Possibility disconnection /well with the SIR 
Assuming the same 55 day well completion time, gives a yearly production of 6.6 wells. Using this we 
can estimate the yearly amount of disconnections: 
Method Possibility*well/year Number of yearly 
disconnections 
Use of drill pipe hang off tool: 0,25*6,6 1,65 
Hanging off the drill pipe and 
shearing 
0,1*6,6 0,66 
emergency disconnection 0,01*6,6 0,066 
Table 16:  Yearly amount of disconnections with the SIR 
  
Method Number of yearly 
disconnections 
Yearly 
disconnection*The 
sum of disconnect and 
reconnect time *day 
rate 
Yearly cost related to 
disconnections in 
dollars 
 
Using the SIR 1,65+0,66 2,31*1,0834*20833 56 145 
Emergency 
disconnection 
0,066 0,066*48*20833 65 999 
Yearly total  4,026  118 134 
Table 17: Cost related to planned and unplanned disconnections using SIR 
In chapter 6.2 it was estimated that the cost associated with disconnections due to arctic operations 
amounts to 1 083 483 $/year for one rig operating on midwater wells and 3 748 878 $/year on 
ultradeepwater wells.  
 
 
The cost for both these cases are now reduced   to 118 134 $/year, a reduction of 965 350 $/year and 
3 630 744 $/year corresponding to an 89 % and 97% reduction in costs related to planned and 
unplanned disconnections. This reduction is not only monetary ,but in some areas where the open 
water conditions only last for say 60-70 days, the possibility of saving a few days due to less non-
productive time, is welcome. Such time savings might be de difference between having large enough 
time safety margins around the well construction time in the open water period, using a small 
conventional MODU and going over to a more expensive specialized vessel designed for operations in 
ice. This difference might make many wells commercially attractive in the harsh environments in the 
Arctic.  
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8 Operational procedure 
The final concept and its limitations and dimensions have now been established. This gives  the basis 
of creating installation, operating and retrieval procedures as the interface between rig and 
components are now  given. This will be the focus of this chapter.  
8.1 Installation 
 The SIR is landed onboard and inspected according to procedure, upon arrival offshore. 
 The riser joint is handled with the same tools as other riser pup joints an lifted up to the 
vessels drill floor  
 The BOP is skidded out under rotary while the riser pup joint is lowered down through the 
rotary table.  
 The pup joint lower flange is made up with the riser flange on the lower flex joint.  
 The SIR machinery module flange protector plates are removed 
 The machine modules can then be rigged from their storage location to their final   position 
on the riser pup joint. This is done with the help of lifting yokes that are designed for a 
horizontal lift as the component will have a center of gravity that probably will give us a tilt 
angle if we lift after the flange. The joke should also have some guide pins that locates the 
right hole pattern on the two mating flanges to save rigging time.  
 The control system is connected to obtain hydraulic and control capabilities. 
 When the machinery modules are completely installed the final function and pressure tests 
can be made.   
 Conventional riser is ready to be run through rotary and connected to the upper flange on 
the SIR  
 Kill, choke, booster and other auxiliary riser lines are kicked out from the conventional riser 
and run via flexible hoses over the SIR and lower flex joint, similar to the method used to 
cross the lower flex joint with today’s auxiliary lines.   
 The weight of the BOP complete BOP stack, LMRP and SIR is picked up and the skid deck is 
removed.  
The riser string is then run according to company procedures and landed/connected to the wellhead 
installed subsea. Running procedure complete 
The day to day operation will not experience any differences when the SIR is installed and dormant.  
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8.2 De-torque procedures 
As described earlier in Chapter 6 there are several triggering factors that might arise and give the 
drillers/company man’s/OIM’s attention and give reason to prepare for an upcoming disconnect. 
When the decision to disconnect is made topside, the procedure performed by the driller will be:  
1. POOH to drillbitt is inside last casing  
2. Activate AHC   
3. Set pressure regulator on tool joint locator  in SIR to a low value to allow for vertical motion 
of drill pipe(500psi),  
4. Tool joint locator is moved partly out in the annulus 
5. Space out tool joint to be ca. 2 m above lower pipe ram in SIR  
6. Center the DP using the upper annular preventer 
7. Partly engage the TJ  so that movement is registered  on both the tool joint locators 
8. Slowly lower the drill pipe and set of 5 tons on tool joint locator 
9. Engage the tool joint with lower rams with  the recommended clamp force on the drill pipe 
size in use 
10. Activate the upper rams to engage the pin end of the hanged of tool joint. Pressure should 
be regulated to achieve recommended clamp force   
11. Open upper annular preventer 
12. Activate CCW de-torque sequence.  
13. Pick up the 5 tons resting on the lower ram. 
14. Retract upper and lower jaws  in the SIR 
15. Space out de-torqued TJ to be 2 meters above pipe ram in BOP 
16. Activate BOP pipe ram with regulated pressure to allow for vertical motion of the DP (500 
psi) 
17. Land tool joint in BOP pipe ram, following the stipulated BOP vendors landing procedures.  
18. Spin out tool joint by applying CCW torque using the DDM  
19. Pull DP into riser  
20. Close LMRP annular preventer and prepare to disconnect the LMRP from BOP  in compliance 
with today’s existing procedures. 
 
Depending on the hazard faced and the assumed situational trends, displacement of the riser can 
have been done during the entire process or start at a later stage. This is a decision that is up to 
the driller/toolpusher and company man. The equipment is designed with continuous circulation 
in mind under the entire process.  The process is illustrated in Figure 55 and in Appendix 18. 
 
Figure 55: Illustrated SIR operational procedure 
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8.3 Reconnection of LMRP DP procedure 
A reconnection can be summarized by the following procedure: 
1. When hazard is reduced to acceptable level , preparations are started to landing LMRP 
2. Seal ring on hydraulic LMRP connector is replaced by ROV 
3. Guide wires are tensioned  
4. LMRP landed 
5. Read back pressure is obtained 
6. When pressure is equalized between riser and well, preventers and required rams can be 
opened 
7. Activate AHC and run DP into the BOP  
8. DP is centered with the use of  the upper annular preventer  
9. The pin is connected to the hug off box end in the BOP pipe ram 
10. The threaded connection is made up temporarily with the use of the DDM 
11. Complete DP string is lifted up above the SIR  
12. Sett pressure regulator on tool joint locator  in SIR to a low value to allow for vertical 
motion of drill pipe(500psi),  
13. Tool joint locator is moved partly out in the annulus 
14. Space out tool joint to be ca. 2 m above lower pipe ram in SIR  
15. Center the DP using the upper annular preventer 
16. Partly engage the TJ  such that movement is registered  on both tool joint locators 
17. Slowly lower the drill pipe with the draw work and set of 5 tons on tool joint locator 
18. Engage the tool joint with lower rams with  the recommended clamp force on the drill 
pipe size in use 
19. Activate the upper rams to engage the pin end of the hanged of tool joint. Pressure 
should be regulated to achieve recommended clamp force   
20. Open upper annular preventer 
21. Activate CW torque sequence.  
22. Pick up the 5 tons resting on the lower ram. 
23. Retract upper and lower jaws  in the SIR 
24. Land TJ in bidirectional test ram following the supplier procedures 
25. Perform pressure test of hydraulic connector seal ring using the bi-directional BOP test 
ram.   
26. When this test is accepted, normal drilling operation can resume. 
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8.4 Retrieval procedures 
The riser is retrieved according to existing procedures in place today with the following exception: 
1. The BOP comes up through the splash zone 
2. BOP lifted above skid deck level 
3. Skid deck is positioned below BOP 
4. BOP is landed on skid deck 
5. Flexible auxiliary riser lines across the flex joint and SIR  are removed  
6. SIR machinery module is removed 
7. SIR control system is removed 
8. Lower SIR flange is disconnected from flex joint riser flange 
9. Flange protector plates are installed 
10. SIR pup joint is picked up and run through rotary 
11. SIR pup joint is laid down on deck 
SIR machinery modules and pup joint is the subject of routine inspection and maintenance according 
to operational log findings and as a result of the use it has been subjected to on wells completed.  
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9 Control end monitoring 
As the SIR concept is proven operational and mechanical feasible, the need for control and 
monitoring should be addressed. The complex nature of the operational sequence combined with 
our need to know and to some extent log our functional actions, demands a thoroughly thought 
through control philosophy 
Before starting to look at control concept, the control system requirements should be established. 
These requirements will have to give guidance on the following points: 
 Number of hydraulic users 
o Pressure rating needed to deliver required force 
o The volume needed to complete one working cycle 
 Monitoring needs 
o What do is required to monitor 
o What refresh rates is required on the data 
 Energy 
o What hydraulic flow rates will users need 
o What additional subsea equipment will need power and how much do they need 
9.1 Conceptual requirements 
Being in the conceptual design phase means that several of these requirements are not settled as 
there has been limited detailed engineering performed. We can however establish what we know 
and work as far as possible with the information at hand. When more detailed information is 
specified, this can be implemented thus supporting or rejecting the assumptions made in the 
conceptual phase. 
The system consists of four main cylinders that are used to locate and fixate the tool joint that we 
want to de-torque. In addition, two cylinders to achieve the rotational torque needed to make up/ 
break out the tool joint to the planned torque. The tool joint locator is also positioned by the use of 
two cylinders. This give a total minimum of 8 hydraulic user’s subsea. 
The hydraulic force applied on the drill pipe and tool joint will have to be regulated depending on the 
drill pipe in question and its recommended brake/make up torque. This will have to be done with the 
use of hydraulic pressure regulators. The basic design will therefore need pressure regulators for: 
 Locating the TJ 
 Adjusting clamp force on lower jaws 
 Adjusting clamp force on upper jaws 
 Regulate applied torque  
This gives us a total of 4 pressure regulators. 
These regulators deliver pressure to processes that should be synchronized relatively to each other. 
This must be done by monitoring their position using the linear variable differential transformer 
technology. This will give the position of each cylinder and will have to be coordinated with the 
cylinders directional control valve (DCV) for regulation of speed and of position.  
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The data collected subsea, will need to be visualized and logged topside.   The data gathered from 
subsea load cells, pressure sensors etc. will need to have a lower limit of refreshment. To be able to 
readout the forces every 0, 5 second is estimated as an absolute lower refresh limit. This refresh rate 
is chosen to be able to log rapid changes in applied forces due to stick friction and/or impurities 
creating minor jams in threaded connections etc. Depending on the control system chosen, these 
refresh rates can increased to almost infinite readouts. But all the control systems that are feasible 
should be able to refresh every 0, 5 second.    
Several control options were considered when preparing this master thesis. They were: 
 Use of existing BOP control system 
 Use of battery powered subsea hydraulic power unit with acoustic link to  the surface vessel 
 Use of a separate system based on  hydraulic conduit and electrical cable  to the surface 
vessel 
 Accumulator based energy stored subsea with possibility for recharging using ROV. Acoustic 
link to surface vessel 
The practice of operating hydraulically mechanisms subsea is widespread within the drilling industry, 
through the use of the well-known BOP.  A conventional BOP control system could in many ways be 
able to facilitate our control and monitoring needs. An introduction to existing BOP control system 
will therefore be given.  
9.2 BOP control systems 
All of the mechanical functions of a BOP have in common that a hydraulically driven piston is being 
forced to move in the desired direction.  The control system should therefore in the end;  
Direct hydraulic fluid at the correct operating pressure, to the appropriate side of piston associated 
with the desired function. The fluid on the other side of the piston must at the same time be able to 
escape to the surroundings or to a reservoir. This must be done while maintaining a high degree of 
operational reliability and with minimal environmental implications.   
Several different control systems have been and are in use. The different approaches can be divided 
into these main groups: 
 Direct hydraulic 
 Indirect  hydraulic  
 Multiplex  
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9.2.1 Direct hydraulic   
In the beginning, the use of BOP’s was developed for use on land rigs. This meant that both the 
control system and the BOP itself was and is accessible for hands on verification and maintenance. 
The distance from the Hydraulic Pressure Unit (HPU) to the BOP is limited by the distance looked 
upon as safe by the crew setting up the land rig as can be seen in Figure 56. The system is designed 
as a directly hydraulic operated system which means that there is dedicated hydraulic hoses for each 
function from the hydraulic control manifold to the functional user. These hoses are big bore hoses 
to improve the hydraulic flow when operating a function. The associated pressure drop over a length 
of pipe/hose can be described as (Kjølle, 1995): 
     
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
(3)   
Where:  = pressure drop  
     = fluid density  
     = friction coefficient as a function of the Reynolds number and the pipe wall roughness   
     = Length of pipe to be used 
    = pipe diameter 
   =  the flow velocity  
 
Studying this expression we see that the flow velocity affects the pressure drop by the power of two. 
Increasing the sectional areal i.e. the diameter, we will deliver the same volumetric flow to the user, 
but reduce the flow velocity. At the same time the increased diameter is contributing to a lower    
as the function is divided by D.  It can therefore be concluded that it will be beneficial from a 
hydraulic point of view, to operate with large diameter hoses or pipes. 
 
 As mentioned in the definition of what a BOP system must fulfill, the need for fluid escape is stated. 
This is called venting and refers to ventilation of the chamber that is going to be compressed such 
that the fluid occupying the volume can escape.  The vented side of the user in a direct hydraulic 
system is drained to the main reservoir trough the dedicated hose already connected to that side of 
the user. The system is therefore classified as a closed hydraulic system with no spills to the 
surrounding environment.  This control approach is still in use on land rigs, jack-up’s and platforms as 
the BOP sits accessible for the crew and where the distance from the hydraulic unit to the end user is 
small.   
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Master Thesis 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
Figure 56: Land rig BOP setup(P.Potter, 2011) 
 
When the industry started operating from floating drilling rigs in the 60’s, the practice of deploying 
the BOP in the water and operating it while situated on the seafloor was introduced.  The same 
direct hydraulic principles were used.  
With time, the operational water depths kept on increasing. The subsequent length of hydraulic hose 
exposed to operational pressure would therefore increase correspondingly.  
When pressurized from the ambient pressure to the working pressure of 1500-3000 psi, flexible 
hydraulic hose is somewhat expandable, the consequence of this being a time lag from activation of 
function topside to required pressure buildup and function execution subsea. The change in conduit 
cross sectional areal can be expressed as(Kjølle, 1995): 
   
    
   
 
 
(4)   
Where:    = is the change in cross-sectional area  
 D    = Is the conduit diameter 
       = Is the pressure change 
 E     = Is the Young’s modulus of the combined conduit wall 
       = Is the wall thickness 
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We see that the change cross-sectional area is highly dependent on the conduit diameter and of 
course by the pressure change. Utilizing large diameter hydraulic hoses will introduce a large time lag 
to account for the “extra volume” needed to sufficiently expand and pressurize the hose or pipe. 
This was also the case when moving into deeper waters. Following this trend, API stated maximum 
closing times in the regulations governing BOP control systems, API 16d. In this document it is stated 
under section 5.2.1 (API16D, JANUARY 2005): 
“The control system for a subsea BOP stack shall be designed to deliver power fluid at sufficient 
volume and pressure to operate selected functions within allowable response times. The control 
system shall have a closing response time not exceeding 45 sec.for each ram BOP. Closing response 
time for each annular BOP shall not exceed 60 sec. Operating response time for each choke and kill 
valve (either open or close) shall not exceed the minimum observed ram close response time. The 
response time to unlatch the riser (LMRP) connector shall not exceed 45 sec. 
Conformance with response time specifications shall be demonstrated by manufacturer’s calculations, 
by simulated physical testing or by interface with the actual BOP stack.” 
 
 To meet these requirements, the system designers looked at ways to lower the time used to execute 
a function.  Two important system changes was implemented: 
 Venting to sea 
 Indirect hydraulic systems 
Venting to sea meant that the hydraulic losses associated with “pushing” the vented hydraulic 
medium trough pipes and hoses all the way to the surface reservoir, was dropped. The hydraulic 
medium that up to now had been petroleum based, had to be changed out to water based , to 
reduce the harmful environmental effects of venting to sea. Water based BOP fluid consists of 
potable water with additives aiming at giving the fluid the right lubricating and corrosion inhibiting 
effects. In colder climates, like Norwegian waters, ethanol is also added to give the fluid the 
appropriate freezing temperature, avoiding hydraulic freeze up of the system. 
In Norwegian waters there is established additional requirements with regards to venting of water 
based BOP fluid based on environmental politics. It is not allowed in planned non-critical operations, 
creating the need for a return path for the vented fluids back to the topside reservoir thus 
eliminating the time advantage of lower hydraulically losses associated with venting to sea.  
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9.2.2 Indirect hydraulic systems 
A large diameter hose being pressurized tend to expand as mentioned earlier. The design philosophy 
behind indirect hydraulic system is that it uses only one operational hydraulic conduit connected to a 
bank of subsea accumulators. Depending on the system design, an electric or hydraulic signal is sent 
down to control valves located subsea, thus reducing reaction times. These systems are divided in 
two: 
 Pilot operated hydraulic 
o Using Sub Plate Mounted (SPM) valves 
 Electro hydraulic 
o Using solenoid valves 
 In this section, the pilot operated hydraulic system will be explained in more detail.  
The pilot operated control system is based on: 
 Transmitting hydraulic power down to the BOP through a large diameter conduit  
 Hydraulic pilot signals are sent down smaller lines to pilot valves that in turn directs 
hydraulic power to the appropriate function 
Following from equation 4 in section 9.2.1, a reduction in diameter will have a substantial impact on 
the change of cross-sectional area thus greatly reducing the associated time lag.  Choosing to build 
the system this way also reduces the size of the umbilical going down to the BOP. A typical control 
umbilical is shown in Figure 57. The large diameter supply hose located in the center of the umbilical, 
give low hydraulic flow losses when used and can be used for all the different functions required to 
fully operate the BOP.   
  
Figure 57: BOP control umbilical on pilot operated system(Vetco) 
The difference is now that large parts of the control system now were out of reach of the subsea 
engineer. To increase the operative reliability, a duplicate of the control system with the possibility of 
switching between two identical subsea parts of the system, created the needed redundancy. 
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The system now consist of: 
• HPU 
• Master control panel with secondary panel situated in the accommodation unit 
• Hose reels with supporting systems for running umbilicals 
• Dual set of identical umbilicals called pod cables 
• Dual identical control pod’s, housing the subsea control equipment 
• End users 
 
 
Figure 58: Pilot operated Control system(P.Potter, 2011) 
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The valves that the pilot hydraulic lines act upon are called Sub Plate Mounted (SPM) valves and 
there is one SPM valve for each hydraulic side of a function. A generic SPM valve is shown in 
Appendix 19. The SPM’s are located in the control pods on the LMRP. A small hydraulic line can in 
this way control a much larger volumetric flow, thus allowing designers to increase system water 
depth compatibility, while still maintaining all onboard equipment handling and API time 
requirements. The system is vulnerable to contaminations in the BOP control fluid as they will 
degrade the SPM vales and shuttle valves capabilities to seal due to the impurities hindering a 100 % 
contact face on the seal surface of the components.   
Summing up, the design has its limitations which are closely connected to the reaction times as 
water depths increase. This created the need to eliminate the time lag experienced with the 
hydraulic signal transfer. Recent developments in umbilical design have given room for claims that 
pilot operated system can, under some circumstances,  operate within the API requirements up to 
10000 feet(3048 meters)(P.Potter, 2011) 
The pilot operated system is widely used in the industry today and will continue to be used due to its 
established technics and known design. It is in most aspects possible to do most of the maintenance 
and smaller modifications onboard by a skilled subsea engineer due to the systems low complexity 
level and well-known mechanical functions that are the foundation of the design 
 
Pros: 
 Simple “comprehensible” design 
 Relatively cheap  
 Can handle a large number of subsea users 
Cons 
 Water depth limitations 
 Only hydraulic connection between subsea and topside, no data transfer  
 Rely on SPM valves and is therefore vulnerable to control fluid contamination  
 
9.2.3 Multiplexer control system 
As the industry moved into even deeper waters with harsher well environments like for example high 
pressure and temperature wells (HPHT), the hydraulic time lag became a limitation. There was also a 
market for monitoring temperature and pressure on several sensors in the subsea stack at the same 
time. The pilot operated system allows for read back of pressure, but no data signals is transferred 
due to the pure hydraulic connection between the topside equipment and the subsea stack. This is 
where the multiplex system becomes attractiv. Multiplex BOP control was first introduced in 1976 
(A.N. Vujasinovic, 1988) and have gone through 5 design modifications and is now on a 6th 
generation, implementing new technology to improve system reliability and performance.  
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The multiplex control system is often referred to as the MUX system. A multiplexer is defined 
as(wikipedia, 2011): 
“Multiplexer is a device that combines several input information signals into one output signal, which 
carries several communication channels, by means of some multiplex technique” 
This is a good way of describing the actions undertaken by the system as we want to control several 
aspects of the operation of a modern BOP. The range of signals varies from hydraulic operations to 
pressure read backs, temperatures, TV-signals, stresses, positions etc.(API16D, JANUARY 2005). The 
nature of the signal can therefore be of a diverse origin, however, all the information is modulated  
to electronic signals and sent via fiber cables from the vessel to the subsea equipment where the 
signal is interpreted. When a command is received subsea, a verification signal is sent back to the 
surface equipment so that errors in the command can be detected. When the surface equipment 
receives the correct verification signal, a last execution signal is sent down again and the action is 
performed. The use of fiber optics gives us a signal transfer time that is negligible, enabeling close to 
unlimited real-time monitoring possibilities. This means that the signals can be sent back and forth 
for verification thus almost eliminating the MUX process as an error source without time lag being 
added.   
In Figure 59, a MUX umbilical is shown. The cable on the picture measures 1” in diameter. This is 
relatively small compared to pilot operated BOP umbillicals. This reduction in pod cable dimensions 
reduces the overall system dimensions on topside cable reels and supporting equipment for running 
of the cables. Conventional electric power cables can be seen alongside fiber optic cables as the 
information carrier.  
 
Figure 59: MUX cable(Umbilicals-International) 
As seen in Figure 59, the MUX cable has no hydraulic conduit. The hydraulic pressure is delivered 
subsea by riser auxiliary lines as mentioned in Section 3.1.2. This is rigid pipe with much lower 
expansion rates that the flexible conduit used in umbilicals. The hydraulic riser line is connected to a 
subsea bank of accumulators to minimize the response time from execution signal to process 
completion subsea.  A generic MUX setup is shown in Appendix 20. 
The MUX system uses similar components as the SPM valves but these are now driven by electric 
signals received from the subsea MUX control pods. They are named differently by each 
manufacturer, but will in this document be referred to as Direct Drive Valves (DDV’s) a term used by 
NOV/Shaffer.  
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The BOP stack after the DDV’s can be, and often is, similar to a pilot operated stack, but are now not 
limited by the need for  dedicated   pilot lines to facilitate a function and can therefore increase the 
subsea users as wished. As mentioned, sensors that feed the system with pressure and temperatures 
can now be utilized for a better understanding of the operational situation subsea. This is a great 
advantage as it will increase the understanding of the process involved in real-time, providing a 
powerful tool in the work minimizing the risks involved.    
Pros 
• Large reduction in size of  hose bundles 
 The need for subsea accumulators is lower as the rigid pipe has better characteristics and can 
deliver a quicker hydraulic response  
 Dramatic quickening of response times 
 Possible to transfer real-time diverse data over an information carrier 
Cons 
• Requirement for more auxiliary lines on riser 
• More equipment mounted on LMRP 
• Can be more costly in both the acquisition  and operating phase due to high system 
complexity 
• Will require a higher dependency on specialist workers for modification etc.  
9.3 Conceptual control options  
This section gives an evaluation of each of the control options intended to use on the concept and 
listed at the beginning of this chapter 
The SIR will, independent of control scheme, need to perform the same mechanical and operational 
features. This give rise to assuming a more or less identical mechanical layout of the SIR itself with 
regards to hydraulic users and the pressure/vent requirements they impose. A simplified Hydraulic 
drawing is presented Figure 60. This will be the basis for the control needs. In addition to this there 
will be the need for energy storage subsea to gain a quick mechanical response when operating the 
equipment from a topside position. This is addressed first 
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Figure 60: Generic hydraulic arrangement of the SIR 
9.3.1 Energy storage subsea 
Maintaining large enough quantities and availability of energy subsea have been solved in different 
ways throughout the offshore oil and gas industry’s history. In this section a quick look at 
accumulators and batteries will be undertaken to see what possibilities there might be on the layout 
of our control system. 
9.3.1.1 Accumulators 
The use of accumulator banks for subsea use has a long operational history. In recent years when 
drilling and operations have taken us into deeper waters, the attentions to accumulator performance 
has increased.  
In Figure 61 the estimated useable volume of the accumulators is shown. It is clearly seen, that the 
available hy,draulic volume dramatically reduces 
at deeper waters. On BOP’s ,API spec 16D and 
NPD both state safety margins on the available 
hydraulic volume which together with increased 
operational water depth  leads to a very large 
accumulator bank subsea.  Considering a 
standard 55 liter, 690 bar steel accumulator, 
one bottle weighs way 255 kg in air (A.S. 
Bamford, 2008). On a normal deepwater subsea 
BOP, the number of accumulator bottles in a 
complete BOP stack, can be in the range of      
Figure 61: Usable accumulator volume (Sattler, 2002) 
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50-130. It can clearly be seen that the sheer size of the accumulators and also the weight of the bank 
can create unwanted side effects on the subsea system.   
The favorable part of using accumulators is that it is a known technology familiar to the offshore 
crew and operational/maintenance engineers onshore.  
9.3.1.2 Batteries 
The battery system has a long record of subsea use in oceanographic and submersible applications 
like petroleum production, BOP backup etc. The use of batteries as single source energy provider in 
our water depths, would not involve technical innovations (A.S. Bamford, 2008). There have been 
developed prototypes of all-electric BOPs capable of shearing tubulars, only using battery packs as 
energy source. The inherent energy in a battery pack is not effected by water depth at all, however, 
there are some factors that reduces available energy when considering batteries as energy source 
such as (A.S. Bamford, 2008): 
 Low temperatures which will be experienced at deep waters and in the arctic might reduce 
the capacity with 20 % 
 If the system is designed to operate with high current rates, the amount of energy that can 
be drawn from the battery might be reduced by 80% 
 Batteries must be designed to deliver high current rates or damage to the internal parts of 
the batteries can be expected.  
Some concern with the use of batteries relates to available energy to complete several operational 
sequences with the SIR. This thesis does not deal with this challenge in particular, but after reading 
several articles (A.S. Bamford, 2008), (Halvorsen, 2008) this is consider possible. Both directly high 
effect electric –hydraulic driven designs and a smaller low effect HPU charging a accumulator bank is 
looked upon as feasible by the author.  
A significant weight and size reduction can be associated with the use of batteries compared to 
standard accumulators. Bamford’s work concerning a shearing operation of tubulars estimated  there 
energy need to be covered using 41 accumulator bottles weighing approximately 10,5 ton  ,at the 
same time the energy amount could be replaced by 6 batteries of commercially available quality with 
a total weight of 204 kg. This was when considering ultra-deep waters and using standard 
accumulators of 55 liters. The size difference is illustrated in Figure 62. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Figure 62: 41 Accumulator bottles versus 6 batteries (A.S. Bamford, 2008) 
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9.3.2 Use of existing BOP control system 
In Section 9.2 an introduction was given to existing BOP control systems in use on the MODU fleet 
around the world. Our concept will in many ways require much of the same capabilities when it 
comes to applying a hydraulic pressure on the right side, venting the opposite side. But in addition to 
this we have the need to receive real-time monitoring of the process. This excludes a direct hydraulic 
and pilot operated system as an option, due to the fact that these systems do not facilitate transfer 
of data in the range that we will require. It might be argued that data can be sent via pressure pulses 
across a fluid conduit, but the maximal attainable data transfer rate using this method is not 
sufficient compared our needs. If we choose to build a control scheme based on an existing BOP 
control system, we are left with the mux system design as described in section 9.2.3 
Regardless of how suited the mux design is to our operational task and design, we still have some 
challenges that will have to be dealt with while the concept is on the drawing board. To send the 
information to and from our equipment we need an information carrier e.g. a mux cable. If the 
drilling vessel is fitted with a version of a mux control system, it would be possible to use the existing 
cabling to send data, power and then leach from the hydraulic conduit with the use of a jumper hose 
from the LMRP to our system.  This seams as an easy choice, but the practical side of this is exposed 
when taking into account: 
 The exciting installed BOP control systems 
o On mid water and certainly on the NCS, pilot operated systems are common.  
 The obtainable operational water depths using pilot operated control system and modern  
hose bundles can certainly exceed 5000 feet, with claims to up to 10000 feet (P.Potter, 
2011), giving room for the use of this system on a large portion of the relevant wells 
These aspects of our implementation process, will lead to a possible narrow marked as many of the 
rigs will have to change out their entire subsea control system These modifications would impose 
large capital expenditures and also require many days at quay taking place to adapt to our concept. 
An easier way around this problem would be to run a dedicated power and information carrier cable 
down to the SIR on vessels equipped with pilot operated BOP’s.  
In API 16 D, section 5.6.5 “Ancillary Subsea Electronics”, the connection of additional electric 
equipment to mux systems is dealt with, in this section it is stated the following(API16D, JANUARY 
2005): 
 
“The transmission of data and power for these types of functions may be through independent conductors in 
the subsea electronic umbilical or may be integrated into the main BOP Control System itself. When integrated 
as part of the main BOP Control System, detailed analysis and system integrity checking shall be performed to 
confirm the ancillary functions in no way impair, jeopardize, or degrade the purpose and operation of the BOP 
Control System.” 
 
It is important to bear in mind that this section only deals with the connection of electro and data 
users, not hydraulic users.  
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Det Norske Veritas  list the following in their governing rules concerning this topic, DNV-OS-E101 
(DNV, 2011): 
“Where practicable, unnecessary hazards should be avoided or prevented through safe design such 
that further protection measures are not required.” 
This is written in a section dealing with overall safety principles and by “unnecessary”, it is 
interpreted as equipment or functions not contributing to increased overall safety.  
In addition to the issues mentioned above, there is the increased operational risk when connecting 
additional equipment to a functional barrier. In the dialog with the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
(NPD), they have expressed concern with connecting a hydraulic user aiming for increased 
productivity, to the BOP hydraulic setup as a safety barrier.   
One solution to this problem might be to connect the hydraulic pressure from the LMRP accumulator 
bank to the SIR.  
To maintain the same level of operational and system reliability, the following measure might be 
applied: 
 
 Sectioning the affected LMRP accumulator bank to reduce the effect of a worst case scenario 
 Introduce two fail save valves between the accumulator bank and the SIR, on the LMRP side 
of the flex joint.  
 One of these would be activated by the BOP control system, the other by the SIR. This would 
minimize the risk involved independent of BOP control system.  
 Applying a small accumulator bank on the SIR to reduce reaction times.  
 Increase safety factor on LMRP accumulator bank sizing 
 
The regulatory concerns does in some way put limitations on the process of introducing a user, not 
contributing to well safety in the same manner as the existing components does, in the BOP/LMRP. 
Nevertheless, we intend to take this control option through our hazard analysis in the hope to 
identify which parts of the design that imposes a high risk on our system. It is the authors belief that 
industry regulators will ease their concerns, if the right measures are implemented and  detailed 
information is presented showing the actual consequences of this auxiliary system. It can also be 
argued that this system will reduce hazards as a result of sheared pipe, milling and fishing as 
described in Section 6.1.2 and 6.1.3.  
 
In this section the following is assumed: 
1. The drilling vessel has installed a modern mux system  
2. This system is capable of delivering our required power and data signals via the already 
installed mux cable 
3. Hydraulic pressure is delivered from the accumulator bank on the LMRP. 
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4. Our conceptual equipment is mechanically, operationally and hydraulically capable of 
executing the procedure 
5. Our equipment is placed as the first riser joint above the lower flex joint 
The setup will then be as following: 
 Lay down mux cables from the LMRP pod platform, up across the lower flex joint and into the 
control unit on the SIR.  
 Lay down rigid hydraulic stainless steel pipe from existing LMRP accumulator bank, via 
flexible hydraulic hoses across the lower flex joint and into the SIR. 
  A pair of flexible hoses should also go down again from the SIR to the control fluids return 
conduit so that vented fluid can be sent to the surface reservoir. 
  It is assumed that all the valves and control equipment required to operate the SIR is located 
on a separate Subsea Control Module (SCM) placed on the SIR or LMRP. 
  It is also assumed that all fluids are shared between the BOP and SIR and that these are 
water based fluids.  
 Additional accumulators should also be installed on the SIR to maintain API/NPD required 
accumulator usable volumes as well as accumulator dump valves such that the accumulators 
pressure rating will not be exceeded when pulling the equipment up to surface again.  
Electric power, data signals and hydraulic fluid is now delivered to support the operational needs on 
the SIR. The cost of this control option would be relatively low as the hydraulic infrastructure is 
present. The components that would make up the majority of development and production cost, 
would be: 
 Dedicated SIR SCM 
 Mux umbilical and reel cost on vessels using pilot operated BOP 
 Topside control system for information sharing between topside and subsea components 
 
Pros: 
 Utilizes existing infrastructure for hydraulic pressure 
 Relatively cheap 
 Low system complexity 
Cons: 
 Shares hydraulic fluid with the BOP  
 Additional equipment connected to BOP 
 Requires pilot signal capability available in the umbilical to operate fail safe valve  
 Increased chance for particle contamination of the BOP control fluid 
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9.3.3 Battery powered subsea HPU with acoustic link to the surface vessel 
The use of underwater acoustics is known trough sonars, echo sounders etc. Acoustics have also 
been used for many years in the offshore industry in the form of an acoustic control system, 
controlling BOP functions and/or subsea production units. Kongsberg Maritime is a Norwegian 
supplier of such systems and has launched a system design called Subsea control unit 34 (SCU-34), 
capable of controlling 16 solenoid functions at the same time (Brevik 2011).  
This is done based on Spaced Frequency Shift Keying. This technique provide a highly reliable 
communication form  in noisy offshore environments which is often the case when numerous vessels 
operate in the same area in addition to noisy flowing well streams or other operations  in adjacent  
pipes.  
The SCU-34 is operable down to 4 000 meters in its standard dressing, but can be upgraded to 
operate at even deeper waters. 
This control option is based on using only acoustic signals as data carrier. This is done with the 
transformation of data recorded/produced subsea, to acoustic signals sent out with the help of 
subsea mounted acoustic transducers mounted on the SIR and vessel. The signal is then read by 
transducers located on the drilling vessel, where it is once again transformed to the original data and 
is feed out to the relevant users onboard. The system is a two way communication system allowing 
the rig to send the same type of acoustic signals down to the subsea stack. The acoustic signals will 
not interfere with other acoustic devices such as (Brevik 2011):  
 Acoustic BOP  emergency control system 
 Drilling/support vessel Positioning  
 Sonars 
As mentioned, the SCU-34 is capable of controlling 16 solenoid signals; it can also facilitate 8 analog 
sensors. This can be expanded too. The amount of sensors and valves required for our design is not 
seen by Kongsberg R&D as impossible to incorporate in either one or a combination of two SCU-34 
modules, this is shown in  Figure 63. 
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Figure 63: SCU- 34, shown with to modules(Kongsberg, 2011) 
 
Hydraulic pressure and flow is delivered by installing a subsea HPU with a sealed pressure 
compensated reservoir located subsea. This reduce hydraulic losses associated with venting to a 
topside reservoir and gives a closed hydraulic circuit with minimal negative environmental effects, 
usable on the NCS and typically in the Arctic region. 
The subsea HPU will consist of an electric motor connected to a pump unit, typically based on 
pistons, to reach the high pressures required to operate our system.  The electricity needed to power 
the HPU motor is stored in subsea battery packages which can be changed out while the equipment 
is on the surface.  
The subsea HPU design can be either: 
 High pressure and low volumetric capacity with low current batteries, connected to a 
accumulator bank. The size of this bank would be highly dependent on the operational water 
depth and the hydraulic volume required to complete the operation.  
 
 High pressure and high volumetric capacity with high current rates drawn from the batteries. 
This system could be connected directly to the users, via DCV’s, thereby saving accumulator 
weight.  
The design choice will affect the type of batteries used and will be dimensioning  for the electric 
system, as higher current rates will require larger cabling and high current components.  
The most favorable advantage by utilizing this design is the elimination of  
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 Additional umbilicals 
 Clamping of umbilicals  to guide wires or similar mechanism to fixate them when installed 
 The need for sheaves to guide umbilicals 
 Hose reels with control and mechanical power 
 Deck/storage area for the reels 
 Topside HPU  
We have in other words a standalone unit capable of lying dormant with no mechanical or 
operational effects on the other subsea systems until it the operation will require it purpose.  
The acoustic control option has been discussed and looked at in collaboration with representatives 
from Kongsberg Maritime, Subsea Division. Controlling this type of complex operation through 
acoustic link only, have never before been carried out and gave us some challenges: 
 No electric power is fed to the subsea equipment, this means that all energy must be stored 
and available subsea.   
 Time lag from vessel to subsea user and back.  
 Data bandwidth 
To give the users a possibility of energizing the system after use, the design would have to 
incorporate a ROV landing platform used for ROV recharge of the batteries, system diagnostics and 
test etc.   This will increase the physical size of the design and give a larger drag force when operating 
in waters with high current velocities.  
One of the greatest challenges will be the time lag that 
will be experienced when sending and receiving signals. 
As sound propagates in water, the speed is dependent on 
the water properties such as temperature, salinity, 
pressure i.e. water depth. In seawater the speed varies from 
ca. 1 480 m/s to 1 600 m/s, but as shown on the velocity profile 
in Figure 64, a mean value will be around 1500 m/s. This will 
introduce a time lag of 2 seconds each way the signal travels 
when looking at a 3000 meter operational situation. Adding 
this, the required time to process the signals and send a read 
back signal, a total of 5 seconds can be expect, from sending to 
feedback signal is received. This forces our design of the 
control system, from real time to sequential operation of the 
equipment. Not necessarily the worst direction to take, but it 
will mean that torque-turn graphs and other monitoring wishes 
will not be given to the users before after the operation is 
completed. This reduces the operator’s possibility to intervene 
if errors are spotted.  
 The data bandwidth available is also limited. Theoretically 
the SCU-34 can operate at 8 kB/s , however, the signal is 
reduced to typically 4-5 kB/s on 500 meters of water depth 
and down to around 1 kB/s on 4000 meters(Brevik 2011). 
Figure 64: example of sound velocity profile in 
salt water(wikipedia, 2011) 
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This, in turn, puts restrictions on the amount of data being feed to the operator so that additional time 
lag is not created. 
The technology needed to construct a pressure compensated closed subsea HPU system is today 
available but at a very high development and production cost. Similar systems used for well control by 
FMC subsea on producing subsea well have a first unit cost, including tests, certification, and 
prototypes of approximately 40 mil NOK. The subsequent units will have a pure production cost of 10 
mill NOK. The system is more advanced then what we need and the governing classification and 
certification is more comprehensive. We can therefore expect a lower cost on our system, the estimate  
shows however, the price range that this equipment will be in.   
A  system designed around a battery powered subsea HPU with an acoustic link to the surface vessel 
would consist of: 
 Acoustic transducer on rig 
 Acoustic transducer on pup joint 
 Subsea control unit 
 Battery package 
 Subsea HPU 
o Electric HPU motor 
o Hydraulic pump unit 
 Subsea reservoir 
 The standard hydraulic setup using rigid pipes, DCV and pressure reducing valves.   
The acoustic side of the system would have a price tag from 500.000 to 1.000.000 NOK. This would 
include  
 Acoustic transducers subsea 
 One mobile topside transducer 
 Sensor interface 
 Batteries to support the acoustic control unit 
 Oil filed cables 
 Software to topside control via operator PC.   
 
The positive and negative sides of a system based on using a battery powered subsea HPU with 
acoustic link to the surface vessel can be: 
Pros: 
 No additional umbilicals 
 No clamping of umbilicals  to guide wires or similar mechanism to fixate them when installed 
 No need  for sheaves to guide umbilicals 
 No hose reels with control and mechanical power 
 No deck/storage area used 
 Separate hydraulic system from the BOP 
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CONS 
 High cost level 
 Weight due to the accumulated equipment needed to support the SIR 
 Size will increase drag force 
 High system complexity 
 Requires extensive maintenance surveillance   
9.3.4 Separate hydraulic conduit and electrical cable to the surface vessel 
Separate hydraulic conduit and electrical cable to the surface vessel will introduce a standalone 
control system using flexible cables with hydraulic pressure hose, communications carrier and 
electric power, almost like the equipment seen on pilot operated BOP control systems but with the 
addition of data communication in the umbilical. Otherwise it can use the combination of a rigid 
hydraulic conduit and a flexible cable with only communication and electric power cabling, more or 
less the same setup as can be seen on a MUX BOP control system. All of the components linked to 
control is then assumed to be fitted to the SIR riser pup joint.  
The first option will, based on the needed diameter of the cables; need large hose reels placed in a 
already cramped cellar deck area. If the system is designed to work on ultra-deepwater wells, the 
size of the reels will grow accordingly. Retrofitting such large components will require the 
construction of new deck platforms, designed to give extra deck space in the cellar deck area.  The 
need for a special designed umbilical, large powerful hose reels and new reel platforms will increase 
the capital expenditures to a high level. It might also be a challenge to find the needed volume on 
smaller drilling vessels to fit such large singular components. Basing the control design on a flexible 
hydraulic conduit will introduce large time lags and will have to be compensated by an increase in 
accumulator bank capacity subsea. This will add to the total system weight.  
The second option, using rigid auxiliary riser pipes, reduces the umbilical diameter and gives us a fair 
chance of installing a smaller hose reel on an existing deck space around the moon pool. Contributing 
to increased expenses is the need to install additional auxiliary riser pipes. These pipes are of a 
stainless steel material grade and will have a high cost.  It can only be installed on risers that have 
available spare slots in their riser flange.  
On the NCS there will be the additional requirements of routing the vented hydraulic fluid back to a 
surface reservoir. Connection to the already existing hydraulic return line on the subsea stack is 
feasible and is baked into the assumptions in this design.  Nevertheless our system will then consist 
of: 
 Reels for umbilical  
 Hydraulic conduit from vessel 
 Control and electric cable from vessel 
 Subsea Control Module on SIR 
 DDV’s to control hydraulic users 
 The standard hydraulic layout 
 Check valve and transfer pipe to hydraulic venting 
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The positive and negative sides of a system based on using a battery powered subsea HPU with 
acoustic link to the surface vessel can be: 
Pros: 
 Simple 
 Known technology 
 Will work 
Cons 
 Additional  hose reels 
 Additional  umbilical 
 High weight due to accumulators 
 Large drag force due to size 
 Umbilical running will increase BOP running time 
 Interface with existing BOP control system on the vent side 
9.3.5 Accumulator based energy stored subsea with acoustic link to surface vessel 
The challenges connected to using acoustics as the main communication carrier has been described 
in section 9.3.3.  With the knowledge that the  aim is to design a system capable of operation on 
ultra-deepwater wells, and the statement made about accumulator usable volume vs. water depth 
made in section 9.3.1, the following can be deduce: 
To be able to perform repeated operational sequences with the SIR without hydraulic recharge by 
the ROV, the size of the accumulator bank would grow rapidly with water depth. The ability to run 
the operational sequence several times, is seen as highly advantageous, as there most likely will be 
situations where this will be required.  
This would make the subsea stack larger both when considering stack weight and fluid drag forces. 
This increase in weight and drag forces would have a negative impact both on the riser forces while 
running and retrieving BOP and on the wellhead forces while in operation. The combination of, 
weight and size of such a bank gives this control option several negative attributes reducing the 
allover system feasibility to such a degree that further analyses will not be undertaken by the author.  
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9.3.6 Subsea HPU with multi-adaptable control and power connections  
When describing and analyzing the control concepts listed above, it became obvious that there was 
in particular one design feature that increased system risk and to some degree an assumed lowering 
in overall system reliability, namely the shared hydraulic fluid with the BOP. It was therefore given 
extra effort to develop a control concept that would utilize a separate hydraulic system, while at the 
same time keeping the expenses at a minimum. Looking at the use of electronic and electric 
equipment on MUX BOP control systems, a decision was made to try to utilize the already existing 
power and control capabilities. 
Such a system may consist of: 
 MUX control pod Interface/separate cable run from vessel 
 Battery package 
  Subsea HPU 
o Electric HPU motor 
o Hydraulic pump unit 
 Subsea reservoir 
 Subsea control unit with DDV’s(see section 9.2.3), mounted on the riser pup joint 
 The standard hydraulic setup using rigid pipes, DCV and pressure reducing valves.   
 
This solution will allow us to connect to the MUX system when the vessel is equipped as such. It also 
gives the opportunity to have the exact same control and monitoring capabilities on vessels equipped 
with pilot operated BOP’s. This is then done by running a small additional low voltage electrical and 
fiber cable. This can be secured and clamped in the same manner as the BOP control pod cables are 
clamped, using modified pod cable clamps such that they hold two cables instead of the traditional 
one cable clamp.  
 
This will lead to a minimum of additional installation/retrieval time and keep the work over open sea 
to a minimum.  
The cable must be spooled on a small reel, but the diameter will be much smaller than 1” and the 
reel footprint is therefore considered to be small.     
 
The above stated system layout will give us a large user group as the system can be installed with 
little or no rebuilding on rigs using MUX, and with some small scale retrofitting on vessels using pilot 
operated BOP’s.  
 
The system layout is considered very favorable from a risk point of view; however, considering the 
utilization of the pressure compensated closed hydraulic system with a subsea HPU, the cost will be 
very high. This will affect the development, production and operational cost of the whole system.   
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9.4 Comparing the different control systems 
To select the best design for the conceptual needs it is necessary to take into consideration a variety 
of aspects. Cost, operational reliability and of course the risks involved must be understood and 
compared. With our solutions consisting of new designs, little or no historical data on failure rates 
and failure modes has been documented.  Different approaches to look into the operability and 
reliability were therefore considered. All of the approaches have the same main goal namely to 
uncover the undesirable occurrences inherent in each design. We will first go through the methods 
that might be used on this particular problem(Rausand and Utne, 2009):  
 Preliminary Hazard Analysis(PHA) 
 Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) 
 Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) 
 
The PHA is a method normally applied in an early design phase of a component or system. Originally 
developed by the US Army, it has gained recognition in a diversity of industries and aims at mapping 
undesired hazards, threats and events early in the design phase. The findings can then be integrated 
in the design of the system eliminating, reducing or adding mitigating measures to components or 
systems prone to critical failures. The method is often used when only the main components of a 
system are selected and detail information is not available. 
The HAZOP method was originally developed by the process industry and as a systemized creative 
method uncovering deviations in process plants. The method is based on groups of selected persons 
with detailed knowledge on different aspects of the system in question.   The group uses guide works 
to systematically look for consequences of deviations from the design intent. The method is often 
used to analyze work procedures and to find new undiscovered failures and consequences. The 
HAZOP is concerned with identifying possible deviations from the design intent and then proceeds in 
two directions, one to find the potential causes of the deviation and the other to deduce its 
consequences. 
FMECA is originally a reliability analytical method developed to uncover component failures in 
technical systems. The method starts with a possible component failure and then proceeds to 
investigate the consequences of this failure on the system as a whole. Thus the investigation is 
unidirectional, from cause to consequence (IEC, 2001)The method often require more detailed 
information on failure rates, modes etc. to become effective in its use. It is therefore often used 
when the first draft of detailed components is selected and component history available.  
The selection of the right method was discussed on several occasions with Professor Svein 
Kristiansen at the institute of marine technology, NTNU. After carefully examining the system that is 
to be analysed and the data/information available the decision was made to perform a PHA analysis 
as this would be the most correct method giving useful information on the different designs. It would 
also give  a way of discovering what risks that could be designed out of the systems and which  could 
not.  
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9.5 PHA analysis of the different control options 
To get a good insight of the underlying methods in a PHA analysis several sources was used: 
 Maritime Transportation-safety management and risk analysis by Svein Kristiansen 
 Risikoanalyse-teori og metoder by Marvin Rausand and Ingrid B. Utne 
 The ISO 14121-1 standard- Safety of machinery – Risk assessment 
In addition to this, several books on hydraulic systems where used to go into the depth of the normal 
problems in relation with hydraulics. These where: 
 Hydraulics and pneumatics by Andrew Parr 
 Oljehydraulikk by Arne Kjølle 
 Oljehydraulikk by Steinar Haugnes 
With the theoretical and methodical foundation now in place, the system or analysis boundary must 
be established.  
As assigned, the analysis should try asses the overall system  safety of the proposed control concepts. 
This will not include mechanical design of the cylinders, jaws, riser pup joint, but will to some extent 
include the operational procedures as they are affected by the communication and control method 
chosen.  It is assumed that the system is operated by trained professionals and that all the 
mechanical aspects of the concept are operational to the level needed to maintain the design intent.  
The PHA analysis gives an assessment on the frequency and the consequence of each entry. This is 
done by ranking them between one and five on the basis of the following criteria’s(Rausand and 
Utne, 2009): 
 
Class  probability Frequency   
1 Very unlikely Less than one occurrence each 1000 year 
2 Remote  one occurrence  each 100-1000 year 
3 Occasional  one occurrence  each 10-100 year 
4 Probable  one occurrence  each 1-10 year 
5 Frequent More than once a year 
Table 18: Frequency classes 
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Consequence class  For humans For assets For the 
environment 
1 Small personal injury Less than 200 000 NOK Small impact, 
short recovery 
time 
2 Serious personal 
injury 
0,2-2 million NOK Large impact 
short recovery 
time 
3 1-2 deaths 2-20 million NOK Some impact 
Long recovery 
time 
4 3-10 deaths  20-200 million NOK Large impact 
Long recovery 
time 
5 More than 10 deaths More than 200 million NOK Large impact 
Permanent 
damage 
Table 19: Consequence classes 
It is important to bear in mind that the classes are large and the inherent variations in risk are 
thereby also big. The assessments of the consequences and frequencies have been based upon the 
author’s system understanding and discussion with co-engineers. It is not in any shape or form a 
complete system analysis, but merely a way of pointing out the pitfalls in a proposal and the way 
around it, if possible.  
To visualize the assessed risk, a risk matrix is used. This has frequency and consequence along to of 
its axis. The numbers in the matrix is the sum of the combination of the frequency and consequence 
class.   
consequence 
class 
          
5 6 7 8 9 10 
4 5 6 7 8 9 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Frequency class 
Table 20: Risk matrix 
Green area -  Acceptable risk, consider ALARP measures 
 
Orange area- Acceptable risk but ALARP measures are required and further investigation 
should be considered  
 
Red area- Not acceptable risk level, risk reducing actions are required 
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The number in the risk matrix is called the risk index number (RIN) and is a number from 2 to 10 
where 10 is the one affiliated with the highest risk. To classify the risk, a principle called “as low as 
reasonable possible” (ALARP), is used. This is a way of classifying risk into: 
 Tolerable risks  
 Tolerable –if the utility value of the activity is seen as high and all reasonable risk reducing 
measures are in place  
 Intolerable risk.  
The principle is used when going through new or existing designs. If findings are made in the 
intolerable area, redesign or other actions have to be done before startup of the activity or system 
can be initiated. In the ALARP zone, the orange zone in the risk matrix, all reasonable mitigating, or 
frequency reducing measures must be put in place.  The overall goal of the ALARP process is to move 
the findings into a lower RIN number class and if possible, get them into the green area of the risk 
matrix. The risk mapped in the lower risk/green area, can be improved if this is proven cost 
beneficial. More information on the ALARP principle and process can be found in the book 
“Risikoanalyse-teori og metoder” by Marvin Rausand and Ingrid B. Utne(Rausand and Utne, 2009) 
Independent of the control concept in question, the SIR would have the same control needs. It was 
therefore set up an input function and output overviews for the SIR de-torque and torque process. 
This can be seen in Appendix 21 and Appendix 22. This gives us insight into the process at hand and 
the flow of information to and from the vessel/SIR.  
The subsequent analysis of the system is divided into the number groups shown in Table 21 : 
Number series Deals with 
100-… General hydraulic control/layout 
200-… hydraulic, control and electric power from existing 
MUX system 
300-… subsea battery bank 
400-… Subsea HPU 
500-… Acoustic communication  
600-… Dedicated umbilical from vessel to SIR 
700-… Recharge of energy subsea with the use of ROV 
800-… Only power and control from BOP MUX system 
Table 21: PHA number classes 
This number refers to the number found on each entry in the PHA appendix.   
As mentioned in Section 9.3 the basic hydraulic layout and control/monitoring needs are the same 
for all the control concepts. The analysis of this part of the system is done with reference to Figure 60  
The complete PHA is attached in Appendix page 98 to 98 
 
The number of RIN class entries for each system is listed in Table 22. 
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 Consisting of 
number 
series 
Number of entries 
RIN class  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Use of existing BOP control 
system 
100, 200 0 1 2 13 11 20 15 4 0 0 
Battery powered subsea HPU 
with acoustic link to the 
surface vessel 
100, 300, 
400,500 
0 2 11 17 12 30 21 4 0 0 
Separate hydraulic conduit 
and electrical cable to the 
surface vessel 
100,600 0 1 2 13 7 19 12 3 0 0 
Accumulator based energy 
stored subsea with acoustic 
link to surface vessel 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Subsea HPU with multi 
adaptable control and power 
connections. 
100, 300, 400 0 0 2 13 9 18 11 3 0 0 
Table 22: RIN observations in the different systems 
It is shown that systems with a high degree of complexity have potentially more hazards in the 
designs currently drafted.   
9.6 Control system conclusion  
The different control approaches have now been presented and a PHA is carried out to map initial 
hazards in the design phase. The decision on which control system to use should be based on:  
 Allover system safety 
 System reliability 
 Ability to fulfill the control and operational needs  
 System complexity  
 Development costs 
 Operational costs 
o Maintenance cost 
o Increased operational time 
Taking all of the above into consideration based on the information obtained writing this thesis, 
carrying out the PHA and discussions with industry representatives, the control method based on 
using the existing BOP infrastructure emerges as the best solution. This is the option described in 
section 9.3.2 and is based on using hydraulic capacity from enhanced LMRP accumulator banks. 
Electric power and control is obtained by dedicated cable on pilot operated BOP’s and by connecting 
to the existing MUX BOP control system when possible. This option is also considered as the best 
control system by industry representatives. 
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10 Discussion of obtained results 
In this thesis several assumptions are made and used as a basis for further decision making. These 
are clearly stated as assumptions in the text. Some of the inherent assumption weaknesses and other 
details that require additional information will be stated in this chapter.  
 The frequency of emergency disconnect sequence is in Section 6.2   assumed to be 0.01 on 
each well. This is assessed by the author, as a somewhat high. The consequences of lowering 
this probability to 0.001 will however, not affect our end results significantly. 
 In Section 6.1.1.1 a tripping speed restriction was assumed due to bottom hole pressure 
variations. This assumption is assessed to be 200 meters/hour. This is not an industry 
standard and is stated only to get an extreme case.   
 In the process of deciding which tool joint tong-spaces to adapt the machine to, large 
uncertainties with regards to tong space were uncovered. This will lead to less than optimal 
gripping contact surface to guarantee relative rotation of box and pin end.  
 The empirical minimum clamp force obtained by Aker Solutions in chapter 7.1.2, is a result of 
a given contact area between the dices and the tong space on the TJ. As a result of the 
uncertainties with the TJ tong-space length, the dice contact area will be smaller than Akers 
industry standard. The obtained clamp force from Aker might therefore be too low in this 
case.  
 The PHA was performed by a limited number of persons; this hinders the uncovering of all 
aspects of the system and might introduce hazard blind spots. 
 The cost of operational failure is very high on these systems, this might explain why the 
entries in the PHA are all above 3 and why there is a predominance of entries in the 5-7 RIN 
area.   
 In previous work, the placement of the components is discussed, with regards to putting 
them in the LMRP or BOP. In this thesis a vertical compact design is achieved, combined with 
the chosen control option based on using LMRP accumulators. Based on this, there is reason 
to believe that a second iteration considering placement of components in the LMRP should 
be undertaken. Industry input combined with a dialog with industry regulators, is needed to 
reach a conclusion on the preferred location.    
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11 Conclusion and further work 
11.1 Conclusion 
This report considers the challenges related to operating conventional drilling vessels in the Arctic.  It 
is concluded that an increase in the frequency of disconnection of subsea drilling equipment, can be 
expected, based upon: 
 
 the areas where floating ice features are relevant versus the locations of the potential 
hydrocarbons 
 the water depths making possible with drifting icebergs 
 the sum of uncertainties in weather forecasting  
 wind as a driving force in floating ice features drift 
Current methods of disconnection lead to a significant operational downtime. The time needed to 
prepare for an upcoming disconnection will also require ice management capabilities in the form of 
additional standby vessels. These factors undoubtedly increase the well cost.   
The goal of this thesis is to investigate a new system and procedure which allows a quick disconnect 
and reconnect of the drill string and the marine drilling riser. The time for disconnection of drill string 
and riser should take place within 5 minutes. 
Physical limitations onboard relevant drilling rigs are mapped and imbedded in the design 
requirements used to develop several alternative methods of quick disconnection of marine drilling 
riser. These methods are rated and one concept of using a subsea iron roughneck located above the 
lower flex joint is chosen. Resulting installation, operation and retrieving procedures are established. 
The subsea iron roughneck’s control and monitoring needs is addressed. Existing and conceptual 
control solutions are evaluated.  Based on a preliminary hazard analysis, cost and system complexity, 
a control system built on the concept of utilizing existing BOP infrastructure, is chosen. 
A reduction of 89-97 % in costs related to planned and unplanned disconnections is achieved. 
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11.2  Further work 
o Placement of components should be re-considered with the option of placing the SIR in the 
LMRP. Industry input combined with a dialog with industry regulators is needed to reach a 
conclusion on the preferred location. 
o A detailed study must be done into what torque will be held by a range of commercially 
available standard BOP pipe rams 
o When upper torque limits on existing BOP rams are in place, a “safe” lowering torque must 
be established. This will be the torque that the SIR will set as a lower limit on the de-torque 
sequence performed when preparing to disconnect.  
o Develop lifting yoke to ease rigging while assembling and disassembling in the moonpool 
area. The yoke should keep the modules in a leveled position and assist in the mating of the 
flanges, perhaps with the use of conical “soft material guide pins on selected bolted holes in 
the flange. 
o Detailed hydraulic system development must be undertaken to establish final system costs. 
o When the hydraulic system is known in detail, the control system can be developed. 
o Fatigue problems should be addressed.  
o The effects of introducing a new bending stiffness as the riser pup joint will be somewhat 
stiffer, should be mapped. Adjustment to stiffness values should be made if found necessary. 
o The uncertainty in tool joint lengths should be addressed and operational data should be 
collected. If found necessary, redesign of the locational sequence should be performed using 
sensors to locate the transition between the two tool joint in question. The accuracy of using 
magnetic sensors imbedded in clamp cylinders should be studied. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Probability of the presence of at least one undiscovered oil and/or gas field with recoverable resources 
greater than 50 million barrels of oil equivalent (D. Gautier, 2008) 
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Appendix 2: Topographic features of the marine Arctic(IASC, 2010) 
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Appendix 3: Definition of the Arctic (GRID) 
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Appendix 4: Iceberg drift limit west of Greenland(EB, 2010) 
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Appendix 5: Drilling rig overview(Sangesland, 2010) 
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Appendix 6:  BOP summary and vertical dimensions in millimetres (Transocean, 2010) 
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Tasks Activity Considerations Specific hazards  
1. 1 Hang off drill string in well head 
using EDPHOT. 
EDPHOT will be racked in derrick 
with a stand of DP at all times. 
When evaluating the weather 
situation, extra time needed to pull 
out of hole due to possible back-
reaming will be taken into account. 
While drilling the 17 1/2" section, 
the drill string will normally not be 
hung off in the BOP, but pulled all 
the way out. 
 Procedure for 
Standard Hang-Off to 
be filled in with well-
specific data, and 
posted on drill floor 
and in rig office after 
every casing has been 
set 
2. 2 Pull bit inside casing plus a 
distance corresponding to water 
depth + 2 std.   
It is essential to have a 
correct pipe tally, and the 
dp stands left in derrick has 
to be counted to verify 
correct bit depth. 
Wrong pipe tally can 
lead to bit outside 
casing shoe when hung 
off. 
3. 3 Install kelly cock (in open position) 
with back pressure valve on top. 
The tool pusher shall verify 
that the kelly cock is 
installed in string in OPEN 
position. 
The kelly cock can be 
run in hole in closed 
position. 
4.  Run one std of DP in hole    
5.  Install EDPHOT w/1 std DP. Check 
that connections are made up. 
Check that back-out connections 
(Left hand ACME treads) are chain 
tong tight only. 
  
6.  Run hang off stand into one stand 
above BOP. (Space out to be able 
to land hang off tool without 
making connection in BOP). 
 
  
7.  Make up top drive to string, and 
Activate AHC. Run in and land 
EDPHOT in wear bushing/ bore 
protector, set down weight 
underneath land of point.  Log 
weight under landing point.  
Be prepared to Pick up.           
If much rig heaves it can be 
a challenge to land out 
gently in well head. 
 
8.  Unscrew landing string with 15 
right hand turns.  
 
  
9.  Pull out of BOP with landing string 
and close middle pipe-ram and b/s 
ram. Cont POOH w/ landing string 
and rack back same. 
Monitor correct BOP control 
fluid consumption for 
closing rams. 
Note down string 
weight left in hole! 
10.  Prepare and displace riser 
including kill, choke and booster 
lines to sea water. (This can be 
done at the same time as the drill 
crew trips in with the EDPHOT). 
It is important to have high 
flow when displacing to 
reduce the amount of 
contaminated mud. 
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Tasks Activity Considerations Specific hazards  
11.  WOW. If weather forecast predicts 
possible disconnect of LMRP:. 
 See guide line # 20131: 
Controlled disconnect 
of LMRP 
12.  Retrieving drill string & 
EDPHOT. 
If LMRP has been disconnected 
and is connected back on BOP: 
Pressure test choke and kill lines to 
decided test pressure to verify 
pressure control integrity. 
 
Ensure the line up prior to 
pressure testing is correct. 
 
13.  Thereafter: Line up kill line against 
adjustable choke, and record 
pressure. Open both upper and 
lower sub sea kill valves and 
observe for pressure build-up in 
well. Record pressure (if any).  
  
14.  If no pressure build-up, flow check 
through choke for 10 minutes. 
If pressure: Bleed off in steps to 
zero. Monitor volume bled back. 
When pressure is zero: Flow check 
through choke for 10 minutes. 
When ok: Open shear ram and 
flow check riser for 10 minutes. 
When flow check is ok: 
 
  
15.  Run in hole with DP to above BOP  Make sure threads 
matches right hand 
threads in the 
EDPHOT. 
16.  Install DDM, Acticate AHC. Tag 
and screw into EDPHOT and 
torque up pipe, annular (with low 
pressure) can be used to centre 
DP if problem to enter EDPHOT. 
  
17.  Open middle pipe ram.   
18.  Pull EDPHOT compensated out of 
BOP. Continue POOH to EDPHOT 
is in rotary. 
 
  
19.  Service and reassemble hang-off 
tool after use. Rack same back in 
derrick ready for use. Log in 
drawing that treads are checked 
and greased. 
 
  
20.  POOH another stand to get access 
to kelly cock and back pressure 
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Tasks Activity Considerations Specific hazards  
valve. 
21.  Close kelly cock. Slowly open back 
pressure valve to verify if any 
pressure below. Break off and 
remove back pressure valve. Then 
slowly open kelly cock to check for 
any pressure in string. Bleed off if 
some pressure. If the feeling is that 
it is too much pressure in string: 
Leave the kelly cock closed. Install 
DDM in string and then open the 
kelly cock. Thereafter the pressure 
in string shall be treated as a well 
control issue. 
  
Appendix 7: Pipe hang off & riser disconnect procedure using EDPHOT (Lund, 2010) 
  
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Master Thesis 
 
 
X 
 
 
Tasks Activity Considerations Specific hazards  
1.  If time displace riser to sea water.  Use upper 
choke outlet.  
  
2.  Activate AHC.    
3.  Space out tool joint to be ca. 2 m above middle 
pipe ram 
Insure correct 
Space out. 
If closing the ram on a tool 
joint, the ram can be 
damaged.  
4.  Close middle pipe ram with reduced pressure. 
500 psi. 
  
5.  Set down 5 ton on ram, increase pressure to 
3000 PSI.  
  
6.  Set down string weight minus the weight 
above the BOP. Have some over pull when 
cutting the string.  
  
7.  Cut the string using the casing shear ram.  Ensure the right 
ram is used. 
Activate and cut with the 5K 
booster. 
8.  Pull out of BOP with the string. Close B/S ram 
while pulling out of riser with dp and prepare to 
disconnect the LMRP. 
 Ref. Procedure L4-DRL-
20758 
9.  Vent all functions on BOP below riser 
connector 
  
10.  De-energize stack stinger seals on both pods, 
leave for one (1) minute 
  
11.  Retract both stack stingers, leave for one (1) 
minute. 
  
12.  Energize both stack stinger seals   
13.  De-energize flow line seals, slip joint seals and 
diverter packer pressure 
  
14.  1 .2.1.1 Riser Disconnect Execution: 
Verify that rig is on survival draft (if time) and 
inform Central Control Room that LMRP will be 
disconnected.  
  
15.  Set riser tension air pressure for disconnect of 
LMRP, i.e. 10-15 % over pull  
 
 
 
 
 
  
16.  Disconnect by unlocking  riser connector 
unlock. When connector is unlocked, increase 
riser tension by using stand-by air. Observe 
the LMRP lift off and ensure tensioning air 
pressure is high enough  to prevent riser and 
LMRP from compensating due to sea drag. 
During this operation: Have one person on 
cellar deck to observe the equipment in moon 
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pool. 
17.  Move the rig off location while slacking off on 
guidelines, if guide lines are connected. 
  
18.  When the conditions are within operational 
limits: Prepare the procedure for re-entering 
the well. 
 
  
Appendix 8: Pipe hang off and shear procedure (Lund, 2010) 
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Appendix 9 :Drill pipe (OWS) 
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Appendix 10: Operational log TO winner 4/2-2011 
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Appendix 11 :Operational log TO winner 5/2-2011 
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Appendix 12: Operational log TO winner 6/2-2011 
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Appendix 13: SIR riser pup joint with and without machinery modules 
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Appendix 14: Internal torque mechanism 
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Appendix 15: SIR conceptual dimensions 
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Appendix 16: Clamp jaws conceptual dimensions 
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Appendix 17: SIR machinery modules 
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The SIR is her viewed with transparent riser 
pup joint 
 
1. TJ is spaced out above SIR 
2. Upper annular preventer centres the DP 
 
 
3. The lower jaws are party moved into the 
annulus 
4. The tool joint Locator is activated and 
engages the drill pipe tube 
 
5. The tool joint is landed in the tool joint 
locator  
 
6. Lower jaws are engaged at recommended 
clamp pressure 
 
7. Upper jaws are engaged at recommended 
clamp pressure 
8. Torque mechanism is activated applying or 
removing make up/brake out torque 
9. 15° of rotation is accomplished 
10. Upper jaw is retracted 
11. Torque mechanism is reset 
12. Upper jaw engages the tool joint  
13. Torque mechanism is activated applying or 
removing make up/brake out torque 
14.  Point 7-12 is repeated until desired torque 
is achieved.  
15. The jaws are retracted 
Appendix 18: The SIR's operational Visualization 
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Appendix 19: principle pare of SPM valves shown on an open system, venting to sea 
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Appendix 20: MUX BOP control system shown closing a ram(P.Potter, 2011) 
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Brake out of drill pipe with SIR  
# Inputs Functions Outputs 
1 AHC is activated on the rig   
2 
Tool joint is spaced out to be above 
lower pipe ram using the draw 
work/drillers system   
3 
Signal sent from vessel to regulate 
pressure on 
 lower pipe ram on SIR   
4  
pressure regulator on lower 
pipe ram adjust to regulated 
value  
5   
Signal is sent from SIR to 
surface on complete pressure 
regulation 
6 
Signal sent from vessel  to activate 
 lower pipe ram on SIR   
7  
Lower pipe ram enters riser 
annulus and engages on the 
drill pipe diameter  
8   
Signals are continually sent 
from SIR to surface on 
pressures, flow rates and 
positions of cylinders 
9 
DP is lowered using drillers 
chair/drawwork until 5 tons are set 
down on pipe ram using hook load cell   
10 
Signal is sent from vessel  to SIR to 
increase regulated pressure to 
recommended clamp pressure   
11  
pressure regulator on lower 
pipe ram adjust to  
recommended  value  
12   
Signal is sent from SIR to 
surface on complete pressure 
regulation 
13 
Signal sent from vessel  to activate 
upper pipe ram on SIR   
14  
Upper pipe ram enters riser 
annulus and engages on the 
pin side of the TJ. Shares 
pressure regulator with lower 
pipe ram 
(Flow restrictor to reduce Q?)  
15   
Signals are continually sent 
from SIR to surface on 
pressures, flow rates and 
positions of cylinders 
16 
Signal for initiation of de-torque 
sequence together with de-torquepre-
set value is sent to the SIR from vessel   
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17  
Torque mechanism is 
activated and CCW torque is 
applied on the TJ until 
mechanism reaches 
operational limits  
18   
Signals are continually sent 
from SIR to surface on 
pressures, flow rates and 
positions of cylinders 
19  
Upper pipe ram is retracted 
to a minimum distance from 
the TJ   
20  
Torque mechanism is reset to 
original position  
21  Upper pipe ram engages TJ   
22  
Step 19-19 is repeated 
untilpre-set de-torque value 
is reached  
23   
Signals are continually sent 
from SIR to surface on 
pressures, flow rates and 
positions of cylinders 
24  
Upper pipe ram is retracted 
to a minimum distance from 
the TJ  
25  
Torque mechanism is reset to 
original position  
26   
Signal is sent from SIR to 
vessel when de-torque 
sequence is completed 
27 
The 5 tons of hook load landed on the 
SIR, is picked up again using the drillers 
system/drawwork   
28 
Signal is sent from vessel to SIR to 
retract upper and lower rams   
29  
Upper and lower pipe ram is 
retracted into the SIR housing  
30   
Signals are continually sent 
from SIR to surface on 
pressures, flow rates and 
positions of cylinders 
31 
The total drillstring load is now carried 
by the hook and the de-torqued TJ can 
be slowly be landed on a dedicated BOP 
pipe ram located in the BOP below the 
SIR.   
Appendix 21: control flow SIR break out 
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Make up of drill pipe with SIR  
# Inputs Functions Outputs 
1 AHC is activated on the rig   
2 
Tool joint is spaced out to be above 
lower pipe ram using the draw 
work/drillers system   
3 
Signal sent from vessel to regulate 
pressure on 
 lower pipe ram on SIR   
4  
pressure regulator on lower pipe 
ram adjust to regulated value  
5   
Signal is sent from SIR to 
surface on complete 
pressure regulation 
6 
Signal sent from vessel  to activate 
 lower pipe ram on SIR   
7  
Lower pipe ram enters riser 
annulus and engages on the drill 
pipe diameter  
8   
Signals are continually 
sent from SIR to surface 
on pressures, flow rates 
and positions of cylinders 
9 
DP is lowered using drillers 
chair/drawwork until 5 tons are set 
down on pipe ram using hook load 
cell   
10 
Signal is sent from vessel  to SIR to 
increase regulated pressure to 
recommended clamp pressure   
11  
pressure regulator on lower pipe 
ram adjust to  recommended  
value  
12   
Signal is sent from SIR to 
surface on complete 
pressure regulation 
13 
Signal sent from vessel  to activate 
upper pipe ram on SIR   
14  
Upper pipe ram enters riser 
annulus and engages on the pin 
side of the TJ. Shares pressure 
regulator with lower pipe ram 
(Flow restrictor to reduce Q?)  
15   
Signals are continually 
sent from SIR to surface 
on pressures, flow rates 
and positions of cylinders 
16 
Signal for initiation of de-
torquesequence together with de-
torquepre-set value is sent to the SIR 
from vessel   
17  
Torque mechanism is activated 
and CCW torque is applied on  
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the TJ until mechanism reaches 
operational limits 
18   
Signals are continually 
sent from SIR to surface 
on pressures, flow rates 
and positions of cylinders 
19  
Upper pipe ram is retracted to a 
minimum distance from the TJ   
20  
Torque mechanism is reset to 
original position  
21  Upper pipe ram engages TJ   
22  
Step 19-19 is repeated untilpre-
set de-torque value is reached  
23   
Signals are continually 
sent from SIR to surface 
on pressures, flow rates 
and positions of cylinders 
24  
Upper pipe ram is retracted to a 
minimum distance from the TJ  
25  
Torque mechanism is reset to 
original position  
26   
Signal is sent from SIR to 
vessel when de-
torquesequence is 
completed 
27 
The 5 tons of hook load landed on 
the SIR, is picked up again using the 
drillers system/drawwork   
28 
Signal is sent from vessel to SIR to 
retract upper and lower rams   
29  
Upper and lower pipe ram is 
retracted into the SIR housing  
30   
Signals are continually 
sent from SIR to surface 
on pressures, flow rates 
and positions of cylinders 
31 
The total drillstring load is now 
carried by the hook and the de-
torqued TJ can be slowly be landed 
on a dedicated BOP pipe ram located 
in the BOP below the SIR.   
Appendix 22: control flow SIR make up 
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The following appendix contains the Preliminary Hazard Analysis of the control proposals.  
The analysis is divided into systems that when combined, make up the different control system. 
Each entry has an accompanying reference number (ref #) each belonging to a number series indicating which sub system the entry is a part of. 
 
 
The list of number series are:  
Number series Deals with 
100-… General hydraulic control/layout 
200-… hydraulic, control and electric power from existing MUX system 
300-… subsea battery bank 
400-… Subsea HPU 
500-… Acoustic communication  
600-… Dedicated umbilical from vessel to SIR 
700-… Recharge of energy subsea with the use of ROV 
800-… Only power and control from BOP MUX system 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
 Operation panel  Human Error 
1
0
1 
 If operated with one hand 
intervention, the wrong button 
can be pushed 
Activation of user/ sequence at 
a the wrong time 
3 1 4 
 2 handed operation to be 
implemented in the design of 
master panel 
  
 Hydraulic fluid  Spill 
1
0
2 
Burst of pipe, fitting, seal etc.  environmental contamination  2  2  4 
Use water based hydraulic fluid if 
conventional oil based fluids prove 
difficult to utilise 
  
 Hydraulic fluid  contamination 
1
0
3 
Bacteria cultures can develop in 
the fluid 
 Operational deviation, clogging 
of pipes, degraded components 
and censors.  
 1 2 3 
Fluid additives can be used to 
minimize this hazard. Optical 
sensors can be used to identify 
fluid condition and show trends  
  
 Hydraulic fluid  contamination 
1
0
4 
 If oil based hydraulic fluid is used, 
water ingress in fluid due to leaks 
from sea or riser annulus, can 
happen.  
 Corrosion, particles and 
operational reliability 
degradation. Possible retrieval 
of equipment for corrective 
maintenance. Damage to 
internal components 
 2  2  4 
Implement sensors for 
measurement of water in fluid. 
ROV fluid test retrieval 
Only if oil based hydraulic fluid 
is used 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
 Hydraulic fluid  contamination 
1
0
5 
Additive levels change over time 
due to water ingress, leaks, 
setteling etc 
Loss of fluid properties, 
corrosion, bacterial growth,  
operational reliability 
degradation 
4 1 5 
Implement sensors for fluid 
properties monitoring or ROV fluid 
test retrieval 
Independent of oil based or 
water based hydraulic fluid is 
used 
 Hydraulic fluid Thermal energy 
1
0
6 
Temperature increase in fluid due 
to Internal leaks originating in 
seal/component wear, incorrect 
operations in relief 
valves/pressure reducing valves, 
or to high fluid viscosity  
 Viscosity changes, loss of fluid 
properties/additives. Increased 
wear and tear on components, 
leaks to environment, increased 
maintenance cost 
5 2 7 
Temperature sensors to log 
historical data, trend viewing can 
give good indication of system 
condition and help in planning of 
preventive maintenance.  
 
 Hydraulic fluid  pressure 
1
0
7 
 Component being moved by 
hydraulic actuator experience 
larger forces due to fluty mating 
surfaces or other component fault.  
 Pressure will rise when moving 
the component as it will require 
more work to do the same job. 
Will lead to component failure 
in the end 
5 1 6 
Pressure sensors to log operations 
and have set values for normal 
and degraded operation. This 
might give good indication of 
component condition and help in 
planning of preventive 
maintenance. 
 
 All components  timing 
1
0
8 
Developing fault in cylinder seals 
or component being moved by 
actuator.  
  Time for activation to 
completion of a process 
increases 
5 1  6 
Sequences  should be timed and 
logged. This might give good 
indication of component condition 
and help in planning of preventive 
maintenance. 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
All components Hydraulic pressure 
1
1
1 
Pressure peak above design 
pressure 
Burst of pipe, pipe bend, 
fittings, flexible hose with 
subsequent environmental 
contamination  
5 2 7 
Design in pressure relief valve with 
return to reservoir 
ALARP  
 Lower Clamp 
Cylinder (LCC)  
Movement 
1
1
2 
 The upper clamp Cylinder (UCC) 
shares pressure regulator with the 
LCC, but the design of the clamps 
differ.  
 No relative rotational 
movement between the box 
and pin end of TJ when 
detorquing . One of the clamps 
might slip on the TJ tong space. 
Loss of operational effectiveness 
and possible shear of DP 
5 3 8 
Use separate pressure regulator 
on U/LCC 
Not acceptable RIN #  
must be re-designed 
 Clamp Cylinders Hydraulic pressure 
1
1
3 
Too much  clamp force is applied  
 Higher break out torque is 
required to achieve relative 
rotation. might not be able to 
brake. 
” False” torque can be 
experienced when making up a 
TJ connection.  Unsecure 
connection when returning to 
operation 
5 2 7 
Pressure feedback loop must give 
read back pressure, mounted after 
user pressure regulator.  
ALARP  
Already taken into design 
 De-torque Direction 
1
1
4 
Faulty Directional Control valve 
(DCV) setup or operation 
Torque is applied in the wrong 
direction, widening of 
operational window, possible 
shear of DP 
2 2 4 
Position indicator on cylinder, 
feeds SCM with changes. 
Corrections can be made. Carry 
out commissioning tests of full 
operation upon installation in 
stack.  
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Hydraulic fluid 
venting 
Hydraulic pressure 
1
1
5 
Clogging or other hydraulic 
resistance in return line to 
reservoir 
The vented hydraulic fluid will 
propagate in the system and 
pressurize other users pistons. 
Movement of unplanned 
components 
5 2 7 
Implement check valves to isolate 
the users on the vent line.  
ALARP 
Already in design 
Locating DP TJ  timing 
1
1
6 
 Hydraulic losses, friction and time 
to build up required pressure 
might create a time lag to position 
the LCC in the riser bore 
TJ might be lowered before LCC 
is in right position. Lost 
operational time. 
5 1 6 
High volumetric flows must be 
available subsea, accumulator 
bank or high effect HPU can 
deliver this Q at the right pressure. 
Position signals on clamp cylinders 
to inform operator and SCS 
Small bank of accumulator is 
shown in generic hydraulic 
layout drawing 
Accumulator      
bank 
 Hydraulic pressure 
1
1
7 
 Pressure builds up when stack is 
retrieved to the surface.  
 Burst of accumulator bottles, 
pipes or fittings with 
environmental spills as a result 
5 3 8 
implement accumulator dump 
valves with return to reservoir 
Not acceptable RIN# 
Already in design 
 Active heave 
compensator 
 Forces 
1
1
8 
 Failure in AHC while clamp 
cylinders are engaged on TJ  
 Large vertical forces. Damage to 
SIR, flex joint, reduction of riser 
integrity, well control issues 
2 3 5 
Load censors can initiate a 
automatic retract of the clamp 
cylinders and provide the user 
with info on how large the forces 
are at any time.  
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Torque 
Pressure  
regulator  
Hydraulic pressure 
1
1
9 
Failure to regulate to correct 
pressure 
Wrong torque is obtained.  
Failure to reach the design 
intent.  
5 2 7 
Pressure sensor mounted after 
pressure regulator in hydraulic 
design for verification of correct 
pressure 
Already implemented 
Clamp cylinder Speed 
1
2
0 
DCV feeds a higher Q then 
required, to high gain in controller 
 High engagement speed, 
impact with TJ, damages to 
dices as they are hard and 
brittle. Loose objects in wellbore 
with the potential of damage to 
drilling and well control 
equipment 
4 2 6 
Flowmeter/position transmitter 
can be used to derive the 
engagement speed and correct 
the DCV feed.  
 
LCC Forces 
1
2
1 
Load cell on drillers equipment is 
faulty when landing  the 5 tons of 
hook load to locate the correct TJ  
 Large vertical forces. Damage to 
SIR, flex joint, reduction of riser 
integrity, well control issues 
2 3 5 
Load censors can initiate a 
automatic retract of the clamp 
cylinders and provide the user 
with info on how large the forces 
are at any time. 
 
Vertical load cell 
on clamp 
cylinders 
 Error 
1
2
2 
 Load sensors send out signal of 
large forces, in a situation where 
this is not correct.   
 Initiation of automatic retract 
of the cylinders, loss of 
operational efficiency. Possible 
shearing of DP 
2 2 4 
2 or more sensors can work in a 
system where a majority desertion 
can be made. Thereby eliminating 
a faulty sensor 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
UCC Size of components 
1
2
3 
Upper pipe clamp cylinder will not 
engage due to friction, jam 
created by contamination 
Operation cannot be completed 2 2 4 
Pressure sensors, in relations with 
position indicators can build up 
historical trends and thereby 
giving us the posebility to se 
trends in the cylinder friction. 
Flush ports might be consider 
 
 UCC  speed 
1
2
4 
UCC DCV feeds to large volumetric 
flow  
High engagement speed, impact 
with TJ, damages to dices as 
they are hard and brittle. Loose 
objects in wellbore with the 
potential of damage to drilling 
and well control equipment 
4 2 6 
Flowmeter/position transmitter 
can be used to derive the 
engagement speed and correct 
the DCV feed. 
Same as ref #:120 
De-torque  Forces 
1
2
5 
Too much torque is removed from 
the TJ connection  
Potential for dropping the lower 
part of the DP(BHA) in wellbore 
when picking up the DP and 
running it down in the BOP for 
hang off.  
3 4 7 
A safe de-torquevalue must be 
deduced and a accurate method 
of measuring it must be designed 
 
 De-torque  Forces 
1
2
6 
To little torque is removed from 
the TJ connection 
DDM cannot spin out the 
hanged of tool joint in the BOP. 
Repeat of   de-torque sequence, 
increased time. 
4 2 6 
A safe de-torque value must be 
deduced and a accurate method 
of measuring it must be designed 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
De-torque Forces 
1
2
7 
BOP pipe ram cannot fixate the 
“safe torque” value mentioned in 
#225-126  
 No spin out is achieved in BOP 3 2 5 
Data must be gathered from 
suppliers of pipe 
rams/experiments must be done 
to get empirical data. This must 
taken into the consideration when 
addressing the “safe de-torque 
value”  
 
De-torque Forces 
1
2
8 
 Large contact faces in de-torque 
mechanism,  might create very 
large frictional forces.  
Incorrect torque values are 
registered by control 
system/operator 
5 1 6 Ref to number 125-126 
 
 UCC position 
1
2
9 
 The UCC is to close to the TJ 
surface when resetting the torque 
mechanism.  
Dice damages, TJ damage, 
debris in wellbore. Damages on 
drilling/well control equipment 
5 2 7 
Position indicator on clamp 
cylinders to verify position.   
 De torque   Position 
1
3
0 
No relative rotation of pin in 
relations to box end of TJ. Due to 
slipping dice on tong space 
No torque is removed from 
connection, 
3 3 6 
A method to accurately monitor 
relative rotation of TJ can be 
found and implemented in the 
design. Possible that monitoring of 
torque-turn can give a good 
decision basis.  
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
LCC Position 
1
3
1 
Relative position difference when 
entering riser annulus 
May experience challenges 
related to centering of DP 
5 1 6 
Position indicators on LCC  can 
feed control system and 
synchronize positions. 
 
 LCS  Locating 
1
3
2 
 TJ not centered in grip segment 
 Not sufficient contact surface 
between TJ and dices. No 
torque can be transmitted 
5 2 7 
Redesign of LCS to assist in 
centering of DP. Look at utilizing 
upper annular preventer in this 
operation.  
 
Clamp Cylinders Position 
1
3
3 
 U/LCC will not retract into SIR  
Restrictions present in riser 
bore. Operations over the cross 
section of the SIR are to some 
degree halted 
2 2 4 
Fail safe DCV design which allows 
for pressure on retract side of 
hydraulic actuator, and venting of 
the other side.  Possible with 
mechanical ROV override design.  
 
Picking up the 
DP after being 
fixated in the SIR 
 Dropped object 
1
3
4 
Spin out of threaded connection in 
TJ due to little effect or residual 
torsional forces in drill string 
 When LCC is retracted, the DP 
can be dropped in the wellbore 
2 3 5 
Load cells on LCC. 
Introduce mandatory pick up 
test(overpull) when still clamped, 
to verify that there is a connection 
between pin and box end of TJ. 
Carry out CW turn with DDM to 
specified torque to verify that 
there is a fixed connection in 
threads.  
Procedure and training, 
instrumentation 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Human error Information flow 
1
3
5 
Operator aims at wrong de/torque 
value 
To little/much torque is applied 
to the TJ in question. Damages 
to treaded connection, dropped 
drill pipe if torque is low 
3 2 5 
Automatic verification of input 
data, DP size, torque etc. by SIR 
control system. Procedures for 
verification of input values of 
second person 
 
Human error Direction 
1
3
6 
Operator maces wrong decision 
and initiates wrong direction on 
hydraulic user 
Increased operational time, loss 
of energy capacity subsea. Loss 
of fixated and located TJ.  
5 1 6 
Built in sequences in SIR for 
automatic stepwise operation   
 
Automatic 
sequence 
Faulty 
operation/components 
1
3
7 
Errors are spotted in feedback 
information, by human operator. 
Or operational consideration 
demands another task to be 
prioritized.  
Faulty operational result, redo 
operation 
5 1 6 
Operator must be able to safely 
abort/intervene in automatic 
sequence. The SIR must also be 
able to be remote operated one 
and one order in case of 
unforeseen circumstances.  
 
Automatic 
sequence 
Operational control 
1
3
8 
Operator is not getting the 
feedback data in the required 
pace 
A faulty operation Is carried out 
subsea, must be redone and 
creates additional time use.  
5 1 6 
Operational speed and data 
amount sent, must be adapted to 
the bandwidth limitation in the 
system 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Clamp Cylinders Position 
1
3
9 
Clamp cylinder is in riser annulus 
when all hydraulic pressure is lost 
No energy is available to retract 
the clamp cylinders. 
2 2 4 
ROV mechanical override can be 
considered.   
 
All components impurities 
1
4
0 
Cuttings, mud additives, sealing 
fragments etc 
Clogged/jammed components, 
no operational goals can be 
achieved. Shearing of DP 
5 2 7 
Appropriate seals shoud be used, 
with over pressure in SIR so that 
the leak path is given. From SIR to 
riser annulus. The losses can be 
monitored and show trends in 
leaks, this might assist in 
maintenance planning 
 
All components Pressure  
1
4
1 
Moving actuators and components 
in a confined fluid filled cavity.   
Creates pressure and under 
pressure if the fluid cannot 
escape or be replaced . Nothing 
will work or burst of seal to 
environment, something will 
give.  
5 3 8 
Reservoir can be integrated with 
the cavities in the SIR. All parts of 
the must have appropriate 
conduits for venting and 
replacement of volumes to and 
from confined cavities. 
Not acceptable RIN 
Must be correct in design 
Seal against riser 
annulus 
pressure 
1
4
2 
The hydrostatic pressure as a 
result of high specific gravity 
drilling mud is much higher than 
the ambient pressure as a result of 
seawater pressure on the SIR.  
Pressure in riser is higher than in 
SIR. leak path is opposite than 
design intension. Influx of 
impurities in SIR  
5 2 7 
Pressure sensor in riser annulus 
can feed info on riser annulus 
pressure. The cavities in the SIR 
can then be pressurized to correct 
level (equal or higher). This must 
be mapped with a pressure 
sensor.The consequence of this 
must be mapped and understood 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
 
Pressure sensor 
failure 
1
4
3 
Pressure sensor in riser annulus or 
SIR as mentioned in #142 is faulty 
The SIR is pressurized to a 
incorrect pressure, higher or 
below design intent. Leak of 
fluid 
1 2 3 
2 or more sensor can be used in 
both cases. A democratic decision 
can then be made and a faulty 
sensor can be switched of.  
 
Piping Leaks 
1
4
4 
Fittings on external pipe leaks Environmental contamination 3 1 4 
Use a minimum of external 
fittings. Look for the correct 
quality in fittings under the 
acquisition process.   
 
Power 
deliverance 
Electrocution  
1
4
5 
Electric components sends current 
in the metal parts of the SIR 
Electric shock can be given to 
humans operation or handling 
the equipment 
3 1 4 
Good electric engineering practice 
should be applied under the 
design of the electrical 
components 
 
Maintenance Hydraulic pressure 
1
4
4 
Residual hydraulic pressure is still 
in components when handled by 
maintenance  
Harm to humans and assets 2 2 4 
Bleed of possibilities /tools to be 
used 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Hydraulic Fluid Air buble 
1
4
5 
Pumps, valves and sudden cross 
sectional changes can crease air 
bubbles 
Dramatic reduction in bulk 
modulus for the system. This 
may lead, depending on the 
extent of air in fluid, to the so-
called spring effect in the 
hydraulic pressure on end users 
5 1 6 
This must be considered in design 
of the hydraulic system and the 
reservoir design.  
Practical tests must be carried 
out on the final design 
Torque 
mechanism 
Position 
1
4
6 
operated beyond its design 
rotational limitations 
Forces are distributed on faces 
that are not intended to 
withstand these forces 
5 1 6 
Limit switches are implemented 
with the use of position data to 
ensure that cylinders are not 
pushed beyond operational 
limitations  
 
All hydraulic 
cylinders 
Position 
1
4
7 
operated to the utmost physical 
cylinder limitations 
The available hydraulic areal is 
lost as the piston surface is in 
contact with the wall. The 
pressure can therefore not work 
on the complete piston areal. 
The cylinder cannot start to 
move 
4 2 6 
Limit switches are implemented 
with the use of position data to 
ensure that cylinders are not 
bottomed out 
This must be implemented in 
design 
Hydraulic fluid Temperature 
1
4
8 
Low temperature might create 
freezing situation 
Blockade of conduit 3 4 7 
Use fluid additives to lower 
freezing temperature 
Normal practice on NCS 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Rigid pipe 
between 
hydraulic control 
unit and flex 
joint 
Burst 
2
0
1 
Burst due to pressure above 
design intent in additional pipe 
leading up to the SIR from control 
location 
Environmental contamination, 
loss of hydraulic power in BOP 
control system, well control 
issues 
2 5 7 
Pressure relief valves, safety 
factors used in design process.  
Not acceptable end result. 
Fail safe valve is in design  
Hydraulic fittings 
on hydraulic line 
between BOP 
system and SIR 
Leak 
2
0
2 
Leak from fittings due to errors in 
mounting, and degrading over 
time  
Environmental spill, loss of 
hydraulic power in BOP control 
system. Well control issues.  
1 4 5 
Pressure testing upon 
commissioning and routinely 
when accessible on surface  
 
Flexible 
hydraulic 
conduit from 
LMRP across 
lower flex joint 
to SIR 
burst 
2
0
3 
Fatigue, cracking or any leak in 
flexible hydraulic hose 
Environmental spill, loss of 
hydraulic power in BOP control 
system. Well control issues. 
1 4 5 
Work closely with supplier of 
components, visual and NDT 
testing. Routinely change out to 
new components. Check valve to 
be installed between SIR acc. Bank 
and flexible conduit.  
 
Flexible 
hydraulic 
conduit from 
LMRP across 
lower flex joint 
to SIR 
Leak 
2
0
4 
Wear due to angular movement 
degrades component 
Environmental spill, loss of 
hydraulic power in BOP control 
system. Well control issues. 
3 4 7 
Securing to ensure room for 
movement, Work closely with 
supplier of components, visual and 
NDT testing. Routinely change out 
to new components .Check valve 
to be installed between SIR acc. 
Bank and flexible conduit. 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
SIR Contamination 
2
0
5 
Debris from components in SIR is 
carried with the hydraulic fluid to 
the subsea central BOP control 
unit 
SPM valve contamination. Leaks 
over seal surfaces, pulling of 
entire BOP to clean.  
5 3 8 
Separate hydraulic system on the 
SIR and the BOP. Increase fluid 
condition surveillance and filtering 
NOT acceptable RIN  
Electrical cables 
from control pod 
on LMRP to SIR 
subsea control 
module 
Electric energy 
2
0
6 
Cable wear due to angular 
movement degrades isolation  
Short-circuit of cable  2 2 4 
Fuse in MUX control pod to ensure 
that the error does not propagate 
to BOP control system 
 
SIR SCM Electric energy 
2
0
7 
Malfunction in electric/tonic 
components leads to short circuit 
Loss of control of SIR, possible 
effect on BOP control system, 
well control issues 
1 5 6 
Fuse in SIR SCM/BOP control pod. 
All mitigating measures must be 
used to reduce the effects on BOP 
control system 
 
Electric 
connectors  
Electric energy 
2
0
8 
Leak in connector seal 
short circuit, loss of control of 
SIR, possible effect on BOP 
control system, well control 
issues 
1 5 6 
Fuse in BOP control pod. all 
mitigating measures must be used 
to reduce the effects on BOP 
control system 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
BOP control pos Electric energy 
2
0
9 
Additional components in control 
pods increases chance of error  
May create operational 
deviations in BOP control pod, 
loss of one control pod 
3 2 5 
Keep additional components in 
BOP control pod to a minimum 
 
BOP control pos Electric energy 
2
1
0 
Additional components in control 
pods increases chance of error  
May create operational 
deviations in BOP control pod, 
loss of both  control pod 
1 5 6 
Keep additional components in 
BOP control pod to a minimum, 
only use the additional 
components on one of the control 
pods.  
 
Operator Human error 
2
1
1 
If operated on the BOP master 
panel, a wrongful order can be 
sent to the BOP  
BOP function activated with 
wrong operational timing, time 
loss 
1 1 2 Use separate control panel for SIR  
Additional 
hydraulic users 
Hydraulic pressure 
2
1
2 
Introducing new hydraulic user  on 
the BOP control system  
Not enough accumulator usable 
hydraulic volume , well control 
issues 
1 5 6 
Install additional subsea 
accumulators 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Accumulators  forces 
2
1
3 
Ref # 212, increasing accumulator 
bang size 
Added weight, more loads on 
the riser tension system, more 
forces on bop stack, wellhead.  
5 2 7 
Look for other control option that 
does not include resizing of 
accumulator bank. Use light 
weight composite accumulators. 
Use helium as pressure gas instead 
of nitrogen.  
 
Communication Congestion  
2
1
4 
All the sensors, data logs and real-
time info is transferred over the 
same info carrier as the BOP 
control signals 
Bandwidth can be exceeded on 
the information carrier 
1 5 6 
Priority should be given to BOP 
control system information, safety 
critical info. Hierarchy system 
must be implemented 
 
Topside 
components 
Component fault  
2
1
5 
The BOP control topside 
equipment will have additional 
components in connection with 
the introduction with the SHFW 
Component fault propagates in 
the system with the effect of 
reduced operational possibility 
of the MUX control system  
1 4 5 
Design so that faults in the 
additional system does not affect 
any other parts of the BOP control 
system 
Has been done historically with 
the use and control of cameras, 
additional sensors. Ref API 16 D, 
section 5.6.5   
LMRP  
Accumulators 
Leak 
2
1
6 
Hydraulic leak  between LMRP and 
SIR 
Loss of hydraulic pressure on 
LMRP 
2 4 6 
Section the accumulator bank, 
resize with bigger safety margin so 
that LMRP will have the desired 
hydraulic capacities in all 
situations 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Battery Capacity 
3
0
1 
Low temperatures reduces the 
battery capacity 
Not enough available energy to 
complete sequence 
5 2 7 
Use batteries that are designed for 
the required temperature range, 
safety margin in designing battery 
package 
Must be taken into design 
Battery Capacity 
3
0
2 
If discharged quickly, the battery 
cannot deliver the same effect as 
if discharged slowly 
Not enough available energy to 
complete sequence 
5 2 7 
Use batteries designed for a high 
ampere output. 
 safety margin in designing battery 
package 
Must be taken into design 
Battery Capacity 
3
0
3 
If numerous discharges are 
performed, capacity might change 
Not enough available energy to 
complete sequence 
3 2 5 
Use batteries design for multiple 
run downs, instrument the 
batteries with mentoring of 
voltage and power output to 
create historical trends. might 
assist in maintenance planning  
 
Battery chemicals 
3
0
4 
Rigging and maintenance of 
battery pack might expose 
personnel for chemicals 
Environmental spills, harm to 
paersonell 
3 2 5 
Include personal protective 
equipment (PPE) , adequate 
procedures and training of 
personnel 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Battery Electric shock   
3
0
5 
Creep current from faulty 
connection and/or components 
Not enough available energy to 
complete sequence 
3 3 6 
Instrumentation of battery pack, 
current must be logged   
 
Battery Capacity  
3
0
6 
Chemical deterioration of battery  
Timely deterioration of available  
energy subsea, not enough 
energy to complete operation 
1 2 3 
Continues or routinely charging of 
battery pack is needed, 
monitoring of trends will help in 
maintenance planning 
 
Battery spill 
3
0
7 
Battery might leak chemicals to 
environment  
Environmental spill 1 1 2 
Possible to encapsulate the 
battery  
 
Battery 
maintenance 
Dropped object 
3
0
8 
When handling a large number of 
single batteries, there is a 
increased risk for dropped objects 
under lifting operations 
Human, asset harm, spill and 
loss of operational time 
4 2 6 
Desisg battery module with 
suitable lifting ears/ appliances.  
 
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Andreas Djupesland 
 
 
XLVII 
 
 
System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Battery Pressure 
3
0
9 
Sea water pressure on battery 
Loss of containment, spill, loss 
of energy subsea 
5 2 7 
Use batteries design to withstand 
pressure or enclose battery 
modules 
 
Batery  Forces 
3
1
0 
The additional weight of the 
battery package  
Must be compensated by riser 
tension system, increased loads 
on bop stack, FJ and well head.  
5 1 6 Limit weight in design  
Battery Electrical energy 
3
1
1 
Chemical reaction when charging  
batteries. This will produce waste 
products , like gas 
If gas is a west product, pressure 
buildup might arise. 
2 2 4 
Relief valve to be used on 
batteries if gas is present while 
charging.  
 
Battery Thermal energy 
3
1
2  
large amounts of energy is being 
withdrawn from the battery in a 
short time period  
Thermal energy build up in 
battery 
2 1 3 
Increase battery module surface 
area if this proves to be a problem 
in tests.  
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Battery Chemicals 
3
1
3 
Chemicals might be unstable 
Transport restrictions on boats, 
helicopters etc. 
5 1 6 
Take into consideration when 
planning logistics at design phase 
 
Battery Chemicals 
3
1
4 
Harmful Chemicals are used in 
battery design 
May be dangerous to dispose of  5 1 6 
Make sure there are safe disposal 
methods that can be used 
 
  
3
1
5 
       
  
3
1
6 
       
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Andreas Djupesland 
 
 
XLIX 
 
 
System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Subsea HPU 
electric motor 
Rotating components 
4
0
1 
Electric motor rotor will rotate 
Vibrations will propagate in the 
subsea system. vibrations 
induced effects on sensors, 
bolted connections, fatigue 
5 2 7 
Balancing of components before 
and after  assembly 
 
Subsea HPU 
electric motor 
Electric energy 
4
0
2 
changes in pressure level, pump 
condition, motor bearings etc. 
Change in drawn current by the 
motor 
5 1 6 
Current monitoring may give a 
good indication of component 
condition and help in planning of 
preventive maintenance. 
Historical data should be saved for 
trend analysis.  
 
Subsea HPU 
electric motor 
Electric energy 
4
0 
3 
Startup current  at o rpm is high Overload of electric components 5 1 6 Take into consideration in design  
Subsea HPU 
electric motor 
Thermal energy 
4
0
4 
When in use, the motor will 
produce thermal energy 
Thermal energy build up 
degrades mechanical properties 
of component materials, built in 
lubrication etc.  
5 1 6 
Look at thermal build up in design, 
increase surface area  or use 
forced convection  
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Subsea HPU 
pump unit 
Cavitasion  
4
0
5 
Low pressure on suction side or at 
any location in the fluid path 
inside the pump 
Cavitation, air bubbles and 
sponge effect on system as 
hydraulic fluid bulk module 
changes  
5 1 6 
Simulations and practical tests 
must be done under real 
operational conditions within 
operational limitations.  
 
 Hydraulic fluid Thermal energy 
4
0
6 
Subsea mounted HPU will 
discharge hydraulic fluid with a 
high pressure increase, this will 
increase the fluid temperature  
Viscosity changes, loss of fluid 
properties/additives. Increased 
wear and tear on components, 
leaks to environment, increased 
maintenance cost  
5 2 7 
Heat exchanger must be 
introduced in circuit, sensors to 
monitor hydraulic temperature in 
different operations to control 
energy level in fluid.  
 
Hydraulic fluid 
filter 
contamination 
4
0
7 
Particles clogs the filter  
More work must be done to 
push the fluid across the 
filterhigh pressure difference 
and chance for lower pressure 
on suction side of HPU. 
5 1 6 
Differential pressure should be 
monitored above the filter 
element. This will give an 
indication of component condition 
and help in planning of preventive 
maintenance. 
 
Hydraulic fluid Volume control 
7
0
8 
Leak to environment somewhere 
in the system 
Environmental contamination, 
loss of hydraulic fluid.  
3 2 5 
Hydraulic Volume should be 
monitored closely. Small leaks 
should be discovered. Level alarms 
should be implemented.   
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Subsea HPU 
electric motor 
Electro magnethic 
phenomena 
4
0
9 
When powered, the motor will 
expose the nearby component 
with a small magnetic field 
Might affect 
components/sensors to give 
faulty readings/signals 
5 1 6 
Must be addressed when detail 
engineering is undertaken 
 
Subsea HPU 
pump unit 
Moving parts 
4
1
0 
Wear in components and 
bearings/bushings due to 
movements and rotation creates 
unbalanced, unaligned 
components 
Rapid worsening of component , 
reduction in operational 
reliability  
5 1 6 
The change in vibrational pattern 
can be detected using 
accelerometers and trends can be 
analyzed. This will be the basis in 
preventive maintenance changes 
and planning.  
 
Subsea hydraulic 
filter 
Component quality  
4
1
1 
Wrong filter grade/design is 
installed under preventive, 
corrective  or planned 
maintenance 
Filter will not performed as 
intended by designers 
3 1 4 
Include in procedures that filter 
grade/design is double checked. 
Choose filter design so that no 
other grade fits filter housing.  
 
Hydraulic 
reservoir 
Contamination  
4
1
2 
Water in oil based hydraulic fluid Loss of fluid properties 3 1 4 
Drain plug in system for water 
settling and drainage. Under 
corrective  maintenance 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Hydraulic fluid Contamination 
4
1
3 
Wear on components give rise to 
metal particles in hydraulic fluid 
Increases wear in seal surfaces 
in pump, valves and in 
actuators.  
5 1 6 
Use magnetic sensors to build op 
historical trends on magnetic 
particle content. 
 
Hydraulic fluid Contamination 
4
1
4 
Wear on components give rise to 
metal particles in hydraulic fluid. 
Metal is not magnetic 
Increases wear in seal surfaces 
in pump, valves and in 
actuators.  
2 1 3 
Optical or other sensor design to 
be used. ROV retrieval of hydraulic 
fluid  test  can be used 
 
Subsea HPU 
pump unit 
foreign objects 
4
1
5 
Bolts, fabric, gloves, nuts etc. are 
left behind after maintenance 
intervention   
Damage to valves, pump unit, 
complete breakdown.  
3 2 5 
Introduce mechanical strainer (low 
pressure drop) on suction side of 
pump. Visual checklist inspection 
after maintenance intervention.  
 
HPU setup Faulty component 
4
1
6 
Breakdown of complete subsea 
HPU 
No pressure delivered to users 3 2 5 
Consider redundant HPU setup 
with shuttle valve 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
HPU setup 
Hydraulic volumetric 
capacaty 
4
1
7 
Several hydraulic users are run at 
the same time 
HPU cannot deliver required 
volumetric capacity, reduced 
pressures and prolonged 
sequence times.  
5 1 6 
Built in prioritizing of users and 
limits on how many commands 
are being executed at one time to 
guarantee fluid deliverance.  Set 
up accumulators after HPU to 
have energy buffer.  
 
  
4
1
8 
       
  
4
1
9 
       
  
4
2
0 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Acoustic 
communication 
Shadow effects 
5
0
0 
Transducer on vessel or subsea is 
located in a shadow zone from the 
riser and/or other components  
Signal disturbance 5 1 6 
Use multiple subsea 
trancducers.Place transducers on 
arms that are expanded by ROV  
 
Acoustic 
communication 
Signal refraction 
5
0
1 
In a vessel drift off situation on 
ultra-deep waters, the acoustic 
signal might be twisted as is 
crosses temperature layers in the 
water column 
Signal disturbance 5 1 6   
Acoustic 
communication 
Signal delay 
5
0
2 
Time from signal is sent to it 
reaches the recipient is governed 
by the sound speed in water 
Signal delay 5 2 7 Sequential control of  the SIR   
transducers Air bubbles 
5
0
3 
Air bubbles are present on the 
vessel transducer 
Signal disturbance 1 1 2 
Lowering of transducer to deeper 
waters, redesign so that bubbles 
cannot be trapped on transducer.  
 
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Andreas Djupesland 
 
 
LV 
 
 
System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Acoustic 
comunication 
Bandwidth 
5
0
4 
Little bandwidth is accessible on 
deeper waters, 1Kb/s at 4000 
meters 
Restrictions on information sent 
to vessel 
5 2 7 
Modification of communication 
protocol or system design.  
 
Acoustic 
comunication 
Signal speed 
5
0
5 
Rapid escalating undesired event 
arise subsea, signal sent from SIR 
but takes time to reach operator 
on vessel 
The operation can be beyond 
the point of no return before 
the operator on the vessel is 
made aware of it. Damages to 
SIR, FJ, DP and possible BOP.  
5 3 8 
Automatic operational limitations 
within the SIR control module 
Not acceptable RIN # 
SCU-34 module 
Component fault 
5
0
6 
Electronic component fault in 
control module 
Operational failure 2 1 3 
Introduce inherent redundancy in 
electronic circuits  
Already in design 
Signal cable Component fault 
5
0
7 
Cable from SCU to transducer is 
faulty  
Loss of communication with 
transducer 
2 1 3 
Fallback on already redundant 
transducer 
In place on existing system 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Signal cable Component fault 
5
0
8 
Failure in Cable from SCU to SIR 
SCM  
Loss of communication 1 2 3 
2 communication cables to be laid 
out 
 
Electric  cable Component fault 
5
0
9 
Electric power cable to SCU-32 
fault  
Loss of electric power 1 2 3 2 electric cables to be laid out  
Cable seals Component fault 
5
1
0 
Leak over cable seals 
Equipment failure due to water 
contamination of components 
1 2 3 
Use cable stabs imbedded in the 
water barrier.  
 
Transducer  Component fault 
5
1
1 
Subsea transducer failure Loss of communication 3 1 4 
Fallback on secondary redundant 
transducer 
 
NTNU  
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
Department of Marine Technology  
  Andreas Djupesland 
 
 
LVII 
 
 
System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Transducer  Component fault 
5
1
2 
Vessel transducer failure Loss of communication 2 2 4 
Introduce secondary transducer 
on vessel for redundancy  
 
Acoustic 
comunication 
noise 
5
1
3 
External activity introduces large 
amount of noise 
Loss of communication with SIR 1 2 3 
Take into consideration when 
planning head, procedures to be 
implemented 
 
  
5
1
4 
       
  
5
1
5 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Umbilical Work over open sea 
6
0
1 
Extra clamps required to install 
cable while running riser joints 
Additional work in heights over 
open  sea 
5 1 6   
Umbilical Component wear 
6
0
2 
Flexible umbilical comes in contact 
with components while kept 
dynamic by current or other 
similar forces.  
Wear on umbilicals, failure of 
umbilical barrier, los of 
operational 
comunication/control.  
1 1 2 
Fixate umbilical with the right 
spacing between clamps.  
 
Hydraulic 
conduit 
Hydraulic fluid 
6
0
3 
Time lag is introduced as the 
conduit must be pressurized 
Precise control of SIR is difficult 
without design changes 
5 1 6 
Introduce large enough 
accumulator bank subsea  
 
Accumulators Forces 
6
0
4 
Needed accumulator bank size 
introduces weight on subsea stack 
Increase forces in subsea stack 
and wellhead.  
5 2 7 
Keep accumulator bank size to a 
minimum 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Umbilical Forces 
6
0
5 
Weight of submerged umbilical  
Must be compensated by riser 
tensioner. Depending on riser 
tensioner system capacity, this 
can reduce the liftoff capacaty 
5 1 6 Increase riser tensioner capacity.   
Accumulators Forces 
6
0
6 
Weight of accumulator bank 
Must be compensated by riser 
tensioner. Depending on riser 
tensioner system capacity, this 
can reduce the liftoff capacaty 
5 1 6 Increase riser tensioner capacity.   
Hose reels Forces 
6
0
7 
Weight of hose reels   Reduced vessel stability 5 1 6 
Must be compensated by a 
reduction in variable deck load  
 
Umbilical 
connection  
leak 
6
0
8 
Leak in transition between 
umbilical and SIR control pod 
Ingress of water in system, leak 
of hydraulic fluid to enviroment. 
Operational stop 
2 2 4 
Use similar technology as seen in 
BOP systems with stingers. Reduce 
the number of transitions.  
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Reacharge of 
energy subsea 
Weather 
7
0
1 
Wave heave over operational 
limitations in splash zone 
ROV cannot be launched  5 1 6 
Planning ahead and using good 
weather to charge accumulators 
or batteries 
 
Stab operation Leak 
7
0
2 
Leak is present while recharging 
accumulators 
Water ingress in hydraulic fluid, 
environmental spill. Deration of 
machinery performance 
2 1 3   
Stab operation forces 
7
0
3 
Current, heave or other forces are 
present while undertaking ROV 
operations 
makes it demanding to use the 
stab function to connect the 
ROV tools to the SIR 
intervention panel. 
3 1 4 
Land and latch ROV on dedicated 
intervention platform on SIR pup 
joint 
 
Stab operation  
7
0
4 
Damaged stab seal while latching 
on to female receptacle on ROV 
platform 
Leak in stab ref # 702 2 1 3   
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
ROV landing 
platform 
Forces 
7
0
5 
Weight of additional landing 
platform  
Must be compensated by riser 
tension system  
5 1 6 Increase riser tensioner capacity.  
ROV landing 
platform 
Forces 
7
0
6 
Increased current drag forces 
Increase in horizontal forces in 
bop stack , taken up as a 
moment in the wellhead 
5 1 6 
minimize  the drag forces of the 
platform 
 
  
7
0
7 
       
  
7
0
8 
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activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
Electrical cables 
from control pod 
on LMRP to SIR 
subsea control 
module(SCM) 
Electric energy 
8
0
1 
Cable wear due to angular 
movement degrades isulation 
Short-circuit of cable  2 2 4 
Fuse in MUX control pod to ensure 
that the error does not propagate 
to BOP control system 
 
SIR SCM Electric energy 
8
0
2 
Malfunction in electric/tonic 
components leads to short circuit 
Loss of control of SIR, possible 
effect on BOP control system, 
well control issues 
1 5 6 
Fuse in SIR SCM/BOP control pod. 
All mitigating measures must be 
used to reduce the effects on BOP 
control system 
 
Electric 
connectors  
Electric energy 
8
0
3 
Leak in connector seal 
short circuit, loss of control of 
SIR, possible effect on BOP 
control system, well control 
issues 
1 5 6 
Fuse in BOP control pod. all 
mitigating measures must be used 
to reduce the effects on BOP 
control system 
 
BOP control pos Electric energy 
8
0
4 
Additional components in control 
pods increases chance of error  
May create operational 
deviations in BOP control pod, 
loss of one control pod 
3 2 5 
Keep additional components in 
BOP control pod to a minimum 
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System 
activity/eleme
nt 
Hazard 
R
e
f.
# 
cause/triggering event Effect 
Risk 
corrective measures comment 
Freq. 
Cons
eque
nce 
RIN 
BOP control pos Electric energy 
8
0
5 
Additional components in control 
pods increases chance of error  
May create operational 
deviations in BOP control pod, 
loss of both  control pod 
1 5 6 
Keep additional components in 
BOP control pod to a minimum, 
only use the additional 
components on one of the control 
pods.  
 
Communication Congestion  
8
0
6 
All the sensors, data logs and real-
time info is transferred over the 
same info carrier as the BOP 
control signals 
Bandwidth can be exceeded on 
the information carrier 
1 5 6 
Priority should be given to BOP 
control system information, safety 
critical info. Hierarchy system 
must be implemented 
 
Topside 
components 
Component fault  
8
0
7 
The BOP control topside 
equipment will have additional 
components in connection with 
the introduction with the SHFW 
Component fault propagates in 
the system with the effect of 
reduced operational possibility 
of the MUX control system  
1 4 5 
Design so that faults in the 
additional system does not affect 
any other parts of the BOP control 
system 
Has been done historically with 
the use and control of cameras, 
additional sensors. Ref API 16 D, 
section 5.6.5   
  
8
0
8 
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Enclosed on CD: 
PDF file of this master thesis 
Excel file containing the rating of the different concepts, reference is made to Section 7.3.1 
